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 My dissertation analyzes visual propaganda produced by the United States 
government for four distinct audiences (German soldiers, German civilians, American 
soldiers, and American civilians) in the liminal period from the last phases of World War 
II to the early stages of the Cold War (1944-1949). I argue that photographs were 
employed as tools of warfare and diplomacy to rebrand Germany during its transition 
from enemy to ally. In order to do so, I compare previously censored and unpublished 
U.S. Army Signal Corps photographs from the National Archives Records 
Administration with images published in Heute, an American government-sponsored 
German-language picture magazine for German civilians; Army Talks, a U.S. Army 
magazine for American GIs serving in occupied Germany; Allied Psychological Warfare 
Division leaflets for German soldiers; and Life, a commercial magazine for American 
civilians on the home front. While the term propaganda often has an insidious 
connotation, implying disinformation, American propagandists employed Archibald 
MacLeish’s "strategy of truth," carefully choosing which images and information to share 
with given audiences. Critical examination of the photographs and texts featured in and 
 
 vii 
omitted from these publications reveals how images were edited, censored, and 
transnationally disseminated to support a carefully constructed and continuously evolving 
picture of German-American relations.  
 My study comprises three chapters, each focusing on how subjects frequently 
portrayed in American propaganda were reframed for German and American readers 
during this five-year period as policy aims shifted. The first chapter examines how Signal 
Corps photographs of German prisoners-of-war were used to encourage German 
surrender in the war’s last year and to buoy the spread of postwar democracy. The 
concentration camp and war crimes trials photographs studied in chapter two demonstrate 
the American government’s use of photography to bring Nazi atrocities to light and to 
showcase democratic judicial processes. The third chapter analyzes photographs and 
cartoons of German women and children, which encouraged American soldiers first to 
fear and later to befriend their former enemies. Together these three case studies show 
how the government used photographs, and what I term a strategy of selective truth, to 
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Introduction 
 
 We have agreed to call this destruction victory. But only as this view of our 
 triumph recedes will the real demands of victory become clear.  
 — Life magazine, May 14, 1945 
 
 At the end of World War II in Europe, a looming question at the top of Life 
magazine editors’ minds, was what would become of the German people after the war? If 
the American government had plans for them, Life complained, they certainly had not yet 
informed the American people.1 Knowing only that postwar Germany would be 
subdivided into four zones of occupation—American, British, Soviet, and French—Life 
proposed its own agenda. In an article titled “The German People,” published May 7, 
1945, the day Germany signed unconditional surrender in Reims, France, Time-Life 
correspondent Percy Knauth suggested that with the Allied victory, the American 
government assumed a moral responsibility to rehabilitate Germany and its citizens. In 
addition to assistance with food and shelter amidst widespread ruins and devastation, 
Knauth mentioned German women and Hitler Youth as being particularly in need of 
Allied re-education. They are “our problem, and the world’s,” he paternalistically 
declared.2  
 The accompanying photograph by Life photographer William Vandivert, 
published on the cover of this issue, shows the Germans as a defeated people. It depicts 
three German men—two young and one older—staring at the camera (Fig. 0.1). Though 
their expressions are stern, the young man in the foreground appears bruised and battered 
with one hand clumsily wrapped in gauze and the other arm suspended in a makeshift 
                                                
1 “The End of the War in Europe,” Life, May 7, 1945, 30.  
2 Percy Knauth, “The German People,” Life, 76. 
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sling fashioned from a scarf. During the war, German men were seldom pictured out of 
uniform, but these men wear tattered shirts and overcoats. 3 They were likely members of 
the Volkssturm, Hitler’s national militia, which German men ages sixteen to sixty were 
required to join if they were not already enlisted. However, the magazine does not 
mention the Volkssturm and instead refers to the three men as “civilians,” inviting a more 
sympathetic reading of the cover image.4 While the commercial magazine focused on 
Germany’s reconstruction and rehabilitation, United States government publications for 
American soldiers and German civilians did not follow the same course.   
 Army Talks, a restricted weekly publication intended for American soldiers 
serving in the European Theater, took a more hardline approach. The May 1, 1945, issue 
outlined a postwar policy plan that called for a complete dismantling of Germany and 
Japan in order to ensure future peace. With a headline that simplistically declared: “The 
same damn thing!,” the back cover of this Army Talks issue paired two photographs that 
equated the German and Japanese enemies to remind American soldiers that the war was 
still ongoing (Fig. 0.2).5 The photographs show the back of a German crowd in an open-
                                                
3 The Volkssturm was founded on September 25, 1944. David K. Yelton, Hitler's 
Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945 (Kansas: University of 
Kansas, 2002), 7. 
4 The extended caption for this photograph, printed inside the issue says: “The faces of 
these three German civilians show they know at first hand the bitterness of defeat. For 84 
hours they huddled with 7,000 others in a mine slag pile while Allied bombs wrecked 
Wehofen. They tried to hoist a white flag, and their troops Tommy-gunned them. These 
faces are unhappy but hard and arrogant. Not yet have these Germans…been forced to 
see the atrocities committed in their name.” This text further distinguishes the three men 
pictured from the unrelenting Nazi troops, who shot at their own countrymen until the 
bitter end. It implies that they were bystanders, or even victims, rather than participants in 
the war. “Life’s cover,” Life, May 7, 1945, 22. 
5 Army Talks, May 1, 1945, back cover. 
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air theater, with arms extended in a Hitler salute, and a group of Japanese people, bowing 
to a shrine. Unlike Life, which portrayed Germans as individuals to elicit compassion, 
Army Talks framed the enemy as faceless participants who performed foreign rituals with 
a dangerous mob mentality. After the war in Europe ended in May 1945, Army Talks 
insisted that American soldiers had to continue to be firm with the Germans, or else risk 
the enemy rising again to start the third world war of the century.6  
 The German people were portrayed differently yet again in American propaganda 
for German civilians. Immediately following V-E Day, the aim of American government 
propaganda for German audiences was to “deepen the mood of passive acquiescence” to 
Allied authorities and “arous[e] a sense of collective responsibility” for the war and Nazi 
war crimes.7 To achieve this goal, the opening photograph of an American government 
pamphlet for German civilians, titled KZ: A Picture Report of Five Concentration Camps 
(1945), shows German citizens on an Allied forced tour of Buchenwald. As in the Army 
Talks photograph, the Germans have their backs to the camera, erasing the differences 
between them (Fig. 0.3). Across from them, American officials stand on higher ground, 
with hands on hips, exuding control. The composition of this image emphasized the 
power dynamic between the victors and the defeated. At the right of the frame, a truck is 
piled with emaciated corpses. By picturing German civilians in the same frame as the 
concentration camp victims, the Germans become visually implicated in the crime. While 
                                                
6 “Five Points of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Army Talks, n.p. (no page numbers in early 
issues). 
7 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Psychological Warfare Division 
(SHAEF PWD), Directive no. 1 for Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information 
Service, May 1945, 1.  
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Life described Germans as in need of Allied assistance and Army Talks called for the 
complete dismantling of Germany, the text of KZ exerted Allied authority and sharply 
confirmed Germany’s enemy status, concluding, “Here you see why we can not be your 
friends.”8 These KZ, Life, and Army Talks stories demonstrate the ways in which the 
German people were framed differently for the American home front, American soldiers, 
and German civilians at the end of the war.  
 This dissertation charts the trajectory of portrayals of the German people in visual 
propaganda produced by the American government for four distinct audiences (German 
soldiers, German civilians, American soldiers, and the American public) in the liminal 
period from the last phases of World War II to the early stages of the Cold War (1944-
1949). My study examines photo-illustrated leaflets, pamphlets, and magazines such as 
Army Talks and Heute (Today), a postwar American-government picture magazine for 
German civilians. These materials frequently featured stories about German prisoners-of-
war, Nazi war crimes, and German civilians (particularly women and children). In three 
chapters, I analyze how these subjects were continuously reframed for German and 
American readers during this period as American propaganda policies shifted. Critical 
examination of the photographs both featured in and omitted from American government 
propaganda publications reveals how images were edited and censored to support a 
carefully constructed and continuously evolving picture of German and American 
relations in the final stages of World War II and the immediate postwar period. My 
                                                
8 KZ is quoting Colonel Hayden Sears, Fourth Armored Division, who delivered a short 
speech to the Germans on a forced tour of Ohdruf concentration camp. “Hier sehen Sie, 
warum wir nicht Ihre Freunde sein können.” KZ; Bildbericht Aus Fünf 
Konzentrationslagern (Amerikanisches Kriegsinformationsamt, 1945), n.p.  
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dissertation argues that the American government employed photographs as tools of 
warfare and diplomacy to negotiate Germany’s transition from enemy to potential ally 
against the Soviets.   
 While past scholarship on American propaganda in World War II and the Cold 
War has focused on materials created for audiences within the United States, my study 
employs a social-historical approach in examining the transatlantic political contexts in 
which American photo-illustrated propaganda was disseminated in Germany in the 
transitional period between the conflicts. This comparative study of propaganda for 
varying audiences across geographic boundaries illuminates how the American 
government used photography and the strategy of selective truth to shape American 
public opinion about Germans and German perceptions of Americans. 
 This study breaks new ground for its in-depth visual analysis of Heute, Army 
Talks, and Allied Psychological Warfare Division materials (like KZ), which warrant 
critical attention for their integral use of photography in promoting evolving policy aims. 
Though not a focus of this dissertation, Life magazine is referenced throughout as a 
useful counterpoint, elucidating how Germans were framed for the American public by 
the commercial press, rather than by the government.9 Marking a new contribution to the 
history of photography, this dissertation comparatively analyzes photographs published in 
Life, Army Talks, Heute, and Psychological Warfare Division materials with previously 
censored and unpublished U.S. Army Signal Corps photographs mined from the National 
                                                
9 Although Life often operated in conjunction with the American government, it was an 
independent publication that reflects, above all, the viewpoint of founder Henry Luce and 
his editorial staff. For more on Henry Luce and Life see: Loudon Wainwright, The Great 
American Magazine: An inside History of Life (New York: Knopf, 1986).  
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Archives Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. Through this 
historical study, my project raises critical awareness about government and media use of 
selective images and information to influence international relations, a practice which 
continues today. It also demonstrates how this strategy of selective truth was shaped by 
the legacy of Nazi propaganda and latent Cold War tensions. While the term propaganda 
often has an insidious connotation, implying disinformation, this dissertation instead 
demonstrates that it is a much more multi-faceted, subtly nuanced, and self-conscious 
form of political discourse. 
 
Photography, Propaganda, and a Strategy of Truth  
 Photography played a key role in both American and Nazi propaganda during 
World War II. In the context of this dissertation, propaganda is best understood as a 
government tool of mass communication that employs text and images to “persuade a 
given audience to a given end.”10 The term propaganda came into its modern usage and 
gained its pejorative connotation in the First World War.11 Many Americans believed that 
reports of German barbarism in Belgium in 1914 had been exaggerated to draw the 
                                                
10 Daniel Lerner and R.H. S. Crossman. Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany: 
The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1971), 5.  
11 Though the history of propaganda traces back to ancient Greece, the word propaganda, 
from the Latin propagare, to propagate or spread the word came into use in the Counter-
Reformation in the 1620s. It maintained a religious connotation, meaning to persuade 
others to the “rightness of a cause” through 1911. In World War I, the British set up a 
Department of Enemy Propaganda and by the end of the war, propaganda was widely 
associated with atrocities and disinformation. Susan Tegel, Nazis and the Cinema (New 
York: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 12. See also: Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the 
Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era (Manchester 
University Press, 2003).  
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United States into the war. And there was widespread belief among Germans that it was 
propaganda and not efforts on the battlefield that cost them World War I.12 In the Great 
War propaganda relied heavily on text and illustrations because photography at the time 
was limited by its technologies and strict censorship policies.13   
 However, in the interwar period, photo-illustrated press publications burgeoned in 
the United States and Germany following advancements in the printing press and the 
invention of faster and smaller cameras in the 1920s. In Germany, with the proliferation 
of photo-illustrated newspapers and magazines such as the Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung 
and Münchner Illustrierte Presse, Germans became “photo-mad.”14 Photography was a 
symbol of modernity, and like modernity, it was greeted with both enthusiasm and 
skepticism in the Weimar period.15 In the United States, the popularity of picture 
magazines such as Life (founded in 1936), which used photo-essays as primary carriers 
for narratives, skyrocketed. Seeking to appeal to contemporary audiences, both American 
and Nazi propagandists employed this popular new medium to propagate their messages. 
 Seizing on photography as a tool to persuade and excite the masses, in 1933 
Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda during the Nazi regime (1933-1945), 
declared, “we believe in the objectivity of the camera and are skeptical of anything 
                                                
12 Tegel, Nazis and Cinema, 9-11. Nicoletta F. Gullace, “Allied Propaganda and World 
War I: Interwar Legacies, Media Studies, and the Politics of War Guilt,” History 
Compass 9/9 (2011): 686. In her article, Gullace provides an astute account of the 
interwar scholarship about the harmful and duplicitous nature of propaganda. 
13 For more on photography censorship in World War I see: Susan Moeller, Shooting 
War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat (New York: Basic Books, 
1989).   
14 Andrés Mario Zervigón, Photography and Germany (London: Reaktion Books, 2017), 
118. 
15 Ibid.  
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mediated aurally or in type.”16 This statement privileged photography as a more trusted 
medium than speech or text. But Nazi propagandists also knowingly abused and 
exploited photography’s credibility by staging photographs and using misleading 
captions to deceive German and international audiences. On their home front, Nazi 
propagandists produced a range of print materials, including posters, bulletins, photo 
books, and picture magazines to further their agendas—buoying the pageantry of the 
Third Reich, promoting Hitler, compelling German citizens to join and serve the NSDAP 
(Nazi Party), and denigrating any perceived enemies.17  
 Additionally, the German Wehrmacht’s Propaganda Department produced Signal 
(1940-1945), which was a large-format, twice-monthly picture magazine closely modeled 
after Life (Fig 0.4). Both Allied and Axis propagandists used this popular style to attract 
international audiences. With a peak circulation of 2.5 million copies per issue, Signal 
was printed in twenty-languages and sold in both Nazi-occupied and neutral countries 
including France, Italy, Norway, Hungary, and Switzerland. The English-version was 
even available in the United States before America entered the war.18 Though roughly a 
quarter of each forty-eight-page issue was dedicated to war reportage and the promotion 
of the German military, the rest of the magazine largely masqueraded as more light-
                                                
16 As quoted in Zervigón, Photography and Germany, 131. 
17 For more information on the Nazi state use of photography see: Ibid., and Klaus 
Honnef, Rolf Sachsse, and Karin Thomas (eds.), German Photography 1870-1970: 
Power of a Medium (Cologne, Germany: DuMont, 1997).  
18 Signal was also available in: Belgium, Bohemia and Moravia, Croatia, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden, Serbia, Switzerland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the Channel Islands, 
and Ireland. Jeremy Harwood, Hitler’s War: World War II as portrayed by Signal the 
International Nazi Propaganda Magazine (Minneapolis, Zenith Press, 2014), 6.  
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hearted cultural content that often showed citizens enjoying daily life in Nazi-occupied 
countries. Called “the deadliest weapon in the vast Axis propaganda arsenal” by Life 
magazine in March 1943, Signal with its transatlantic reach and high production quality, 
unnerved American propagandists.19 
 To counteract Nazi propaganda, which employed exaggerations and falsities to 
wage a war on the mind, American propagandists employed a “strategy of truth,” first 
outlined by Archibald McLeish, Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, in a speech 
delivered to the Associated Press in 1942. It was believed that factual information could 
be propaganda’s most effective weapon. However, as Psychological Warfare Division 
Intelligence Office Daniel Lerner has explained, the strategy was not based on showing 
the “whole” truth nor was it “synonymous with honesty.”20 Rather, propagandists were 
selective about which truths to show and which to omit for a given audience.21 
Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the American approach as the strategy of selective 
truth—instead of simply the “strategy of truth”—in order to call attention to this careful 
editorial process, which propagandists used to influence, persuade, and sometimes even 
mislead Axis and Allied soldiers and civilians. Like the Germans, American 
propagandists further deployed photographs as visual facts and were similarly selective 
about which photographs to publish and which to censor. Though the Nazis had exploited 
photography’s credibility, American propagandists still thought that photographs could 
                                                
19 “U.S. is Losing the War on Words,” Life, March 22, 1943, 14.  
20 Lerner, Psychological Warfare, 26-27.  
21 Ibid. 
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be more readily believed than text, which Germans could easily dismiss as lies written by 
their enemy.  
 American propagandists employed this strategy of selective truth and photographs 
in publications for both home front and international audiences. Office of War 
Information (OWI) domestic propaganda posters and printed materials used carefully 
crafted images to boost national morale and mobilize citizens to participate in the war 
effort at home and abroad. From 1942 to 1945, the OWI Bureau of Overseas Publications 
published Victory for international audiences (Fig. 0.5). However, with a smaller 
circulation and lower production quality than Signal, Life deemed Victory a “pallid 
imitation” of the Nazi magazine and implored the American government to dedicate more 
resources and talent to their propaganda.22 This study does not attend to Victory or OWI 
domestic propaganda, since these materials have received previous scholarly attention.23 
 The American government expanded its production of propaganda for 
international audiences with the formation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF PWD) at the end of 1943. 
A joint British and American division, SHAEF PWD was led by American Brigadier 
General Robert A. McClure, who served at the command of General Dwight D. 
                                                
22 Ibid. 11. 
23 For an astute study of Office of War Information (OWI) print, posters, and paintings 
created for America audiences (1942 to 1945) see: Austin Porter, “Paper Bullets: The 
Office of War Information and American World War II Print Propaganda,” PhD. diss. 
(Boston University, 2013). For an analysis of OWI photography and Victory see: Jeanie 
Cooper Carson, “Interpreting National Identity in the Time of War: Competing Views in 
the U.S. Office of War Information,” Ph.D. diss. (Boston University, 1995). See also: 
Allan Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).  
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Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of SHAEF. PWD was a military division, 
which controlled all psychological warfare campaigns in Northwest Europe. It was 
supported by four civilian agencies: the OWI, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE), and the British Ministry of 
Information (MOI).24 The aims of PWD included waging psychological warfare against 
the enemy, maintaining morale of friendly nations occupied by the enemy, and 
controlling information services in Allied-occupied Germany.25 Deeping an 
understanding of the American wartime and postwar propaganda output, my dissertation 
includes new analyses of unexplored Psychological Warfare Division materials, such as 
KZ and an Allied aerial leaflet campaign for German soldiers in the last year of the war. 
  After the war ended, the Psychological Warfare Division was dissolved, and the 
newly formed Information Control Division of the Office of Military Government 
managed the production of postwar propaganda for German civilians.26 In the four zones 
of occupied Germany (American, French, British, and Soviet), each occupying 
government controlled its own press and cultural affairs. In addition to tightly regulating 
the German press through a licensing system, the American government published its 
own series of newspapers for German audiences as well as the picture magazine Heute 
                                                
24 For more information on the structure of the PWD see: Clayton D. Laurie, The 
Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade against Nazi Germany (Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1996), 188-189.  
25 Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 
“An account of its operations in the Western European Theater, 1944-1945” Appendix G: 
“Final Report on Leaflet Operation: Leaflets Operations in the Western European 
Theater,” prepared by Maj. Robert H. Garet, AC. (March 1951), 5. 
26 Robert McClure, who had headed the Psychological Warfare Division, also directed 
the Information Control Division.  
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(Today).27 Like its wartime predecessors, Signal and Victory, the postwar Heute was 
modeled directly after Life (Fig. 0.6).28 
  Heute was a German-language photo-illustrated magazine published twice 
monthly by the American occupying government from 1945 to 1951. The first issue was 
created in London in June 1945, but in October, Heute’s offices relocated to Bad 
Nauheim, Germany (north of Frankfurt), before settling at their permanent location in 
Munich in December 1945. In Germany, Heute’s eleven American and Allied editors 
added a staff of nine “trustworthy German civilians” as translators, secretaries, and 
reporters.29 The thirty-five-page magazine was printed in a rehabilitated Munich factory 
at 400,000 copies per issue and sold for fifty pfennigs.30 It circulated primarily in the 
                                                
27 See: Clare Flanagan, A Study of German Political-Cultural Periodicals from the Years 
of Allied Occupation, 1945-1949 (Lewiston, N.Y: E. Mellen Press, 2000) and Jessica C. 
E. Gienow-Hecht Transmission Impossible: American Journalism As Cultural Diplomacy 
in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 
28 Dimensions for the publications are as follows: Heute was 9.25 x 12 inches, Victory 
was 10 x 14 inches; Life was 10.5 x 14 inches; and Signal was a similarly sized 11x 14 
inches. 
29 Initially the magazine was written in English and translated into German but later 
Heute employed a smaller staff of two Americans and one Englishwoman, all of whom 
were fluent in German. The magazine was then written and edited in German, Heinz 
Norden (Heute Chief Editor), “The Development of Heute Policy” June 15, 1947, 4 RG 
260 box 247. “Narrative Report – Heute magazine,” 1-2, n.d. RG 260 box 247, NARA.  
30 The Munich factory formerly printed Völkischer Beobachter, a “prime Nazi 
mouthpiece.” “What is Heute?,” Heute, August 1, 1946, American digest, n.p. By 
comparison, as of 1941, Life magazine was 108 pages, sold for 10 cents (or $4.50 for a 
yearly subscription), and had a net paid circulation of 3,290,480 issues. Robert T Elson, 
Curtis Prendergast, and Geoffrey Colvin. Time Inc.; the Intimate History of a Publishing 
Enterprise Vol. I (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 449. 
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American zone of occupied Germany, and the magazine estimated that each copy, passed 
hand-to-hand, reached ten readers.31  
 While the first issue of Heute stressed collective guilt and the devastation wrought 
by war, once they were based in Germany, Heute editors quickly realized that such 
stringent material would not have popular appeal for its target audience of German 
civilians.32 The magazine began to present a more positive portrayal of life under 
American occupation and adopted a new aim “to give Germans a truthful picture of 
America, of the world, and of their own reconstruction.”33 Relying on photographs to tell 
the stories, typical issues by late 1945 featured photo-essays on current events, leisure 
culture, and life in America to impress readers with the benefits of democratic capitalism. 
The magazine, however, was selective about which truths to feature and how to frame 
them. Conditions in postwar Germany were dire, with rampant hunger and ubiquitous 
ruins. Heute touched on contemporary issues that plagued German civilians, but it 
presented a largely optimistic and airbrushed picture of postwar Germany, constructing a 
vision in which conditions were continuously improving and the American government 
was a benevolent and well-appreciated occupier. 
 In addition to materials for German audiences, the United States government also 
published propaganda magazines for American soldiers serving in the European Theater 
                                                
31 According to a 1949 survey, Heute was read by about 32% of people surveyed in cities 
over 100,000 in the American zone, Bremen, and Berlin. The report says this represents a 
doubling of their readership since 1947. “Readership of Heute” Opinion Surveys Branch, 
Information Services Division, OMGUS (Office of Military Governor United States), 
Germany, 2.   
32 “Narrative Report- Heute magazine,” 1. RG 260 Box 114, NARA. 
33 “Questions,” Heute, December 1, 1946, American digest n.p. 
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of Operations. From 1943 to 1946, the United States Army Information and Education 
Department published Army Talks, a weekly photo-illustrated magazine (Fig 0.2).34 The 
aim of Army Talks was to mentally prepare soldiers for battle, to educate them about the 
enemy, and to keep them updated about the progress of war and the postwar occupation 
mission.35 One issue was printed for every twenty-five men, and the magazine was 
intended as a pedagogical tool to facilitate an hour-long officer-led weekly discussion. In 
March 1946, I&E Bulletin (Information and Education) replaced Army Talks. The 
publications were nearly identical. However, I&E was geared more to the officer leading 
the weekly discussions, and it included quizzes to test the soldiers on materials presented. 
At eight-by-ten inches and fifteen pages per issue, Army Talks/I&E was smaller in format 
than Life or Heute.36 Unlike Life or Heute, which used photo-essays as primary carriers 
for narrative, Army Talks/I&E relied more on text and used copious photographs to 
illustrate and strengthen their messages.  
 Army Talks/I&E, Heute and Psychological Warfare Division materials employed 
images taken by military photographers in the Signal Corps, which was a multi-faceted 
branch of the U.S. Army responsible for communications. Additionally, Heute used 
photographs taken by its own reporters, international press agencies, and reproduced 
entire articles from magazines like Life. 37 The photographic and motion-picture units of 
                                                
34 The first issue of Army Talks is dated September 29, 1943.  
35 A memo dated August 29, 1943, detailing Army Talks mission was reproduced in Army 
Talks, May 3, 1944, 1.  
36 Life magazine was 10.5 x 14 inches and Heute is similarly sized at 9.25 x 12 inches. 
37 Heute began to publish photographer credits in issue 17, August 1, 1946 but 
photographers still were not easily identifiable because they are listed by last name only. 
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Signal Corps were responsible for documenting the war for the historical record, 
collecting photographic evidence to be used in the war crimes trial, and supplying images 
for use in government propaganda.38 During World War II, Signal Corps also provided 
fifty percent of all still pictures published in commercial American newspapers, 
magazines, and books.39  My study is the first to compare images published in Heute and 
Army Talks with unpublished and previously censored Signal Corps photographs held in 
NARA. 
 Signal Corps photographers shot alongside accredited civilian photographers in 
the field, but there were several differences between them. Unlike Office of War 
Information or press photographers, Signal Corps were armed soldiers. While press and 
civilian photographers came and went on short assignments, Signal Corps photographers 
traveled with Army divisions in a theater of war for longer durations. Signal Corps still 
and motion picture units were often composed of one officer and six photographers. 40 
The officer would receive assignments from various divisions such as the SHAEF Public 
Relations Division, and these sometimes included detailed shooting scripts. 41  In total, 
                                                                                                                                            
Before this, the sources for photographs in Heute are not listed. The Signal Corps 
Photographic Section was created in July 1917. Moeller, Shooting War, 111. 
38 SHAEF Public Relations Division, “Subject: Motion Pictures of Concentration 
Camps,” April 25, 1945, 1. RG331 Box 3 Entry S2, NARA.  
39 George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 
565.  
40 Ibid., 574.  
41 For example, the April 25, 1945 directive ordering coverage of concentration camps, 
mentioned above, included a twenty-six-item list of suggested subjects to photograph 
such as: entrance gates to camps, torture chambers, latrines, disposed property including 
shoes, close-ups of individuals, and graves, mass or individual. SHAEF Public Relations 
Division, “Motion Pictures of Concentration Camps.” This shooting script is a similar 
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there were approximately 2,259 men and 284 Signal Corps officers, far outnumbering the 
twenty-one Life photographers who covered the war globally.42 However, civilian Life 
photographers, like Margaret Bourke-White and George Rodger, received much of the 
fame and glory. While Signal Corps motion-picture units had well-known Hollywood 
directors in their ranks, such as Frank Capra and John Huston, the Signal Corps 
photographers did not receive the same recognition then nor have they garnered much 
scholarly attention since.43 As a matter of security, anonymity was imposed upon them, 
and to the chagrin of some Signal Corps still photographers, they were not credited in the 
period press and most remain unnamed today.44  
 Signal Corps photographs went through a multi-step editorial process. It began 
with the photographer, who decided what to include and exclude in the frame, but after 
exposure, the photographer had no authorial control over his images.45 In the European 
theater, exposed film was sent to Army Pictorial Service labs in London and Paris or 
directly to the Pentagon for processing. Still Picture Editors would review negatives and 
decide which to print. They would also write captions, and a Distribution Section would 
                                                                                                                                            
format to those produced by the well-known Roy Stryker who oversaw the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) and early OWI photographers. However, Signal Corps did not 
have a singular leader controlling the photographers’ output like Stryker.   
42 “Combat Photography,” Historical Section, Special Activities Branch, November 1946, 
16, 12. Moeller, Shooting War, 182.  
43 Capra headed a special motion picture unit and created seventeen films, including the 
renowned Why We Fight soldier orientation series. See: Thompson and Harris, Signal 
Corps, 556. 
44 For more on the anonymity of Signal Corps photographers see: Peter Maslowski, 
Armed with Cameras: The American Military Photographers of World War II (New 
York: Free Press, 1993), 26-31. 
45 FSA and OWI photographers also did not have much authorial control over their 
images after exposure.  
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fill requests from other departments.46 All Signal Corps and accredited civilian press 
photographs and captions had to pass through censors. From a pre-selected pool of 
images, Heute and Army Talks editors made crucial decisions, choosing which 
photographs to publish, how to arrange them in layouts, and what captions articles to 
include to guide readers to specific interpretations.   
 In addition to examining published photographs, this dissertation discusses 
unpublished and previously censored Signal Corps photographs. The comprehensive 
Signal Corps archive held at NARA is navigated through a physical library card catalog 
system through which one can find photographs registered by location, subject matter, or 
Army Division (Fig. 0.7). The verso of Signal Corps prints in NARA provide useful 
information not available in period press and propaganda, such as the approximate date 
the photograph was taken, the photographer’s credit when available (last name, first 
initial only), and captions from the photographer’s notes and the central office.47 Each 
print is also marked with a stamp identifying it as confidential or with the date of field 
censorship approval (Fig. 0.8a-b). Comparative analysis of unpublished and previously 
censored Signal Corps photographs with those published in Heute, Army Talks/I&E, Life, 
and Psychological Warfare materials illuminate the ways in which the events and subjects 
studied in this dissertation were edited and censored differently for German and 
American audiences to support sometimes competing agendas. 
 
                                                
46 “Combat Photography,” 131.Thompson, Signal Corps, 563.  
47 Because the photographers’ full names are not available, it is very difficult to ascertain 
their identities.  
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Periodization  
 This study traces the use of photography in American government propaganda 
created for German and American audiences between 1944 and 1949. Most studies on the 
American occupation of Germany span the period from the end of World War II in 1945 
to the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic in 1949. However, this study begins in 1944, in the last phases of World War II, 
because it is imperative to examine wartime propaganda—when Germany was still 
decisively the enemy—in order to demonstrate how American policy and propaganda 
shifted in the postwar period as Germany became a potential ally. Unlike past studies on 
the American occupation of Germany, this dissertation critically focuses on the vital role 
photography played in American propaganda as both German-American and Soviet-
American relations underwent a dramatic transition.  
 A brief historical overview of this period illuminates the social and political 
contexts in which American propaganda was produced and disseminated. My dissertation 
begins with the Allied landings on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day (June 6, 1944), 
which marked the beginning of the end of the war and initiated the Allied liberation of 
Western Europe. Seeking to hasten Germany’s unconditional surrender following D-Day, 
the recently formed Allied Psychological Warfare Division deployed an aerial leaflet 
campaign for German soldiers. Leaflets included photographs of German prisoners-of-
war in Allied-run POWs camps in order to reassure soldiers that they, too, would be well 
treated if they surrendered. When American troops first entered Germany in September 
1944, they were forbidden from fraternizing with German civilians, including women and 
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children. Propaganda magazines and posters produced by the American government for 
GIs used photographs and hyper-sexualized cartoons of German women to show the 
dangers of consorting with the enemy.48  
 At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Big Three—President Roosevelt, 
Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin—agreed that postwar Germany 
would be divided into four zones of occupation (American, British, Soviet, and French).  
At the subsequent Potsdam conference, the Allied governments settled on an overall 
strategy that included disarming and demilitarizing Germany, dissolving the Nazi Party 
and all affiliated institutions, and punishing war criminals. However, each occupying 
government was responsible for carrying out these aims in its own zone and governed its 
own cultural, political, and economic affairs.49   
 After the war ended in the European theater on V-E Day (May 8, 1945), President 
Truman approved JCS 1067 (Joint Chiefs of Staff), the initial policy directive for the 
American military government in Germany.50 It took a firm approach, prohibiting 
American aid for reconstruction and imposing a strict denazification program (which 
                                                
48 The policy defined fraternization as: “the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon 
terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in 
official or unofficial dealings.” Joseph R. Starr, “Fraternization with Germans in World 
War II,” Office of the Chief Historian, European Command (Frankfurt-Am-Main, 
Germany, 1947), 16. 
49 The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945, Protocol of the 
Proceedings, August l, 1945. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, last accessed March 
11, 2018: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp  
50 For more on JC 1067 see: Zink, Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-
1955 (Princeton, N.J: Van Nostrand, 1957), 93-95. For full text of JC 1067 see: 
“Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany; April 1945,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, 
last accessed March 11, 2018: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ger02.asp 
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would remove anyone “nominal[ly]” affiliated with the Nazi party from any positions of 
influence, such as public office, press, and education).51 The American government 
would help prevent starvation in order to stave off civil unrest, but ultimately, Germans 
were to provide for themselves. The U.S. government knew that living conditions in 
occupied Germany would be difficult but JSC 1067 declared that Germans should be 
made to realize that “Germany's ruthless warfare...destroyed the German economy and 
made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility 
for what they have brought upon themselves.”52 In the initial months after V-E Day, the 
American government also sought to stimulate a sense of German collective guilt for 
Nazi war crimes. The Psychological Warfare Division released pamphlets (like KZ) and 
posters with photographs of Nazi concentration camp photographs in order to force 
German civilians to confront the atrocities (Fig. 0.3).  
 But by the late summer and early fall 1945, the weight of the United States’ 
responsibilities in Germany began to set in. Food became the most critical problem of the 
occupation. Much of the agricultural infrastructure had been destroyed by the war, and 
there were food shortages across Europe. In addition to the German civilian population, a 
massive influx of displaced persons, refugees, and expellees flooded from eastern 
territories formerly occupied by Germany into western Germany, and they, too, needed to 
be fed.53 Moreover, much of the housing stock in Germany had been destroyed by Allied 
                                                
51 Ibid. For more on denazification see: Zink, The United States in Germany, 156-168.  
52 “Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation.” 
53 Zink, The United States in Germany, 293-303. See also: James F. Tent, “Food 
Shortages in Germany and Europe, 1945-1948” in Eisenhower and the German POWs: 
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air raids. Homelessness was widespread, fuel and heat were limited, and American 
officials worried that winters would be bitterly cold.54 In addition to facing serious 
challenges involved in maintaining survivable standards of living, the U.S. government 
had a long-term goal of democratizing occupied Germany. However, as Byron Price, 
former Director of the Office of Censorship, articulated in a report to President Truman 
in the fall of 1945: “We can win converts to democracy only if we again find a way of 
instilling hope.”55 Consequently, propaganda for German audiences ceased its message of 
German collective guilt, in order to avoid antagonizing the occupied population. 
Furthermore, American postwar propaganda for German and American audiences used 
photographic coverage of the Nuremberg Trials (November 1945-October 1946) to shift 
public attention to the democratic process and to the criminal guilt and punishment of top 
Nazi Party leaders as opposed to all German civilians. 
 In 1946, tensions with the Soviets mounted. Relations between the United States 
and Soviet Union became strained after World War II ended, but as eminent Cold War 
historian John Gaddis has explained, in late February and early March 1946, there was a 
                                                                                                                                            
Facts against Falsehood, eds. Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 95-112. 
54 It is estimated that in cities over 100,000 residents an average of 45% of housing stock 
was lost. As a result, in Hamburg for example, nearly half the population was in turn left 
homeless. Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German 
Cities after World War II (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 11. By the end of the war about 
14 million Germans had lost their homes. Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the 
Woman: Memories of Germany's ‘Crisis Years’" and West German National Identity,” 
The American Historical Review, Vol. 101, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), 362. Byron Price, 
“Relations Between American Forces of Occupation and the German People: Report of 
the Byron Brice to the President,” The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII No. 336, 
December 2, 1945, 888. 
55 Ibid., 891. 
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fundamental downturn in Soviet-American relations. From then on, the Soviet Union was 
regarded “not as an estranged ally but as a potential enemy.”56 A series of events 
predicated this shift, including a speech delivered by Stalin in Moscow on February 9, 
1946, in which he implied that capitalism and communism could not peacefully co-exist. 
Subsequent speeches given by James Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, and 
Winston Churchill, then former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, brought 
American and British concerns about the Soviet Union to the public stage.57 Introduced 
by President Truman, Churchill delivered his now famous “Iron Curtain” speech in 
Missouri, on March 5, 1946, in which he declared that the Soviets were the next great 
enemy and Germany was at risk of falling to communism.58 
 As relations with the Soviets deteriorated, the American government dedicated 
increasing efforts and resources to improving German-American relations. In a stark 
departure from JCS 1067, Byrnes pledged American support for German reconstruction 
in his landmark “Speech of Hope,” delivered in Stuttgart, Germany, on September 6, 
1946.59 These speeches by Byrnes and Churchill serve as benchmarks in my chapters as 
they reflect turning points German- and Soviet-American affairs and also coincide with 
changes to American government propaganda strategies. In 1946, American propaganda 
                                                
56 John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 284.  
57 James Byrnes delivered a speech to the Overseas in New York, February 28, 1946. 
Ibid., 304-315, 299-300.  
58 Full text of Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace,” (March 5, 1946), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1946-03-05.pdf 
59 Zink, The United States in Germany, 95; Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 331. Full 
text of James Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, Restatement of Policy on 
Germany Stuttgart, September 6, 1946, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Germany, 
accessed March 11, 2018, https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm  
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for Germans audiences began to take on an increasingly positive tone. The United States 
government launched its German Youth Activities program in the American zone of 
occupied Germany, and photographs of German children learning to play baseball with 
GIs were published in propaganda publications for both German and American audiences 
as a means of fostering positive and cooperative relations. The American government 
also publicized its reeducation programs for German prisoners-of-war; essays on German 
POWs embracing democracy ran in Life magazine to rebrand the enemy and assure the 
American public that communism could be quelled. 
 In his Stuttgart speech, Byrnes had also called for the economic unification of 
Germany and declared that the German people should “now be given primary 
responsibility for running their own affairs.”60 On January 1, 1947, the American and 
British zones united, creating the “Bizone,” and in 1948, the initially reluctant France 
joined to form the “Trizone,” which would be regarded as the core of the future West 
German state. With the Marshall Plan (proposed in 1947 and implemented in 1948), the 
American government began to provide significant financial support for the economic 
recovery of Germany and Western Europe.61 The Soviets denounced the fusion of the 
Western zones and began interfering with traffic between West Germany and the Western 
                                                
60 Zink, The United States in Germany, 95. 
61 For the full text of George C. Marshall’s famed speech at Harvard University, June 5, 
1957, the George C. Marshall Foundation, accessed March 11, 2018,   
https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/6-077-speech-harvard-
university-alumni-june-5-1947/. For more on the Marshall Plan see also: Tony 
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 90-
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Allies’ zones of occupation in Berlin.62 On June 24, 1948, the Berlin Blockade began as 
the Soviets blocked off the delivery of goods to West Berlin. And, just two days later, the 
Western Allies organized the Berlin Airlift, which delivered relief supplies to West 
Berliners on a daily basis until September 1949. These highly publicized events have 
traditionally been read as signs of the opening of the Cold War.  
 During this period, the American government continued to promote German-
American relations in its propaganda for German audiences. Photographs of smiling 
civilians opening CARE packages were published to show that Germans welcomed 
American support. Heute also increasingly ran stories on life in America to promote 
democratic capitalism. Meanwhile, the American government continued to prosecute and 
execute 262 lower-ranking war criminals for acts committed in World War II. Although 
Army photographers carefully documented the Dachau Trials (1945-1947) and 
subsequent executions, the latter were censored from American press and propaganda for 
German and American audiences so as not to blemish the American government’s 
carefully polished picture of itself as a benevolent occupier. This dissertation highlights 
the five years from 1944 to 1949 as a period of dramatic transition with a focus in each 
respective chapter on the shifting portrayals of German prisoners-of-war, Nazi war 
crimes, and German civilians. As both German-American and Soviet-American relations 
shifted, the American government retooled its propaganda and its use of photography to 
fit evolving policy aims.   
 
                                                
62 Ibid., 124-126.  
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Theorizing Photography and Propaganda  
 Employing theories of latency, my study considers both what is absent and 
present on the pages of American press and propaganda created during World War II and 
the immediate postwar period. In “The Iconic Image of the Mushroom Cloud and the 
Cold War Nuclear Optic,” Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites write that victims of 
the atomic bombs dropped in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945 remain unseen in 
these mushroom cloud photographs.63 Similarly, images of the human suffering caused 
by Allied air raids were barred from circulation in the United States and Germany. 
Hariman and Lucaites also argue that the mushroom cloud “came to refer forward,” as 
the birth of the subsequent atomic age, “rather than backward to the atrocity it 
effected.”64 So too, American postwar propaganda in occupied Germany tended to look 
optimistically toward reconstruction rather than back at the destruction and violence of 
World War II. In After 1945: Latency as Origin of the Present, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 
describes latency as a residual Stimmung (mood or atmosphere) that permeated postwar 
Germany. Like a stowaway in a ship’s hull, he explains, the “resonances of the war” lay 
beneath the surface, but could not “be grasp[ed] or touch[ed].”65 So too, I argue that both 
the deep scars of World War II and the seeds of the Cold War are latent in American 
postwar press and propaganda. Although Heute often avoided overt discussions about the 
                                                
63 Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, “The Iconic Image of the Mushroom Cloud 
and the Cold War Nuclear Optic in Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis, ed. by 
Geoffrey Batchen, M Gidley, Nancy K. Miller, and Jay Prosser (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2012), 135.  
64 Ibid., 143.  
65 Hans U. Gumbrecht, After 1945: Latency as Origin of the Present (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), 23-24. 
 
  26 
causes and culpabilities of World War II and did not directly acknowledge rising tensions 
with the Soviets, these issues were always present, underlying the editorial decisions 
about which images to feature and which to omit from the magazine.   
 In addition to ideas of latency, theoretical discussions about discursive use of 
photography and representations of power inform this project. In The Burden of 
Representation, John Tagg argues that the “evidentiary value” of photography is not 
inherent to the mechanics of the medium, but rather was historically constructed by 
institutions.66 In the time period studied in this dissertation, Signal Corps photographers 
were instructed to take photographs of concentration camps, Nazi war criminals, German 
POWs, and German civilians to collect evidence and create historical records. However, 
as Tagg has written, “Photographs are never ‘evidence’ of history; they themselves are 
historical.”67 This dissertation thereby does not treat Signal Corps photographs as mere 
illustrations of historical subjects or as pure documentary records, but rather as 
instruments of power. In The Power of Photography: How Photographs Changed Our 
Lives, Vicki Goldberg argues that photographs shape our perception of the world and can 
be used as powerful tools of persuasion.68 So, too, the American government used 
photography in propaganda to reshape American perceptions of Germans, and German 
views of Americans.  
                                                
66 John Tagg, The Burden of Representation, (MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1988), 4.  
67 Ibid., 65.  
68 Vicki Goldberg, The Power of Photography: How Photographs Changed Our Lives 
(New York: Abbeville Press, 1991). 
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 In American government propaganda publications like Heute and Army Talks 
singular photographs were not presented in isolation; rather, they were sequenced in 
photo-essays and paired with text that instructed viewers how to read the image. In “The 
Photographic Message,” Roland Barthes argues that in photo advertisements or 
photojournalism the linguistic message (caption, label, and accompanying text) is in 
continuous communication with the photographic image. Further, he writes that the 
paradox of photography is that codes of connotation (produced by trick effects, syntax, 
pose, etc.) are always present in the photograph, yet photographs maintain a presumption 
of denoted, objective truth.69 With a semiological approach, Barthes labels these codes of 
connotation as signifiers and suggests that they should be read as cultural symbols. Heute 
repeatedly states that its aim is to present a “truthful picture” of American culture and 
postwar Germany, but the aim of this study is to analyze the codes of connotation and 
symbols laden in the photographs chosen for publication.70 Barthes further wrote that a 
photographic message was produced by “the source of emission” (the photographers), 
communicated through “a channel of transmission” (the magazines), and consumed by a 
“point of reception” (the audiences).71 With these three categories in mind, I analyze how 
American propaganda was constructed and transnationally disseminated to promote the 
government’s shifting agenda.  
                                                
69 Roland Barthes, “The Photographic Message,” in Image, Music, Text (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1977), 21, 17.  
70 “If This is Your First Copy of Heute,” September 1, 1946, American digest n.p. In 
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that had brief summaries of each article in English. 
71 Barthes, “The Photographic Message,” 15.  
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 Utilizing a social art history approach, I further analyze the transatlantic historical 
and political circumstances in which American propaganda was produced and 
disseminated in Germany. This methodology, which gained ground through publications 
like T. J. Clark’s The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848–1851, has 
been applied to several recent studies on subjects relevant to my dissertation.72 In The 
Third Reich, the Paris Exposition and the Cultural Seduction of France, Karen Fiss roots 
her discussion of the aesthetics of the German Pavilion in the 1937 World Fair in Paris in 
a complex study of German-Franco relations in the interwar period.73 Sarah James, in 
Common Ground: German Photographic Cultures Across the Iron Curtain, looks at 
shifts in cultural politics, German identity, and photography from the 1950s to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in the 1989.74 Stephanie Barron’s Art of Two Germanys—Cold War 
Cultures, similarly addresses questions of German identity and the ways in which 
political, cultural, and economic circumstances shaped artistic production in East and 
West Germany.75 As these three authors did, I investigate the political intricacies of a 
cross-cultural exchange of images. But while James and Barron deal with canonical and 
less-well known artists, I am instead focusing on the historical context in which 
photographs taken by often-uncredited U.S. Army photographers were produced and 
disseminated in the popular press and propaganda. 
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 My discussion of published and unpublished military photographs differs from 
previous scholarship, which tends to focus on the most iconic pictures from the war and 
the most frequently reproduced images of the Holocaust. Of the numerous publications 
on Holocaust photography and its relationship to trauma and collective memory, Barbie 
Zelizer’s Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera’s Eye is 
particularly useful for its comprehensive analysis of concentration camp photographs 
published in the American and British press in April and May 1945.76 While my study 
does not focus on the Holocaust, it includes new analysis of the ways in which the camps 
were depicted in American propaganda for German audiences. Susan Moeller’s Shooting 
War: Photography and The American Experience of Combat examines renowned 
photographs like Joe Rosenthal’s Old Glory Goes Up on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima 
(1945), but her work is most useful for its information on censorship policies and Signal 
Corps practices.77 Censorship in Life is also discussed in Erika Doss’s introduction to 
Looking at Life, but this anthology does not include any essays on Life stories about 
Germany in the immediate postwar period.78  
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  While there have been no studies dedicated to Heute or Army Talks, there are 
several insightful publications on cultural propaganda policy and journalism in occupied 
Germany, including David Culbert’s essay on American film as a tool of postwar re-
education and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht’s examination of Neue Zeitung, an American 
newspaper in occupied Germany.79 In Capturing the German Eye: American Visual 
Propaganda in Occupied Germany, Cora Sol Goldstein compellingly argues that postwar 
Germany was the first Cold War battleground. Despite the publication title, however, 
Goldstein does not visually analyze propaganda.80  
 Through my focus on visual culture, my dissertation further deepens the discourse 
on the transitional moment of the late 1940s. Previous studies on the subjects covered in 
the three chapters of this dissertation have primarily been historical publications that do 
not examine the critical role images played. Arnold Krammer’s Nazi Prisoners of War in 
America provides a comprehensive survey of German POWs in the United States, and 
Ron Robin’s The Barbed-Wire College focuses on reeducation programs for these 
POWs.81 There is abundant scholarship on the Nuremberg trials, but Tomaz Jardim’s The 
Mauthausen Trial: American Military Justice in Germany is particularly illuminating for 
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its focus on the Dachau trials.82 Petra Goedde’s GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and 
Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 offers a fascinating account of the changing relationships 
between American soldiers and German women and children in the period.83 John 
Gaddis’ United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 provides an essential 
narrative on the emergence of the Cold War and Harold Zink’s The United States in 
Germany is a seminal study of the postwar occupation of Germany.84 Though these 
publications do not focus on visual material, they greatly inform the historical basis of 
my study. 
 Above all, my project is based on archival research conducted at the National 
Archives Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, which has a comprehensive 
holding of U.S. Army Signal Corps published and unpublished photographs as well as 
extensive records on the American governing agencies that produced propaganda for 
American and German audiences. Official Army reports on German youth, fraternization, 
the Allied leaflet campaign, and Psychological Warfare Division in particular provide 
unrivaled insight into American policy aims during the period.85  
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 While my study illuminates American intentions and includes some analysis of 
German reactions to American propaganda, German experiences of the American 
occupation warrant their own study. Research in German archives also reveals the extent 
to which the American government controlled the documentation, photographs, and in 
many ways the history of Allied occupation. German archives contain copies of the same 
American official reports as held in NARA, and official state history museums across 
Germany, including at the Dachau Concentration Camp, are replete with American 
Signal Corps photographs of the camps that were taken upon liberation. Through my 
archival approach, close image and text analysis, and consideration of latency and power 
structures, my project sheds new light on the construction of American propaganda and 
how it shifted in this five-year period to reshape German and American public opinion.   
 
Chapter Summaries  
 This study comprises three chapters, each focused on a subject frequently featured 
in American propaganda. The first chapter examines United States Army Signal Corps 
photographs of German prisoners-of-war, spanning the period from 1944 until the last 
German POW was released from American custody in 1947. It traces the trajectory of the 
American government’s use of photographs of POWs as instruments of war in the aerial 
leaflet campaign to encourage unconditional surrender as well as the postwar diplomatic 
use of images of POWs in re-education programs to buoy the spread of democracy. I 
closely analyze how images of POWs were edited differently in four publications for four 
audiences: the Allied leaflet campaign (for German soldiers), Army Talks (for American 
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soldiers), Life (for the American public), and Heute (for German civilians). Though the 
aims of these publications initially appear disparate, all materials, with the exception of 
Army Talks, championed the American government as a benevolent captor and touted 
America’s strict adherence to the Geneva Convention. Through a close comparative 
study, this chapter further elucidates the American government’s strategy of selective 
truth—choosing only those photographs that made its propaganda credible and persuasive 
to target audiences and censoring any images that could compromise this aim. 
 The study of concentration camp photographs and the war crimes trial in chapter 
two demonstrates the American government’s use of photography to bring Nazi war 
crimes to light. Declaring the need to bear witness and collect evidence, General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower ordered Signal Corps photographers to thoroughly document German 
concentration camps. In contrast to earlier studies that focus on concentration camp 
photographs in the American press, this chapter sheds light on how these images were 
used in an Allied Psychological Warfare campaign that sought to compel German 
civilians to see, acknowledge, and feel a sense of guilt for Nazi atrocities. However, after 
the failure of the collective guilt campaign was realized, American propaganda stopped 
running concentration camp images and tacitly allowed Germans to turn away from the 
past and instead focus on postwar reconstruction. The second chapter further 
demonstrates the ways in which photographs of the Nuremberg Trials were published in 
Heute, Life, and Army Talks to shift attention to the top twenty-two Nazi Party leaders 
and to showcase the democratic process. The subsequent Dachau Trials (1945-1947), 
which prosecuted 1,676 lower-ranking German war criminals, were well documented by 
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Signal Corps photographers for the historical record, but these images received relatively 
little coverage in American press and propaganda so as not to disrupt improving German-
American relations. Previously unpublished images of the Dachau trials and executions, 
held in NARA, provide a more complex picture of the war crimes trial than portrayed in 
American propaganda from the period. 
 The third chapter examines photographs and cartoons of German women and 
children. Negotiating complex issues of victimhood, culpability, agency, and innocence, 
American propaganda depictions of German civilians remained simplistic and carefully 
calibrated to target audiences in the war and the immediate postwar period. During the 
war, materials for GIs portrayed both women and children as dangerous, in order to 
dissuade American soldiers from fraternizing. But by 1946, German youth were recast as 
victims of the Nazi regime and believed to be the most vital demographic to save to 
ensure future peace. While there were slight variations in the portrayal of the American-
sponsored German Youth Activities program for German and American audiences, 
materials for both sought to encourage German-American participation and cooperation.  
 The conclusion briefly examines the promotion of American culture and 
democratic capitalism in Heute as the Cold War began to heat up. Starting in late 1947, 
the magazine published an increasing number of photo-essays that promoted American 
industry, democracy, and a new consumerism. In a nearly identical format, the U.S. 
Department of State also published the Russian-language Amerika (1945-1994), which 
provided citizens in the Soviet Union with a picture of life in America (Fig. 0.9). 
Examples of stories in Heute and Amerika demonstrates how the American government 
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continued to use the format of picture-magazines and photo-essays, as well as the strategy 
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Chapter One 
German Prisoners-of-War and a Campaign of American Benevolence 
  
 A previously unpublished U.S. Army Signal Corps photograph from January 
1945, held today at the National Archives Records Administration (NARA), shows a 
German chef holding a heap of sausage links (Fig. 1.1).1 More sausages are spread across 
the table, and tall pots simmer on the stove in the background. The cook's mustache 
accentuates his broad smile, and without the caption, there is nothing in the image to 
indicate that he is an internee at a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp in Pennsylvania. 
Between 1942 and 1947, the United States government held nearly 400,000 German 
POWs on American soil.2 The Geneva Convention of 1929 dictated that the American 
government must treat German captives as well as its own soldiers. It was a challenge, 
however, to uphold these standards in war-ravaged Europe, and the U.S. government did 
not want to divert much-needed food and supplies from American GIs stationed abroad. 
As a solution, the government sent a significant number of German POWs to America. In 
490 camps erected across the country, POWs engaged in social and recreational 
activities, and beginning in 1944, select prisoners participated in a reeducation program 
that included seminars on democracy, history, and English.3 As the Signal Corps 
photograph of the cook demonstrates, these German POWs in the U.S. received generous 
                                                
1 The Signal Corps archives are located at the National Archives Records Administration 
(NARA) in College Park, Maryland.  
2 At its peak in May 1945, the United States held 371,683 German POWs in the United 
States. At that time, the U.S. also held 50,273 Italian POWs and 3,915 Japanese prisoners 
in America. Office of Provost Marshal General (OPMG), “World War II: A Brief 
History,” January 15, 1946, 375. 
3   “Investigations of the National War Effort,” Report, Committee on Military Affairs, 
House of Representatives (June 12, 1945), 6.  
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rations, and that became the subject of much controversy on the home front. Comparison 
of published and previously unpublished photographs of German POWs in United States 
and Europe shows how propaganda and the image of the German POW was carefully 
constructed for public consumption.  
 The 1.5 million German POWs who remained in Europe under American custody 
lived in comparatively difficult conditions.4 Another unpublished archival Signal Corps 
image from May 1945 shows a group of German POWs in an American-run camp in 
Germany standing in front of a sack of bread loaves (Fig. 1.2). The caption on its verso 
explains that a representative from each company collects a ration of one loaf for every 
twelve men. During the war and in the immediate postwar period, images of German 
POWs frequently ran in American press and propaganda publications. However, 
propagandists were careful not to show camp conditions that appeared either exceedingly 
comfortable or exceedingly grim. As a result, both the image of the soldiers waiting for 
bread and the picture of the chef laden with sausages were restricted from circulation.5 
Rather than these censored photographs, the American government published a neutral 
image of German POWs eating cans of food in its aerial leaflet campaign to encourage 
German soldiers to surrender in the last year of the war (Fig. 1.3). The accompanying 
caption explains that the soldiers pictured are having U.S. Army C-Rations as their first 
meal as prisoners. Together, the text and image work together to reassure German 
                                                
4  Ibid., 2. 
5 The sausage image was restricted from circulation from British Isles, Australia, New 
Zealand, France, South Africa, Hawaii and the Western Hemisphere. Restrictions are 
marked on print verso in NARA. 
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soldiers that they too would be treated by Geneva Convention standards if they 
surrendered.  
The sausage, bread loaves, and C-rations photographs were equally truthful 
representations of the diverse treatment German POWs received at American hands 
during World War II. However, this comparison of published and censored photographs 
elucidates that the American government undertook a clear strategy of selective truth in 
choosing images that could make its propaganda credible and persuasive to target 
audiences, and censoring any images that compromised these aims.  
 This chapter examines photographs of German prisoners-of-war taken by U.S. 
Army Signal Corps photographers between 1944 and 1947, when the last POW was 
released from American custody. I will demonstrate how portrayals of German POWs 
shifted during this three-year period as American policy aims evolved, from encouraging 
unconditional surrender in the last year of the war to improving German-American 
relations as Cold War tensions began to brew in the immediate postwar period. The 
American government used images of German POWs, as well as photographs of the war 
crimes trial and German civilians examined in the next two chapters, to negotiate 
Germany’s the transition from enemy to ally. In three sections, this chapter examines, 
respectively, photographs of German POWs surrendering in Europe, in captivity in the 
United States, and in postwar reeducation programs, as they were edited and censored 
differently in four publications created for four distinct audiences, Heute (for German 
civilians), Life (for the American public), Army Talks (for American soldiers), and the 
Allied leaflet campaign (for German soldiers). Comparative analysis of propaganda for 
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these various audiences reveals the subtle shifts in American propaganda during this 
transitional period.  
Though the aims of these four publications were initially disparate, all, with the 
exception of Army Talks, used photographs of POWs to ease the minds of their target 
audiences—Germans or Americans in Europe or the United States. The Allied leaflet 
campaign featured photographs of POWs to reassure German soldiers that they would be 
treated well if they surrendered. During the war, Life portrayed POWs in American 
backyards as non-threatening, and in the postwar period, the magazine ran images of the 
reeducation programs to buoy the spread of democracy in the face of communism. In 
Heute, images of POWs receiving fair treatment during the war were used to assure 
German civilians that the American government would continue to be kind during its 
occupation. Ultimately, this chapter argues that during World War II and in the 
immediate postwar period, the United States government used the image of the German 
POW to tout itself as a benevolent captor, and it censored any photographs that could 
question its adherence to the Geneva Convention. Constructing propaganda for these 
various audiences was difficult balancing act—the American government’s treatment of 
German POWs had to be shown as kind enough to encourage German soldiers to 
surrender, but not too extravagantly nice that it would be disbelieved or cause upset 
among American soldiers or civilians on the home front.  
 Past scholarship has studied the treatment of German POWs held in American-run 
camps in Europe and the United States as separate subjects. Historians widely agree that 
German POWs in America fared exceedingly well; however, the American treatment (or 
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alleged mistreatment) of German POWs held in Europe has been hotly debated.6  While 
previous studies have sought to determine the truth about America’s treatment of German 
POWs, my study explores the ways in which carefully selected photographs of German 
POWs, whether accurate or misleading, served as tools for assuaging concerns on the 
American and German home fronts. Just like depictions of the war crimes trial and 
German civilians studied in the next two chapters, the reframing of German POWs 
reflected the government’s changing policy aims and approach toward German 
reconstruction.   
 
Promoting Surrender in Europe and the Allied Leaflet Campaign 
 In the last year of the war, the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF PWD) deployed an aerial leaflet 
campaign to persuade German soldiers to surrender. Allied propaganda attempted to 
                                                
6 For examples of scholarship that praise the U.S. governments treatment of German 
POWs in America see: Judith Gansberg, Stalag, U.S.A: The Remarkable Story of German  
POWs in America (New York: Crowell, 1977); Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War 
in America (New York: Stein and Day, 1979); Antonio Thompson, Men in German 
Uniform: POWs in America During World War II (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 2010). For an evaluation of the reeducation program see also: Ron Robin, The 
Barbed-Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States During World 
War II (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995). The scholarship on German 
POWs held by the American government is much more contentious. In 1989, Canadian 
author James Bacque alleged that General Dwight D. Eisenhower intentionally massacred 
some one million Germans POWs in American and French camps in Europe, in part by 
withholding rations. In 1992, a group of German and American scholars published a 
volume of papers disputing and discrediting Bacque. James Bacque, Other Losses: An 
Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and 
Americans After World War II (Toronto, Canada: Stoddart, 1989); Günter Bischof and 
Stephen E. Ambrose, eds. Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts against Falsehood 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992). 
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convince German soldiers that they would experience better conditions in Allied custody 
than in continued fighting. Photographs were integral to the leaflet campaign. While 
illustrations or text could embellish or fabricate the conditions of American-run POW 
camps, photographs of German soldiers in Allied captivity served as the best proof of fair 
treatment. 
 The Psychological Warfare Division employed a “strategy of truth.”7 As a PWD 
report explained: “Since the technique of waging a campaign of psychological warfare 
depends upon the slow building of acceptance by the audience, it follows that truth is the 
most important ingredient in psychological warfare. Such truth, to be sure, can, and 
sometimes must be selective, for often the truth is not credible to the enemy.”8  In other 
words, PWD propagandists were careful in choosing which truths to show and which to 
leave out in order to make their propaganda the most credible and persuasive to a target 
audience. The PWD was similarly selective in deciding which photographs of German 
POW camps in America and Europe to publish in its leaflet campaign. From the vast 
array of U.S. Army Signal Corps images available, the campaign showed only a limited 
view of the POW experience, focusing on the process of surrender rather than the 
sustained conditions POWs faced in captivity. In addition to comparing photographs and 
text published in the campaign to unpublished, previously censored archival Signal Corps 
                                                
7 As explained the introduction, the “strategy of truth” was first outlined by Archibald 
McLeish, Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, in a speech delivered to the 
Associated Press in 1942. Archibald MacLeish, A Time to Act: Selected Addresses 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943). 
8 Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 
“An account of its operations in the Western European Theater, 1944-1945” (March 
1951), 14. 
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images, this section also includes a brief examination of Nazi propaganda leaflets created 
for American soldiers, demonstrating that photographs cannot always be trusted and 
certainly never tell the full story. Analysis of American propaganda for German 
audiences and Nazi materials for Americans further show how both sides transnationally 
disseminated images as instruments of power to persuade their enemies to capitulate. 
 During World War II, the American government, in collaboration with the British 
government, dropped nearly six billion leaflets from airplanes over the European 
Theater.9 From D-Day (June 4, 1944) to V-E Day (May 8, 1945), the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF 
PWD) governed this aerial leaflet campaign.10 SHAEF PWD was a joint British and 
American division, led by American Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, who served 
at the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of 
SHAEF. In the last year of the war, the PWD produced over two hundred different 
leaflets for German audiences, and about twenty-five of these included photographs. The 
number of copies printed per leaflet design ranged from several hundred thousand to 
                                                
9 PWD SHAEF, “An account of its operations in the Western European Theater, 1944-
1945” Appendix G: “Final Report on Leaflet Operation: Leaflets Operations in the 
Western European Theater,” prepared by Maj. Robert H. Garet, AC. (March 1951), 107. 
10 Prior to D-Day, leaflets were produced by the Office of War Information (OWI) and 
the British Political Warfare Executive/ Political Intelligence Division (PWE/PID). The 
American and British Divisions created leaflets for eleven nationalities in German-
occupied countries including: German, Belgian, Channel Islands, Czechoslovakian, 
Danish, Dutch, French, Italian, Luxembourg, Polish, Norwegian and Slovak leaflets. 
PWE/OWI “A Complete Index of Allied Leaflets and Magazines,” 1939-1945 (July 31, 
1945). 
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several million of each.11 The standard leaflet was double-sided and 5 x 8.25 inches. 
Printed in the United Kingdom, the leaflets were dropped from Allied airplanes over 
Germany and throughout the Western European Theater via leaflet bombs, which carried 
80,000 leaflets per bomb.12 As a result of these efforts, the leaflets were seen by most 
German soldiers, according to an Allied survey of German POWs.13 
Promoting Surrender 
 The Allied PWD leaflets focused on images of surrender, showing it as a peaceful 
and expedited process. As a PWD report explained, photographs were used to “enable the 
German soldier to think of captivity in terms of definite mental images—thus overcoming 
his fear of the unknown.”14 To ease the minds of German soldiers, Brigadier General 
McClure sent a request to Signal Corps asking for images of “dignified German 
surrenders, group of PWs at collecting points, entrucking, detrucking, being fed, 
                                                
11 Of the nearly two hundred different leaflets produced for Germany, approximately 56 
were targeted to civilians and 139 to German soldiers. Ibid. For an incredibly 
comprehensive catalog with reproductions of the PWD leaflets see: Klaus Kirchner, 
Flugblätter aus England, aus den USA 1944-1945 (Erlangen, Germany: Verlag D u. C, 
1980). 
12 In September 1944, PWD Leaflet section moved to Paris and a small amount of 
printing was done in Paris and Brussels. Appendix G, “Final Report on Leaflet 
Operations,” 116, 119.  
13 Groups of German prisoners were surveyed by the Intelligence Section of SHAEF on 
July 9, 1944; July 21, 1944; August 3, 1944. According to the surveys, 77%, 69% and 
84% of the prisoners interviewed on the respective dates said that they had seen Allied 
leaflets. The size of groups interviewed is unspecified but appears to be approximately 
200 prisoners per group. “Reactions of German Prisoners to SHAEF Leaflets: A Study 
Based on a Group Questionnaire,” Surveys, Intelligence Section Psychological Warfare 
Division, SHAEF (August 17, 1944), 2. RG331 Box 31.  
14 PWD leaflet report, November 1, 1944, n.p. RG331 Entry 93 Box 97, NARA. 
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registered, at transit camps, in formation, resting, working etc.”15 Images fitting these 
descriptions were published in the leaflet campaign while any photographs showing the 
difficult conditions faced by German POWs in Allied-run camps were restricted from 
circulation. The leaflets further paired the photographs with the text, which promised 
German soldiers they would be treated fairly.   
 Allied leaflets themselves could be used as instruments of surrender. A German 
soldier could wave a leaflet overhead like a white handkerchief to signify his capitulation 
to Allied troops. An unpublished Signal Corps image in NARA shows one such instance 
of a German turning over a leaflet to American GIs in surrender (Fig. 1.4). German 
soldiers stand with arms behind their head and their backs to a stone wall. Their eyes are 
averted, but one soldier at center looks down at the leaflet in his hand, a literal lifeline. 
U.S. censors whited out the text of the leaflet in the photograph, since the information on 
leaflets was only permitted for the eyes of soldiers in the European Theater. But the one 
visible word, “Behandlung,” suggests it was a “Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen” 
(Treatment of POWs) leaflet, which listed instructions for surrender as well as terms of 
the Geneva Convention. 
 The cornerstone of the leaflet campaign was the repeated assurance that Germans 
who surrendered would be treated in accord with the Geneva Convention, which was 
ratified in 1929 by fifty-one countries including the United States, Great Britain, and 
Germany. Six points of the Convention were continually repeated on Allied leaflets. 
These dictated that the POW would be removed from danger as soon as possible, would 
                                                
15 R.A. McClure, Brigadier General, G.S.C., Chief, PWD, December 21, 1944. RG331 
Entry 87 Box 7, NARA. 
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receive decent treatment like a soldier, be fed rations equivalent to that of the U.S. Army 
soldiers, receive medical care, have mail privileges, and be repatriated “as soon as 
possible” after the war.16 
 These six points were included on the “Safe Conduct Pass,” which was the single 
most reproduced leaflet during the war (approximately 127.5 million copies 
disseminated).17 Printed on brightly colored red or green paper, the standardized “Safe 
Conduct Pass” incorporated graphic elements to make it appear like an official document 
(Fig. 1.5). It used exactingly consistent language and bore the seals of the United States 
and British governments as well as a facsimile signature of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
Supreme Allied Commander of SHAEF. This design was intended to convey a reassuring 
sense of authenticity to the German soldier.18 The Psychological Warfare Division 
(PWD) consciously employed design, photographs, and text to convince German soldiers 
that they could trust the Allied leaflets’ guarantee of safe treatment after capture and to 
ultimately persuade them to surrender to Allied authorities.  
 The use of bright colors and design elements in Allied leaflets was explained in a 
PWD report, which stated, “To the greatest practicable extent, [leaflets] are produced in 
multiple colors and illustrated with photographs, diagrams and other graphic illustrations 
which will convey information and ideas at a glance, even to those who may steal only 
                                                
16 “History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare” 12th Army Group, January 1943- 
August 1945, 58. RG331 Entry 194 Box 3, NARA.   
17 Kirchner, Flugblätter aus den USA, lxxx-xc.  
18 “History: Publicity,” 55. 
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furtive glimpses at the risk of drastic reprisal.”19 This instruction alludes to the danger 
posed to German soldiers who were subject to death or imprisonment if caught reading 
Allied leaflets.20 Despite the risk, U.S. Army reports state that many German soldiers 
“prudently” tucked leaflets into a pocket or a shoe and kept them there for weeks or 
months to use if an opportune moment for surrender arose.21  
 In addition to being quick and easy to understand, photographs were also intended 
to ease German soldiers’ minds by showing them the step-by-step process of surrender. 
Numbered one to six, the photographs in the four-page special “What Does the Other 
Side Look Like?” leaflet produced in February 1945, illustrated the six points of the 
Geneva Convention (Fig. 1.6). The first image shows German soldiers walking in a line 
with their hands up down a dirt road lined with houses. The second photograph depicts 
soldiers, as the caption explains, consuming their first meal, a U.S. Army C-Ration.22 The 
third image shows a soldier receiving medical attention and the remaining images show 
the soldiers being transported by truck to a transit camp, being registered by personnel, 
and finally writing letters home. Together, they show surrender as a steady and peaceful 
progression. 
                                                
19 “Leaflet Operations in the European Theater.” OWI and PWD, SHAEF Report (1944), 
2. Exact date not listed on report, but a copy of it in NARA has an attached cover sheet 
dated April 11, 1944. RG331 Entry 87 Box 31, NARA. 
20 Appendix G, “Final Report on Leaflet Operations,” 121.  
21 “History: Publicity,” 55.  
22 “Die Erste Mahlzeit der Kriegsgefangenschaft besteht meistens aus Büchsenfleish (C-
Ration) mit einer Dose Keks und Konfekt.” (The first meal for prisoners of war usually 
consists of canned meat (C-ration) with a can of biscuits and sweets.) Leaflet first issued 
February 22/23, 1945. “What Does the Other Side Look Like?” / “Wie Sieht Es Drüben 
Aus?” ZG113 English title translation, “Index of Allied Leaflets,” 36.  
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 The narrative presented in the “Other Side” leaflet focuses on the experience of 
German capitulation rather than the Allied forces. In the first image of German soldiers 
walking down a dirt road, Allied gunmen are conspicuously absent. Contrary to this, 
unpublished NARA photographs of Germans surrendering show armed GIs. One image 
of U.S. Ninth Army GIs apprehending a group of Germans depicts a GI with his gun at 
the ready, pointed at a German soldier’s midsection (Fig. 1.7). A second more dramatic 
and threatening image shows an American GI charging at German soldiers with a 
bayonet (Fig. 1.8). The versos of these prints were marked with notes restricting their 
circulation, indicating that the PWD did not want to use photographs that portrayed the 
U.S. forces as aggressors. For this reason, Allied gunmen were left out of the frame in the 
first “Other Side” surrender photograph. The absence of Allied gunmen turned the focus 
on the German soldiers. Through this subtle visual language, the photograph effectively 
conveys surrender as an inevitable reality, rather than a forced or voluntary act.  
 The Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) attempted to minimize the distinction 
between desertion and surrender. According to a PWD report, “It was found that soldierly 
pride and feeling that desertion was dishonorable were perhaps the most basic and 
unchanging factors of German soldier mentality, even among deserters. SHAEF therefore 
attempted to show that capture was something that just ‘happened’ to a German 
soldier.”23 The caption for the first “Other Side” image of soldiers surrendering on the 
dirt road says, “It can happen to anybody.”24 By portraying surrender as a matter of 
happenstance, the PWD used photographs as well as text to combat the idea that 
                                                
23 Appendix G, “Final Report on Leaflet Operation,” 113. 
24 “Das kann jedem passieren.” “The Other Side,” Allied leaflet, 1945 
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desertion was a deliberate act of cowardice or betrayal to Germany. The pamphlet's 
introductory text assured the reader that their comrades who surrendered had fought no 
less bravely, but they realized the hopelessness of the situation, were now under the 
protection of the Geneva Convention, and would be sent home as soon as possible after 
the war.25 In its text, the “Other Side” leaflet drew a direct path from desertion to 
repatriation and avoided any hints as to the experience of captivity.  
 For most German POWs, captivity was more arduous and prolonged than the 
Allied leaflets suggested. Any photographs that showed difficult conditions in POW 
camps were deliberately omitted from the Allied leaflet campaign and many such images 
remained unpublished in the archives. One unpublished photograph in NARA shows a 
sea of 20,000 German soldiers, seated and crowded together with legs folded at a former 
German military school occupied by the U.S. Seventh Army in 1945 (Fig. 1.9). Because 
this image showed the overcrowding of transit camps and would have been seen as a 
negative message, it was restricted from circulation and not included in the leaflet 
campaign.26 Instead, the picture of a transit camp chosen for “This is How Your 
Comrades Fared,” a leaflet similar to “Other Side,” with six photographs depicting the 
various stages of surrender, shows only a small corner of a camp where soldiers had 
                                                
25 “Diese Kameraden haben nicht weniger tapfer gekämpft, aber sie mussten in 
hoffnungsloser Lage erkennen, dass mit Weiterkämpfen nicht mehr gedient war. Als 
Kriegsgefangene unterstehen sie dem Schutz der Genfer Konvention von 1929, der 
zufolge sie nach Kriegsende so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt werden.“ 
(These comrades fought no less bravely, but they must recognize in this hopeless place, 
that it was not worth fighting any more. As prisoners of war, they are protected under the 
Geneva Convention of 1929, which states they will be sent home as soon as possible after 
the end of the war.) Ibid.  
26 Verso print in NARA says “Not for use in British Isles, France, Belgium or Western 
Hemisphere.”  RG208-AA Box 303, NARA. 
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ample room to recline (Fig. 1.10). A caption describes the soldiers as they “smoke, relax 
their nerves and rest,” while waiting for their forthcoming transfer.27 For its leaflets, the 
Psychological Warfare Division selected only photographs that showed comfortable 
conditions in the camps.  
 Additional unpublished NARA photographs that show makeshift encampments in 
transit camps were left out of the leaflet campaign because they were not considered 
useful propaganda. One archival image depicts another 20,000 German soldiers held in 
France in 1944 (Fig. 1.11). Within the fenced-in plot, many POWs set up bare-bones 
tents with little shelter from the elements. Another NARA unpublished photograph shows 
a soldier captured by the 82nd Airborne Division and held near Dellien, Germany, sitting 
outside a shelter constructed from a scrapped car roof and piles of bricks and mud (Fig. 
1.12). This elaborate encampment suggests that German soldiers lived in transit camps 
for much longer than the short stopover implied in the steady sequence of images in 
“Other Side” and “How Comrades Fared,” but the published print and photographic 
propaganda edited out this unfavorable information. Though Allied leaflets promised 
German soldiers they would be returned to Germany “as soon as possible” after the war, 
the Geneva Convention did not outline specific guidelines or timelines for repatriation. 
Consequently, the American government did not have a firm plan in place for its 
                                                
27 “Als Kriegsgefangene warten diese Kameraden auf Abtransport, rauchen, entspannen 
die Nerven und ruhen sich aus.“  (“As prisoners-of-war, these comrades are waiting for 
transport, smoking, relaxing their nerves and resting.”) “This is How Your Comrades 
Fared” PWD Leaflet ZG54. First dissemination August 31/Sept 1, 1944. “Index of Allied 
Leaflets,” 35. 
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prisoners at the end of the war, and the repatriation process proceeded slowly and 
piecemeal until the last German soldier was released from American custody in 1947.28 
 The “Other Side” and “How Comrades Fared” leaflets also touted the generosity 
of the U.S. Army C-Rations given to POWs, despite the fact that rations decreased 
significantly after V-E day. The “How Your Comrades Fared” leaflet includes a 
photograph of pallets of C-Rations stacked in abundance and German POWs lined up to 
receive their allotment (Fig. 1.10). The image caption explains that upon surrender 
German soldiers are given two cans: “one contains meat, the other contains biscuits, 
coffee powder, sweets and cigarettes,” adding, “in the camps, the food is, of course, much 
better.”29 During the war German prisoners were fed reasonably well, but photographs 
taken in American-run camps in Germany in the weeks immediately following V-E Day 
show meager rations. One unpublished archival Signal Corps image depicts German 
POWs standing in line for drinking water, and a second shows POWs waiting to pick up 
their ration of one bread loaf for every twelve men (Fig. 1.2 and Fig. 1.13).30 During the 
summer of 1945, malnutrition became an increasingly serious problem for German 
POWs as well as German civilians and citizens across Europe because of widespread 
food shortages. The American government had to help feed not just German POWs, but 
                                                
28 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners, 248-249.  
29 “...Eine enthält die Fleischspeise, die andere enthält Keks, Kaffeepulver, Konfekt und 
Zigaretten. In den Lagern ist das Essen selbstverständlich bedeutend besser.“ Ibid. 
30 Caption for water image on print verso states that it is Buderick (Büderich), Germany. 
May 22, 1945 and that there were 21,000 men in the camp. Signal Corps caption states 
the bread image was taken in Schwerin, Germany May 12, 1945, 111-SCA-4927, NARA. 
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also German civilians, displaced persons, and the millions of refugees expelled from the 
eastern territories, inundating the American zone of occupied Germany.31  
 The German POWs sent to camps in the United States lived much more 
comfortably than those who remained in Europe. The Allied leaflet campaign featured 
few images of German POWs on American soil, perhaps because propagandists did not 
want the prospect of being sent overseas to deter German soldiers from surrendering. 
However, one multi-page leaflet for German soldiers in the European theater included 
photographs of German POWs in the United States writing letters home while relaxing in 
their spacious bunks, shopping at a commissary, and eating in a dining hall (Fig. 1.14).32 
As a PWD leaflet report explained, leaflets should show good treatment “with 
conservatism (‘underplayed’)” since that would make them seem more credible than 
images of exceedingly comfortable conditions.33 The images chosen for this leaflet are 
indeed more conservative than unpublished archival photographs that show POWs with 
abundant food, playing chess and music, and creating art (Fig. 1.1, 1.15-1.17). While 
these archival photographs were true representations of life from the various camps in the 




                                                
31 James F. Tent, “Food Shortages in Germany and Europe, 1945-1948 in Eisenhower 
and the German POWs, 100-103.  
32 “Sie Kehren Zurück!” listed in the Index of Allied leaflet as “Ps/W Booklet,” PWD 
Leaflet, ZG117. First disseminated April 22/23, 1945. 
33 Appendix G, “Final Report on Leaflets,” 114.  
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Nazi Counter-Propaganda 
 The unpublished archival photographs of German POWs in the United States are 
strikingly similar to images featured on Nazi leaflets for American soldiers. In 1944, the 
Nazis launched their own leaflet campaign to encourage American soldiers to capitulate. 
Like the Allies, the Nazis claimed to treat their prisoners well, and they presented 
photographs as incontrovertible proof of that. One leaflet titled, “That’s the Way 
Germany is Treating Her P.O.W.s,” included photographs of prisoners playing sports and 
chess, drawing, acting in plays, and purchasing provisions in a commissary (Fig. 1.18). 
This leaflet was first disseminated in February 1945, and even more so than the American 
leaflets, it was egregiously misrepresentative of the actual conditions of German-run 
camps for Americans POWs in that period.34 Though there were some recreational 
programs in German-run POW camps (mostly supported by resources sent in from the 
YMCA), conditions in the camps were often grim and got increasingly worse as the war 
progressed; many American POWs suffered chronic hunger and lived in unsanitary 
conditions.35  
 It seems likely that these leaflet images were staged or taken at some sort of 
show-camp, because the Nazi propagandists employed similar tactics with their 
                                                
34 These same photographs were featured on several other Nazi leaflets. Klaus Kirchner, 
Leaflets from Germany For American Soldiers in Western Europe, 1944, vo. 16 
(Erlangen, Germany: Verlag D u. C, 2007), 258-262; Klaus Kirchner, Leaflets from 
Germany For American Soldiers in Western Europe, 1945, vo. 17 (Erlangen, Germany: 
Verlag D u. C, 2007), 149.  
35 For more information on conditions for American POWs in German-run camps, 
including rations, sanitation, and recreational programs in the camps see: Andrew 
Hasselbring, “American Prisoners of War in the Third Reich” (PhD diss., Temple 
University, 1991) and David A. Foy, For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of 
War in Nazi Germany (New York: Stein and Day, 1984).  
 
  53 
portrayals of concentration camps. Soon after Dachau, the first concentration camp, 
opened in March 1933, reports about abuses and forced labor began to circulate in the 
international press.36 A Nazi propaganda photographer, Friedrich Franz Bauer, was 
brought in to take staged images that would show the world that conditions there were 
not so bad.37 In July 1933, Müncher Illustreite Presse published a series of these images 
in an article titled “The Truth about Dachau.”38 The photographs show political prisoners 
relaxing on the grass and playing sports (Fig. 1.19). The brutal mistreatment of prisoners, 
which began as soon as the camp opened and gravely worsened as the National Socialist 
period progressed, was conspicuously absent.39 Both the Müncher Illustreite photo-essay 
on Dachau and the Allied photo-leaflet are examples of the ways in which Nazi 
propagandists exploited the trusted medium of photography to deceive viewers. This 
contrasts the strategy of American propagandists, who chose not to publish their images 
of extremely comfortable conditions as they thought they might not be believed. 
 The Allied leaflets, which generally pertained to the progress of war and 
happenings on the battlefield, used an unemotional tone in their text, to avoid being 
                                                
36 For a useful database of period American press articles about Dachau, see the 
fascinating project: “History Unfolded,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
https://newspapers.ushmm.org/events/dachau-opens. 
37 Peter Reichel, “Images of the National Socialist Sate: Images of Power, Power of 
Images” in German Photography 1870-1970: Power of a Medium, eds. Klaus Honnef, 
Rolf Sachsse, Rolf, and Karin Thomas (Cologne, Germany: Dumont, 1997), 80.  
38 “Die Wahreit Über Dachau,” Müncher Illustreite Presse, July 16, 1933, 851-856. 
39 At least 28,000 prisoners died between January 1940 and May 1945; it is not known 
how many perished between 1933 and 1939. “Dachau,” United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, last accessed March 11, 2018: 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/dachau. 
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dismissed as propaganda.40 Nazi propagandists, on the other hand, frequently referenced 
GIs’ wives and families on the home front in order to psychologically rattle their enemy. 
Tugging on GIs’ heartstrings, one such Nazi leaflet has a photograph of a little girl gazing 
longingly at the camera (Fig. 1.20). The caption says, “Daddy you just got to come 
home…” and the verso has a facsimile letter from the little girl to her daddy, which said:  
 Dear Daddy: Today I went to the birthday party of Jean, but I didn't have a good 
 time because I was worrying so about you. Last night Mummy cried and cried 
 because we haven’t heard from you for so long. Jean got a letter from her Daddy. 
 He is a prisoner of war. Jean says he will be sure to come back home now. Oh 
 Daddy, you just got to come home. We miss you so. Loads of kisses, Winnie. 
 
This emotional letter implied that if the GI surrendered, he too would get to go home. 
This “sad girl” photograph, which was meant to remind the GI of his child left at home, 
was used in at least seven variations of the same leaflet with different texts, to weaken GI 
morale.41  
 Nazi leaflets also attempted to engage American anti-Semitism to make GIs 
question why they were fighting. While Americans tried to produce more subtle 
propaganda, Nazi propagandists were much more blunt and brazen. One leaflet implied 
that while the GI was off at war, his girlfriend was having an affair with “Sam Levy” 
(Fig. 1.21). The illustration shows a woman sitting by a telephone, and the accompanying 
text said that she was getting tired of waiting around for “Joe” to come home, so she was 
going to call up the “war dodger” Sam Levy to take her out on a date.42 Nazi leaflets 
                                                
40 SHAEF PWD, “Directive no. 1 For Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information 
Services,” May 1945, 2.  
41 Kirchner, Leaflets from Germany, v. 16, 358-361, 386. 
42 “What about calling up Sam Levy,” Nazi leaflet, 1945, reproduced in Kirchner, 
Leaflets from Germany, v.17, 46. 
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frequently repeated the theme that American soldiers were risking their lives while Jews 
profited. Another leaflet includes an illustration of a man raping a woman splayed out on 
the bed and the text on the verso says, “American kid. You have to fight now… in 
Europe,…While Messrs. Cohn Rabi Moises & Co grab big profits” (Fig. 1.22).43 These 
horrifying leaflets attempted to trigger GIs’ latent anti-Semitism, and they used 
illustrations to produce content that they could not easily fake with photographs.  
 Nazi propagandists also created a parody leaflet that looked exactly like the Allied 
“Safe Conduct Pass.” Both the original and Nazi versions were printed on red paper, 
employed the same fonts, and included reproductions of the American and British seals 
and Dwight D. Eisenhower’s facsimile signature (Fig. 1.5 and Fig. 1.23). The Nazi 
leaflets were intended to undercut those from the Allies, demonstrating that, although the 
original “Safe Conduct Pass” was designed to appear like an official document, it was not 
one. Though the formats were similar, the Nazis altered the text so that it read: “The 
German soldier who carries this safe conduct pass is using it as a sign of his genuine wish 
to go into captivity for the next ten years, to betray his fatherland, to return home a 
broken old man and very probably never see his parents, wife and children again.”44 The 
verso of this Safe Conduct parody reasserted the Germans’ brutal strength and 
                                                
43 Pornographic illustrations were surprisingly common in Nazi leaflets. See: Kirchner, 
Leaflets from Germany, v. 16 and 17.  
44 “Passierchein/Safe Conduct,” Nazi propaganda leaflet, first disseminated December 
1944. Reproduced in: Kirchner, Leaflets from Germany, vo. 16, 475. The original Allied 
“Safe Conduct Pass” text read: “The German soldier who carries this safe conduct pass is 
using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well 
looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from 
danger as soon as possible.” Though Nazi propagandists criticized the Allied “Safe 
Conduct Pass,” they also directly copied it, producing “Safe Conduct Passes” that assured 
Allied soldiers in possession of it that they would be safely captured and well cared for.  
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commitment to their ideals, stating that they cannot be “lured into surrender through mere 
ham and eggs” and ending the text with a “Heil Hitler!” signoff.45 This leaflet served as 
an acerbic rebuttal to the Allied pamphlets, but it was also intended to rally the German 
troops and to stir their doubts about the truthfulness of Allied propaganda leaflets. In one 
way, Nazi propagandists’ response to the Allied leaflet campaign demonstrates the 
campaign's success. In March 1945, Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels 
wrote in his diary, “Enemy propaganda is beginning to have an uncomfortably noticeable 
effect on the German people. Anglo-American leaflets are now no longer carelessly 
thrown away but are read attentively.”46 The American government also deemed the 
leaflet campaign a success, claiming that it helped hasten the end of the war.47  
 This comparison of Allied and Nazi leaflets brings the Psychological Warfare 
Divisions strategy of selective truth and its preference for photographs over illustrations 
into focus. While Nazis used photographs of cheery German POWs and sensationalized 
illustrations to deceive American soldiers, Allied propagandists took a more moderate 
approach, featuring images of surrender in Europe, and selecting only those that they 
thought would be credible and persuasive for their audience of German soldiers. Their 
leaflets did not focus on the prolonged experience of captivity in either United States or 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 Goebbels, Final Entries, 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, ed. Hugh Trevor-
Roper (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1978), 223, entry for 23 March 1945, as cited in: 
Laurie, Clayton D. The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade against Nazi 
Germany (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 230.  
47 Ibid, 230-231. “Reactions of German Prisoners to SHAEF Leaflets;” PWD, November 
1, 1944, n.p. RG331 Entry 93 Box 97, NARA; Investigations of the National War Effort” 
(1945), 19. 
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Europe, and Allied propagandists censored any images that showed difficult conditions, 
for fear that they would deter soldiers from surrendering.  
 
Captivity in the United States 
 American audiences were presented with a different view of German prisoners-of-
war than shown in the leaflets for German soldiers’ consumption. The American press 
did not often publish photographs of German soldiers surrendering in Europe. Instead, 
magazines like Life and Newsweek focused on the nearly 400,000 German POWs held in 
United States because their readers were anxious to learn more about the enemy present 
on American soil. Produced by a single government agency, the leaflets studied in the 
previous section provided consistent messaging during the last year of war. By contrast, 
the voices in the American press varied on the topic of prisoners-of-war.  
From 1944 to the end of the war in 1945, the emphasis of the American press 
coverage of German POWs shifted in response to current events. German prisoners were 
initially shown as docile but were later described as brutish once the Nazi mistreatment of 
American POWs increasingly came to light. The U.S. government also faced criticism for 
pampering German POWs. In Army Talks, a weekly U.S. Army magazine for American 
soldiers, the American government used cartoons of German POWs instead of 
photographs, which made it easier to side-step the issue of comfortable conditions in the 
camps. Throughout the war, both the commercial outlets of the American press and the 
military-produced Army Talks championed the American government for its strict 
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adherence to the Geneva Convention, characterizing America as a benevolent captor with 
a moral character that was superior to that of Germany.  
German POWs in Life  
 In early 1944, Life used photographs of German POWs to ease readers’ concerns 
about the enemy held in the 490 camps erected across the United States. Produced in 
collaboration with the American government, the January 1944 Life article “PWs: Nazis 
Arrogant and Sturdy but Far From Being Supermen” was written by an unnamed U.S. 
Army chaplain and used three Signal Corps photographs. The relationship between the 
U.S. government and the magazine was mutually beneficial. The chaplain, as a 
representative of the U.S. Army, was given a platform, and Life had an inside-scoop. This 
POW story, like all American press coverage during the war, was subject to government 
sanction and censorship. Life, too, only had access to Signal Corps photographs released 
by the U.S. Public Relations Division. The three photographs in its article were selected 
to dispel the myth that Nazis were not Aryan supermen, but conquerable foes.  
 The first Signal Corps photograph in the piece shows German soldiers obediently 
following American orders, the POWs walking in two neat rows to go to work on a 
private American farm, as part of a labor program that began in 1943 to fill a need for 
labor on American farms (Fig. 1.24).48 Unlike the photograph of German surrender used 
in the “Other Side” leaflet, where the American GI was cut out of the frame to downplay 
the threat of American force, the Signal Corps photograph selected for Life includes an 
armed guard behind the German POWs to emphasize American dominance and control 
                                                
48 For more information on the labor program see: Chapter III: The Labor Program in 
Arnold Krammer, Nazi Prisoners. 
 
  59 
(Fig. 1.6).49 The caption states that the POWs “respond to armed authority with utmost 
deference” and are now “shouldering shovels instead of guns.”50 The photograph and 
caption not only show German soldiers as harmless foes, but also convey the benefits 
they reaped for American agriculture. Such images of labor would not have appeared in 
the aerial leaflet campaign, because Allied propagandists wanted to dispute Nazi counter-
propaganda claims that the Americans would work Germans to the bone.  
 The second Signal Corps photograph shows German prisoners in a moment of 
relaxation on a peanut farm in Georgia, where they had been sent out to work (Fig. 1.24). 
It depicts four POWs crowded around a young soldier who is cuddling a baby rabbit (Fig. 
1.24). In the accompanying article, the chaplain wrote that it was necessary to “subdue” 
the enemy, and the image conveyed the German soldiers as successfully tamed.51 The 
photograph further humanizes the enemy by showing one soldier’s careful attention to a 
baby rabbit and in so doing serves Life’s aim to make the Germans in American 
backyards seem non-threatening. With their smiles, hairless chests, and sun glinting in 
their eyes, the German soldiers appear like the boys-next-door and not hardened robotic 
soldiers. The chaplain underscored this message of familiarity by stating that the POWs 
“could be mistaken for any young group of Americans,” implying that they need not be 
feared because they look like Americans.52  
                                                
49 The armed guarded also countered civilian complaints in the American press, and 
documented in the November Coddling report, that POWs were often not properly 
guarded when they went to work. “Investigations of the National War Effort” (1944), 17. 
50 “U.S Army Chaplain (Unnamed), “PWs: Nazis in US Prison Camps art Arrogant and 
Sturdy But Far From Being Superman,” Life, Jan 10, 1944, 47. 
51 Ibid., 50. 
52 Ibid., 47.  
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The third photograph displays an affinity between German POWs and American 
GIs. The image shows three POWs lounging on cots reading newspapers (Fig. 1.24). Just 
like American soldiers, they have pictures of pin-up girls taped to their walls. This 
portrayal of Germans contrasted sharply with propaganda depictions of Japanese soldiers, 
who were often caricatured as animals or “sub-human ‘gooks.’”53 By making the Nazis 
appear familiar, Life used photographs and text to comfort American readers. The 
chaplain’s commentary continued his comparison between Germans and Americans: “A 
group of Texans or Midwestern boys selected indiscriminately would outrange these 
[POW] boys in height, and certainly outweigh them by many pounds.”54 His statement 
reassured readers about American soldiers’ ability to defeat Germans in battle. 
Life magazine regularly ran stories that lauded the comfortable living conditions 
in German POW camps, with photographs of German POWs playing music, watching 
movies, painting, and building birdhouses (Fig. 1.25); but other outlets of the American 
press criticized the American government for coddling its prisoners. The complaints 
began in 1943, when a New York Times reporter wrote that on a visit to a POW camp he 
saw “piles of juicy hams, plenty of butter, steaks, and sausages.”55 Similar criticisms 
continued to appear in the American press until the end of the war, stemming from the 
belief that German POWs were better fed than American soldiers abroad and 
                                                
53 Michael C. C. Adams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 7. For information on caricatured depictions of 
Japanese soldiers and civilians and racism in the Pacific War, see: John Dower, Without 
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54 “PWs: Nazis in US,” Life, 47. 
55 F.G. Alleston Cook, “Nazi Prisoners are Prisoners Still,” New York Times, November 
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substantially better than American POWs in German hands. 56 Furthermore, after 1942, 
American civilians on the home front had begun to face their own rations and shortages.57 
The coddling allegations led to Congressional Committee investigations and the 
subsequent release of two reports, published on November 30, 1944, and in June 1945, 
often referred to as the “Coddling” reports.58 Investigators conducted detailed surveys of 
the luxuries available and conditions in individual camps. Ultimately, and unsurprisingly, 
the reports concluded that the U.S. government was not coddling its prisoners but treating 
them in proper accord with the Geneva Convention. 
 The government did not want to fuel coddling allegations in the press, nor 
grievances from American soldiers who, as documented in the November “Coddling” 
report, complained that German POWs could often buy cigarettes and chocolate in the 
commissary when U.S. soldiers could not.59 In response to the complaints, SHAEF began 
to censor Signal Corps photographs that showed excessive food in camps. One 
unpublished image that shows a German POW chef with sausages (previously discussed 
in the introduction of this chapter) was never released to the press (Fig. 1.1). A second 
restricted Signal Corps photograph shows a German baker leaning over a tray of crisp 
domes of bread (Fig. 1.26). These images were a far cry from pictures of bread and water 
                                                
56 For a list chronicling allegations of coddling in the U.S. press see: Krammer, Nazi 
Prisoners, 305-306.   
57 Ronald H. Bailey, The Homefront: USA (Virginia: Time Life Books, 1977), 110. As 
American supplies lessened, the German POWs in camps in the U.S. eventually faced 
their own ration reductions in February 1945. OMPG, “Brief History,” 403. 
58 “Investigations of the National War Effort,” Report, Committee on Military Affairs, 
House of Representatives (Nov 30, 1944); “Investigations of the National War Effort,” 
(1945). 
59 “Investigations of the National War Effort” (1944), 18.  
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lines in Allied-run camps in Europe. However, like the images of hungry soldiers, 
photographs of rolls and sausages were censored. Text on the verso of each print declares 
“Not for use in the Western Hemisphere.”60 These unpublished images demonstrate the 
control of American propaganda, restricting overly positive or negative views and only 
permitting a middle-ground images to be released for public consumption.  
Army Talks 
 Army Talks, a restricted U.S. Army weekly publication intended only for GIs in 
the ETO (European Theater of Operations), also addressed American soldier’s concerns 
about the pampering of German POWs in the United States.61 The magazine's goal was to 
mentally prepare the American soldier for battle, to educate him about the enemy, and 
keep him updated with the progress of war.62 Printed in a slightly smaller format than 
Life, Army Talks did not rely on photo-essays to tell its stories; instead, it made liberal use 
of photographs and illustrations to accompany and substantiate its articles.63 However, in 
its portrayals of German POWs, Army Talks did not privilege photographs, as material 
for German soldiers and magazines for the American public had. Contrary to Life’s 
photographs of seemingly contented German POWs, Army Talks used cartoons to 
suppress and side-step the truth about how comfortable German POWs were in the 
United States. Caricatures allowed Army Talks to present the Germans as deceptive 
characters and dismiss any claims of coddling as bogus rumors. 
                                                
60 Restrictions are marked on print verso in NARA. 
61 Army Talks ran weekly from September 29, 1943 to December 30, 1945. 
62 A memo detailing Army Talks mission, dated August 29, 1943, was reproduced in: 
Army Talks, May 3, 1944, 1.  
63 Army Talks was 8 x 10 inches and Life magazine was 10.5 x 14 inches. 
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 In December 1944, Army Talks ran a story titled “What’s the Score on Prisoner of 
War Camps?” that began: “Troops in the ETO have not been exuberantly happy over 
stories littering into the theater about the treatment of enemy PWs in camps back 
home.”64 It stated that German soldiers were bragging about how well their comrades 
were being treated in the U.S., claiming that POWs smoked cigars and had butter (a 
commodity rare in the ETO and rationed for American civilians on the home front). 
Although the American government was aware that there was butter in POW camps (as it 
was noted in the “Coddling” report), Army Talks did not directly confirm or deny this 
luxury.65 Instead, it dismissed the rumors as German fodder.66  
 The story's text shifted the narrative from a focus on comfortable conditions in 
POW camps to a depiction of German soldiers as untrustworthy. Army Talks told its 
readers, “…if you hear a story about German prisoners smoking big, fat cigars, the 
chances are pretty good (if there is any truth in it) that they saved them up to be smoked 
at the right psychological moment,” which is “any moment when our PX [Post 
Exchange/Commissary] is short of cigars.”67 Deliberately distorting the truth, the 
magazine's editors were obviously aware that German POWs could not have known 
when a commissary was short of cigars. However, with this statement the magazine 
cunningly moved the blame away from the American government to German soldiers 
                                                
64 “What’s the Score on Prisoners of War Camps?” Army Talks, December 4, 1944, 11.  
65 “Investigations of the National War Effort” (1944), 27.  
66 Meanwhile, one of the “Coddling” reports asserted that German POWs’ letters home 
about the good conditions were the “greatest propaganda” the U.S. had in the war. 
“Investigation of the National War Effort” (1945), 3.  
67 “What’s the Score,” Army Talks, 12.  
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who, in an oft-repeated theme in Army Talks, were attempting to unsettle or deceive 
American GIs. 
  As the magazine sought to dispel German rumors, it avoided photographs that 
showed comfortable conditions for German POW camps in the United States. Life’s 
photographs of POWs building birdhouses or the Signal Corps images of mounds of 
sausages and rolls would have only substantiated German claims that their comrades held 
in the U.S. were treated exceedingly well (Fig. 1.1, 1.2, 1.25). Instead of a photograph, 
Army Talks topped “What’s the Score on Prisoner-of-War Camps?” with a cartoon. It 
showed two German POWs smoking, with big plumes of smoke hanging above them 
(Fig. 1.27). The POWs’ eyes look over to the American guard, making sure that he was 
seeing them smoke. The cartoon, unlike the Life and Signal Corps photographs, 
supported the Army Talks narrative that German POWs were attempting to deceive 
American GIs. But the cartoon, unlike the photograph, had no basis in reality.   
 In using a cartoon, Army Talks attempted to diffuse the situation with humor. The 
two German POWs depicted, one fat and the other diminutive, become the butt of the 
joke. During the war, Army Talks and other periodicals for American soldiers frequently 
employed cartoons because they were a popular and an easily consumable format. They 
also dehumanized the enemy. Unlike Life’s photographs of German POWs as the boy-
next-door (Fig. 1.24), Army Talks caricatured depictions of POWs were intended to sow 
distrust and maintain a level of distance between the GI and his enemy. 
 However, similar to the Life article, the “What’s the Score on Prisoner of War 
Camps?” story in Army Talks asserted that the American government fed Germans 
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according to the standards set forth in the Geneva Convention. Unlike Life, Army Talks, 
provided an in-depth explanation of the terms of the Geneva Convention, which states: 
“The food ration of prisoners of war should be equal in quantity and quality to that of 
troops at base camps.”68 This meant that German POWs in Texas should be fed the same 
rations as American soldiers in Texas—not the same amount provided to American 
soldiers in war-torn Europe. Army Talks also reminded readers that the U.S. government 
treated the Germans in accord with the Geneva Convention so that the Germans would 
treat American POWs reciprocally. The magazine cautioned: “We should remember, 
therefore, that if we want to get super tough with the prisoners, it is our men in enemy 
hands that suffer, and not us.”69 The arguments for reciprocity, however, became 
complicated by a series of events that revealed the horrific mistreatment of American 
POWs in German hands. 
Nazi Mistreatment of American POWs  
 In late-December 1944, news broke of the Malmedy Massacre, in which 
American POWs were rounded up and ruthlessly executed by Nazi soldiers in Belgium. 
Initial reports, such as those that ran in the New York Times, did not include images, 
probably because Signal Corps photographers did not document the bodies until January 
1945, when the U.S. military recaptured the territory. 70 However, news of the massacre 
marked a turning point in American propaganda on German POWs. Stories on 
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69 Ibid., 13 
70 “Nazi Slaying of 100 Yanks Confirmed,” New York Times, Dec 21, 1944. 
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comfortable conditions in POW camps were replaced with those that conveyed Germans 
as vicious perpetrators.  
 After the massacre, there was an immediate, if indirect, shift in portrayals of 
German POWs in the United States. In early January 1945, the New York Times ran a 
series of articles (without photographs) that gave detailed accounts of Nazi POWs 
murdering fellow prisoners in American camps. In unsparing detail, one article described 
a German POW who was beaten to death with clubs, while “his barrack mates looked 
on.”71 A second article, reported that in a six-month span (September 1943 - April 1944) 
there had been six murders, two forced suicides and forty-three suicides, “doubtless due 
to insanity.”72 Notably, the violent reports were not published at the time the murders 
were committed; they ran only after the Malmedy Massacre, to call attention to German 
brutality.  
 In February 1945, Life magazine ran photographs of American soldiers killed in 
the Malmedy Massacre. In the first two years after the United States’ entry into the war, 
there was a strict censorship policy banning images of American dead from the American 
press, following a long tradition of restricting depictions of one’s own war dead. The U.S. 
government was hesitant to allow images of fallen American soldiers because it feared 
such photographs would harm American morale. But the policy had been earlier, and 
                                                
71 The article is about an ex-New Yorker who was conscripted by the German Army. 
Russell Porter, “Ex-Yorkville Man Slain as Prisoner,” New York Times, January 17, 
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famously, challenged in 1943, when Life correspondent Cal Whipple pushed for the 
publication of George Strock’s image of three American soldiers who had been killed in 
action on Buna Beach in the Pacific Theater (Fig. 1.28).73 Nearly nine months after the 
Strock photograph was taken, the War Department and President Roosevelt himself 
granted Life permission to publish it.74 This debate paved the way for the publication of 
images of American soldiers murdered in Malmedy. 
 However, in the publication of this 1945 piece on the Malmedy Massacre, Life 
and the American government still exercised sensitivity about which images of American 
war dead were appropriate to print. The opening photograph taken by Life photographer 
Johnny Florea for the magazine’s story “Murder in the Snow: Americans Find a Field of 
Horror where Germans Shot U.S. Prisoners,” shows an American soldier looking down at 
his fallen comrades (Fig. 1.29). Similar to Strock’s image, the murdered American GIs lie 
face down blanketed in snow. Their bodies are nearly indiscernible from one another. 
The photograph on an adjacent page shows another deceased American soldier laying on 
his back with his face half covered in snow. The caption explains the image was 
“retouched to obscure the dead man’s face” and that “many of the men’s faces were 
mutilated when Germans shot the wounded at close range.”75 This caption suggests that 
the magazine wanted to conceal the GI’s identity and that the original photograph was too 
                                                
73 “Behind the Picture: ‘Three Americans Dead At Buna Beach, 1943,” last accessed 
March 11, 2018: 
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beach-iconic-photo-of-three-dead-americans/?iid=lf%7Cmoreon. 
74 Life reports, “President Roosevelt and Elmer Davis and the War Department decided 
that the American people ought to be able to see their own boys as they fall in 
battle…And so here it is.” “Three Americans” Life, September 20, 1943, 34.  
75 Ibid.  
 
  68 
gruesome to print. The National Archives also has dozens of unpublished Signal Corps 
photographs of American soldiers killed at Malmedy. Some of these are close-up images 
of fallen soldiers after they had been dug out of the ground by American troops. Taken as 
evidence of Nazi crimes, these images were not released to the American press because 
they were so ghastly (Figure 1.30). 
 The American press began to publish graphic photographs of murdered 
concentration camp victims on April 10, 1945, just days after American troops liberated 
the first camp.76 The release of these photographs of the camps and images of American 
POWs starved by Nazi captors reignited outrage over the American government’s 
pampering of German POWs. Amid the controversy, however, some outlets of the 
American press maintained that the American government was dutifully upholding the 
standards set forth by the Geneva Convention. As discussed in the next chapter, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower called on American press and army photographers to thoroughly 
document the concentration camps for evidence to be used in the postwar prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals, and also so that the American public and international audiences 
could see the true extent of Nazi atrocities.  
 Shortly following this initial release of concentration camp photographs, Life 
magazine published images of American POWs recently liberated from German custody. 
Two Life photographs published in the April 16, 1945, issue depict American POWs who 
were starved by Nazi captors. One image shows a frighteningly emaciated American 
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soldier, later identified as Joe Delmer, lying on a bed with every rib and tendon visible; 
the second photograph depicts an unidentified soldier’s hollow face steeped in shadow 
(Fig. 1.31). These soldiers looked similar to Nazi concentration camp prisoners, 
demonstrating to readers that their fellow Americans were victims of Nazi brutalities. 
Though the Germans did mistreat many American prisoners in their custody, Delmer and 
his comrade were extreme cases.77 On the following page of the Life story, two more 
photographs show American POWs greeting liberating Third Army American soldiers 
outside a hospital in Frankfurt, Germany (Fig. 1.32). Though many of these “Luckier 
American Prisoners of War” lean on crutches, they appear substantially better fed. 78 The 
disparity between the Delmer and “Luckier” American POWs indicates that conditions 
for American POWs in German custody varied greatly.  
 The images of starved POWs sparked outrage over the pampering of German 
prisoners in the United States. A Newsweek article, titled “Anger at Nazi Atrocities 
Rising but U.S. Treats Prisoners Fairly,” from May 7, 1945, declared that “fury [was] 
burning deep in the hearts of every American with a boy overseas” because American 
POWs were grossly emaciated while German POWs were “fat as hogs” in the United 
States.79 The photographs in the accompanying double-page spread illustrate this brutally 
dichotomous treatment. The images on the left-hand page depict an American POW 
being medically examined and a group of American POWs, as the caption read “half-
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78 “The Backwash of Battle,” Life, April 16, 1945, 27.  
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starved as Nazi prisoners,” lying in a makeshift bed (Fig. 1.33).80 The right-hand page 
shows images of a “husky German POW” doing carpentry work and German POWs 
putting on a play in an American camp.81 The mirrored layout, with single and group 
photographs of American and German POWs on opposite pages, emphasizes their stark 
juxtaposition.  
The treatment of German POWs in American hands and American POWs in 
German custody was probably not as disparate as this pairing implied. But the American 
press did not know how difficult conditions had become for German POWs in American-
run camps in Europe after the war ended because images of such were censored. The 
Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lurch, Provost Marshal General, quoted in Newsweek, would have 
known about the difficulties providing food and shelter to German POWs. However, he 
asserted that the American government was continuing to uphold the Geneva Convention 
because the “atrocities ought not to stampede us into abandoning the American way of 
doing things.”82 With this statement Lurch espouses the fair treatment of German POWs 
as illustrative of American ideals and moral values.  
 From 1944 to 1945, the American press ran photographs of German POWs living 
in comfortable conditions in the United States. In addition to their accusations of 
pampering, outlets of the American press also chastised the American government for not 
                                                
80 Ibid., 60. 
81 Ibid., 61.  
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initiating reeducation programs that would teach German POWs about democracy.83 
During the war, the American government stood firm on this, maintaining that it could 
not institute such programs, because that would violate the Geneva Convention. 
However, after the war, the American government revealed that it had been running re-
education programs in secret since 1944. 
 
Reconstruction and Reeducation   
 Stories on German POWs continued to be published in magazines for both 
German and American audiences in the postwar period until the last POW was 
repatriated in 1947. However, postwar stories about German POWs did not focus on 
coddling allegations or deteriorating conditions within American-run camps in Europe. 
Instead both Heute for German civilians and Life for the American public ran stories on 
the reeducation programs that had been classified during the war. While each magazine 
framed the programs differently for their respective German and American audiences, 
both publications used photographs and text to showcase the success of American 
reeducation efforts and promote democratic teachings as tensions with the Soviets began 
to rise. While wartime imagery showed Nazi mistreatment of American soldiers, in the 
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Aims and Scope of Reeducation Programs 
 The aim of the American government’s reeducation program was to teach 
German POWs to appreciate American culture and democratic thinking and reject 
Nazism. The ultimate hope was that the POWs “upon repatriation to Germany might 
form the nucleus of the new German ideology which will reject totalitarian controls and 
will advocate a democratic system of government,” as explained in an Office of the 
Provost Marshall General (OPMG) report.84 In other words, the German POWs would 
ideally foster a postwar democratic Germany.  
 During the war, the reeducation program had been kept secret because it stood in 
possible violation of the Geneva Convention.85 The Geneva Convention dictated that 
POWs could not be indoctrinated with enemy propaganda. However, the U.S. War 
Department, determined to initiate the program, found a loophole in Article 17 of the 
Geneva Convention which stated: “So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage 
intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war.”86 It was therefore 
determined that the camps would offer educational courses, in addition to films and 
literature, that could pique the interest of Germans POWs and entice them to learn more 
about the United States and democracy.87 While the government could not directly 
disavow Nazism, by exposing POWs to the benefits of democracy, the reeducation 
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85 There is debate in postwar scholarship as to whether the reeducation programs violated 
the Geneva Convention. Gansberg asserts that the reeducation program was “undoubtedly 
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program was designed to illuminate for POWs the danger and falsity of Nazi ideology 
and totalitarianism.  
 The program was multi-tiered, and featured general education courses, available 
in all the camps. Subjects included math, science, and languages, with a special focus on 
English. In October 1944, the first “special” program began for a select group of 
prisoners.88 At Fort Kearney in Rhode Island, prisoners reviewed films and publication 
materials disseminated to their comrades held in other U.S. camps, screened POW 
newspapers created in camps to assess Nazi leanings, and created their own newspaper, 
Der Ruf, which was distributed to other camps. After V-E Day, the U.S. government 
initiated specific programs to train German POWs for administrative and police roles in 
occupied Germany. At Fort Getty, also in Rhode Island, and its affiliated police school, 
the Wetherill Program trained roughly 1,000 German POWs through a sixty-day course 
focused on the language of English and the principles of democracy. 89 As a last-ditch 
effort before all POWs were repatriated, the War Department ran a program at Fort Eustis 
in Virginia from January 1946 to April 1946, in which 22,000 POWs attended a six-day 
intensive program before returning home.90 
                                                
88 POWs for special programs at Fort Kearny, Fort Eustis, and Fort Getty were chosen 
because they had demonstrated anti-Nazi leanings through assessment surveys that all 
POWs were compelled to take. The initial special education program actually started at 
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1945). Krammer, Nazi Prisoners, 200.  
89 English was taught in these intensive programs in order to train POWs for 
administrative and police work in occupied Germany. It was also believed that 
knowledge of English would strengthen POW’s understanding of democracy. William G. 
Moulton, "Our Profession in Reverse: Teaching English to German Prisoners of 
War." The Modern Language Journal 32, no. 6 (1948): 421-30.  
90 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners, 220-221. 
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Reeducation Photographs in the Wartime Leaflet Campaign 
 Even though photographs of the reeducation program did not run in the American 
press, they were included in an Allied leaflet campaign for German soldiers. A short-
lived leaflet, which ran in June and July 1944, featured a photograph of German POWs in 
a classroom at an American prisoner-of-war camp (Fig. 1.34).91 Instead of picturing 
POWs at work, the photograph shows POWs in a comfortable setting. Leaning over 
drafting tables, they appear actively engaged in their studies. A print of this same Signal 
Corps photograph in NARA was marked with a censorship notice barring it from 
circulation within the Western Hemisphere. But if the American government feared 
German retaliation for their reeducation efforts, why would they have included this 
photograph on a leaflet intended for German audiences? 
 There are several possible reasons. One possible objective was to provide German 
soldiers with a vision of a hopeful future. Despite the fact that any mention of German 
reconstruction was exceedingly rare in American wartime propaganda, the POW 
classroom leaflet was headlined “Here is Where Reconstruction Begins.”92 Appealing to 
a German sense of responsibility to country, the leaflet text read: “Your duty as a soldier 
has been done…Your family, your people and your Fatherland need healthy people to 
rebuild.”93 While many other leaflets focused on surrender or threatened future 
destruction from Allied bombs, this one stood apart for its promise to give Germans an 
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active role in the reconstruction. This narrative of German POWs helping to rebuild 
Germany also combated Nazi counter-propaganda, which asserted that POWs would not 
be allowed to return home quickly after the war and would remain in American custody 
as forced laborers.    
 The “Reconstruction” leaflet advertised general education courses that provided 
practical skills for reconstruction. It listed classes in medicine, natural sciences, 
languages (English, French, Spanish, and Russian) and engineering, including Machine 
Construction and Mechanical Engineering.94 The leaflet also said that the Allies were in 
the process of negotiation with a German high school, so that diplomas could be 
recognized in Germany once soldiers repatriated.95 This represented an optimistic sign of 
cooperation between the two enemy countries. The leaflet does not mention the special 
programs on American history or democracy since these were still in the planning stages. 
The first special education program in Fort Kearney was not initiated until October 1944, 
three months after the “Reconstruction” leaflet. “Special” programs were kept classified 
until after the war, because the U.S. government continued to encourage surrender as a 
primary objective, withholding any information that might discourage German soldiers 
from doing so. 
Postwar Stories on Special Education for German and American Audiences 
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 The Fort Getty special education program to train POWs for positions in postwar 
Germany ran after V-E Day from May to October 1945.96  However, stories about it did 
not run in Life and Heute until March 1946, as Cold War tensions began to grow. Heute, 
the American government-sponsored German-language magazine for German civilians, 
began publication in June 1945 and ran until 1951. Published twice monthly in Munich, 
Heute was run by Allied editors, assisted by some German staff members. In postwar 
occupied Germany, the American government published a range of newspapers in the 
American zone, but Heute stood apart because it was a photo-illustrated magazine, 
modeled after Life and Signal, a popular wartime German propaganda magazine. In many 
ways, Heute had similar goals to the POW reeducation program. Its stated aim was “to 
give Germans a truthful picture of America, of the world, and of their own 
reconstruction.”97Among its stories on reconstruction, sports, and literature, Heute 
featured articles that promoted American culture and democracy, hoping to pique 
German civilian readers’ interests in these subjects.  
 Like many stories in Heute, “Als Kriegsgefanger in USA” (As a Prisoner of War 
in the USA), which ran on March 1, 1946, was an optimistic tale in praise of America. It 
differed from most of the other articles in the magazine because it was written by a 
German author, and not an Allied one. The author was a former POW, identified in the 
byline only by his initials, H.A. Captured in North Africa, H.A. remained in American 
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captivity for over two years, first held in Camp Gruber in Oklahoma and then in 1945 
transferred to Fort Getty.98  
 In “As a Prisoner,” H.A. conveyed his experience at Fort Getty as one for which 
he was grateful. He described the school as a co-operative and open-minded environment. 
He wrote, “Our school bore… the democratic spirit of America: it is trust, rather than 
mistrust, understanding rather than malice, voluntary discipline rather than compulsion. 
Fort Getty was a school of goodwill.”99 These qualities not only fit an idealized captor-
prisoner relationship, but also served as a hopeful model for the postwar American 
occupier-German civilian relationship. H.A. described his American professors as true 
mentors and not as captors, writing: “It is difficult to say to whom of these men we owe 
most” as they helped the students to “rediscover values that had been buried in us” and 
helped him to see his country, the world, and the U.S. more clearly.100 H.A.’s effusive 
testimony in Heute fit squarely within the reeducation program’s aims whereby former 
POWs shepherded an appreciation for Americans and democracy into postwar Germany. 
In a paternalistic sense, the American government also hoped that German civilians 
would be similarly welcoming of postwar reeducation programs.  
                                                
98 H.A.’s dates of captivity listed are listed in the byline: August 4, 1943 to November 30, 
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 Though H.A.’s description of Fort Getty is expansive, none of the accompanying 
photographs show the special education program. Months before “As a Prisoner” ran, 
photographs of both Camp Gruber and Fort Getty were requested for the Heute spread 
but the latter appears to have been denied, likely because information on the special 
reeducation programs was not yet permitted for release to German and American 
audiences.101  Instead the eight Signal Corps photographs in “As a Prisoner” show a 
range of activities in Camp Gruber (Fig. 1.34). Organized across a two-page spread, they 
depict POWs heading to work or at a library, a radio station, in a bunkroom, a 
recreational room, a kitchen, and a theater.  
 Only one photograph in the article shows a classroom, and it depicts a general 
education course in Camp Gruber rather than a special education class in Fort Getty. The 
single classroom picture is nearly illegible, with a pole cutting two-thirds across the 
frame (Fig. 1.35). A POW and a teacher stand at the front of the classroom. Although the 
teacher’s nationality is indiscernible from the photograph alone, the caption said, “All 
subjects were taught by fellow prisoners.”102 This statement offers an implicit yet 
important distinction from H.A.’s description of Fort Getty classes taught by American 
professors. Prisoners acting as teachers fell within the Geneva Convention statute that 
                                                
101 The Office of War Information (OWI) Bureau of Overseas Publications supplied 
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allowed for “intellectual diversions…organized by prisoners of war,” while the use of 
American teachers could have been construed as a violation of the Geneva Convention.103 
Careful to avoid this latter interpretation, H.A.’s article said that initial proposals for 
courses with Americans teaching POWs about “American thought and life” were rejected 
because of the Geneva Convention, and the program at Fort Getty was only implemented 
after the war.104 This statement implied that the Fort Getty program was not a violation 
because it began after the war, but in truth, prisoners held in the U.S. after the war were 
still protected by the Geneva Convention.  
 The language Heute used to describe the special education programs was 
markedly different from a similar story in Life magazine for American audiences. 
Published on March 18, 1946, the Life “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy” article opened: 
“For more than 18 months the Army has been indoctrinating German prisoners in this 
country with the ideals of constitutional government.”105 Life, unlike Heute, dated the 
start of the reeducation program to September 1944. It also focused on Fort Eustis, which 
had a program still in operation at the time of the Life article, as opposed to Fort Getty, 
mentioned in the Heute story, which had closed its program by the time the “As a 
Prisoner” story ran.  
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 Conspicuously, Life did not mention the Geneva Convention. Moreover, the 
magazine’s use of the term “indoctrinating” blatantly violated the Geneva Convention 
and described a top-down approach that starkly contrasted with the cooperative 
environment described by H.A. Life’s mention of Fort Eustis lectures such as “Why the 
Weimar Republic Failed” also implied a more forthright rejection of Nazism than what 
was portrayed in Heute.106 Heute authors would not have written about such courses for 
fear of alienating its German readers.  
 The photographs of Fort Eustis in Life’s “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy” portray 
German POWs as embracing American democracy. Beneath the opening photograph that 
shows a sea of faces in dark uniforms looking intently toward the front of the auditorium, 
a second photograph shows a POW in front of an American flag delivering a lecture to 
his fellow internees (Fig. 1.36). On the following page, a photograph depicts POWs 
gathered under a poster that reads: “Democracy is not only a government system. It is a 
way of life” (Fig. 1.35).107 In both photographs, the flag and the poster stand as symbols 
or statements of American ideology. The position of the POWs next to these emblems in 
the image suggests that they are readily accepting of American ideals.   
 Both Life and Heute praised the special education programs but used varying 
images and text to frame the story differently for their respective audiences. But what 
prompted both magazines to release their stories on the program in March 1946?108 The 
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Life photo-story “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy” may have been prompted by an invitation 
to photograph a Fort Eustis graduation, which was open to the press.109 However, the 
timing of the article’s release also aligned with brewing Cold War tensions in 1946. A 
narrative about the resiliency of American culture and its success in the reeducation 
program provided a helpful counter-narrative to the threat of Soviet ideology on the rise.   
  The same March 18, 1946, Life issue that featured the Fort Eustis story also 
included three articles that referenced growing Cold War fears. The first was about 
Winston Churchill’s March 5, 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech, in which he warned that all of 
Germany could potentially fall to communism and ultimately destroy the peace that had 
been so hard-won in World War II.110 The former Prime Minister also an proposed 
American-British alliance “to oppose Russian advance.” 111 In the second article, Joseph 
Kennedy, a former ambassador to Great Britain, outlined his own proposal for America’s 
relationship with Russia, and referenced Soviet attempts to “communize” Germany.112 
The third was a Life editorial, titled “‘Getting Tough’ with Russia,” which responded to 
the Kennedy and Churchill stories. The Life editorial stated: “In our belief Mr. Kennedy 
does not give sufficient weight to the practical need for American idealism in American 
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foreign policy. The conflicts in the modern world concern ideas and ideals no less than 
bases and bread.”113 Such a statement signals the motivations behind Life’s decision to 
run the Fort Eustis story and explains why the War Department opened the Fort Eustis 
graduation to the press. Both Life and the War Department wanted to propagate the 
strength of American ideals, champion America’s ability to spread democracy, and 
reassure the American public that Germany would not fall to communism and, and a 
result, bring on World War III, as Churchill had suggested.  
 The Heute issue from March 1946 did not reference the imminent threat of USSR, 
but the Soviet state became a latent theme in the magazine. Cold War tensions are evident 
in an October 1946 Heute story about German POWs returning from Soviet camps. 
Unlike H.A.’s article on the American camps, the story titled, “Homecoming from 
Russia,” did not include text testifying to a positive experience, nor were there any 
photographs from inside the camp (likely because Heute did not have access to them). 
Instead, the story was told in pictures, showing German POWs at the moment of their 
return home.  
 The German POWs pictured returning from Soviet camps are bruised and 
bandaged, which contrasts sharply with the cheery photographs of POW camps in the 
United States. In five out of eight photographs, they are shown hobbling on canes or 
crutches (Fig. 1.37). In one image, a wounded soldier requires a nurse’s help to get off a 
truck (Fig. 1.37). These images starkly diverge from those included in H.A.’s story of 
POWs playing in an orchestra, attending classes, and shopping in a commissary (Fig. 
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1.35). While H.A. described his POW experience as enlightening, the POWs who 
returned from Russian camps are shown as “war-wounded,” as described in the 
captions.114 The photographs in “Homecoming from Russia” imply that German POWs 
had been abused or mistreated by their Soviet captors. According to historian Robert 
Moeller, the narrative of Germans as victims of the Soviets became dominant in Germany 
during the 1950s.115  
 Heute wanted to position the America government as a benevolent captor and 
occupier in comparison to the Russians, and its story about the last German POWs 
released from American custody showed Germans in much higher spirits. A photograph 
published in Heute on July 17, 1947, depicts an American GI, perhaps a U.S. Army 
Signal Corps photographer, with a camera to his eye, photographing Walter Hartwig, the 
last POW, as he looks down at his discharge papers (Fig. 1.38). Hartwig smiles, as do the 
young man beside him, with his arm in a sling and pipe at his lips, and many of their 
German comrades in the crowd looking on. This story not only showcased the fact that 
the American government was the first of the Allied occupiers to release all its German 
prisoners, but, in picturing the American and German soldiers smiling together, it implied 
that the former enemy nations were now on friendly terms. 
Former POWs in Occupied Germany: A Photographic Album 
 Neither Heute nor Life discussed what became of the graduates of the special 
education programs. However, photographs in an unpublished makeshift album in NARA 
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show the final discharge of former special POWs and their subsequent roles in 
government positions in American-occupied Germany. This album, titled “Photographic 
Record: Former Special Prisoners Engaged in their Present Jobs as Civilians,” is 
comprised of twenty-three manila paper pages bound by a fastener clip (Fig. 1.38).116 
Slits have been cut into the pages and forty-seven small photographs shoehorned in. 
Typed captions were simply cut and pasted next to each photograph. The format suggests 
this is a unique object and not a mass-produced, widely seen album. Though it may have 
been shown to English-speaking German POWs, it was likely created as an historical 
record for the American side.117 Its aim was to show the special education program as a 
lasting success.  
 The “Photographic Record” portrays the discharge of POWs as a quick and 
hopeful process. Photographs on the first six pages depict former special POWs in a 
discharge center in Bad Aibling, Germany, near Munich, likely in 1946 or 1947. They are 
pictured filing paperwork, being medically examined, and provided with ration tickets 
(Fig. 1.39-1.42). The final image in this sequence shows the gate of the Bad Aibling 
center (Fig. 1.43). The wide driveway, in a swath of light gray mirroring the sky, 
stretches across the frame. Rucksacks and former POWs line a diagonal stretch flowing 
out of the hangar. The caption says that 24,000 former special prisoners walked through 
this gate as “free men” who could “take off in search of their next of kin and start their 
                                                
116 The italicization of civilians in the original album emphasizes that the former soldiers 
are voluntary serving the American occupying government, rather than fulfilling 
conscripted service.  
117 There are a lot of typos/spelling errors in captions, which could also suggest the album 
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life anew.”118 This promising message and the sequence of images imply that graduates 
of the special education programs were immediately set “free.” However, the album 
photographs only show the final steps of discharge and leave out the much more labored 
repatriation process that the majority of German POWs faced. 
 For many, the path from prisoners to repatriated citizen was circuitous. From V-E 
Day to 1947, the repatriation process proceeded slowly and piecemeal as the American 
government transferred approximately one million German POWs to governments in 
France, Britain, and Belgium to help rebuild Europe. The other million were conscripted 
to work in a range of positions in both skilled and unskilled work in the American zone 
of occupied Germany. In the spring of 1946, the POWs in the American zone were given 
a choice to be immediately repatriated or continue their work as voluntary civilian 
workers.119  
 While the repatriation narrative is left out of the unpublished album, it is still 
remarkable because it shows a complete turnaround in the portrayal of German POWs 
during the postwar period. In late 1944 and the spring of 1945, Germans were described 
as savage brutes, shooting and starving American POWs and concentration camp victims. 
However, in this album from 1946 or 1947, Germans are shown as productive members 
of the postwar occupation, working cooperatively with the American government. The 
photographs, taken by an unknown photographer, show a range of positions that former 
POWs held. Posed with tools of their trade, they are photographed in their positions as 
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doctors, dentists, nurses, painters, cooks, and mechanics. Each image is staged to show 
the positions in the best possible light. The kitchens are clean, and the gurneys are 
immaculate (Fig. 1.44-.46). In the photograph of an “unskilled laborer,” former POW 
Rupert Reigersburger stands (in unsullied clothing) against a backdrop of mounds of dirt, 
holding a shovel against his body (Fig. 1.44). But the empty wheelbarrow beside him, 
which has a sheet of glass precariously balancing on it, resembles a prop rather than a 
tool. The caption reveals that Reigersburger was “one of thousands of former Fort Eustis 
graduates now engaged as unskilled laborers in the reconstruction of towns and cities 
throughout the U.S. zone of occupation.” 120 The album does not mention that many 
former POWs had been conscripted to do more hazardous jobs, such as clearing enemy 
mines.121 
 The album also includes photographs of former special prisoners who were 
appointed to government positions in occupied Germany and Austria.122 In the immediate 
postwar period, the American and other occupying governments in Germany and Austria 
attempted widespread denazification, which included removing anyone affiliated with the 
Nazi Party from governmental and cultural affairs offices. While this initiative proved 
nearly impossible, it left many open seats in the occupying government.123 Some of these 
were filled by former special POWs who had been trained in the ideals of democracy, and 
the album shows fourteen men posed at their desks, looking down at papers or up at 
secretaries, presenting themselves as productive members of the occupying government. 
                                                
120 Album, “Photographic Record,” n.p. 
121 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners, 248.  
122 Like Germany, Austria was split into four zones of occupation.  
123 Denazification is discussed further in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.   
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The positions ranged from economic, public health, and education advisors to some in 
cultural affairs. One image depicts Helmut Alt, a former POW who was on the editorial 
staff of Heute, and was possibly also the mysterious H.A. author of “As a Prisoner” (Fig. 
1.47). Together the photographs in this album present a positive picture of Germans 
working with the American government to build a democratic postwar government.   
 
Conclusion   
 During the war and the immediate postwar period, the American government 
employed a strategy of selective truth in order to frame itself as a more benevolent captor 
than Germany or the Soviet Union. From 1944 to 1947, the images of POWs shifted from 
a focus on surrender to the successful rehabilitation of German POWs as Cold War 
tensions brewed. The photographs of German POWs surrendering in Europe, in captivity 
in the United States, and in reeducation programs published in Heute, Life, and the Allied 
leaflets presented American treatment of German POWs in a favorable light. However, 
the unpublished Signal Corps photographs of difficult conditions in Europe that were 
deliberately omitted from propaganda for German and American audiences hint at a 
grittier narrative and an imperfect POW program. Although photographs of plentiful 
sausages, C-Rations, and meager loaves of bread are all equally truthful representations 
of experiences German POWs faced in American custody, truth is not synonymous with 
credibility (Fig. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). Nazi propaganda’s overt and unsubtle use of photography 
to deceive audiences ushered in a certain level of skepticism on the part of both German 
and American viewers. So American propagandists had to be exceedingly careful in 
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choosing images that they thought would be most believable and persuasive in materials 
for each target demographic: German soldiers, American soldiers, German civilians and 
the American public. As explored in the following chapters, similar issues of selective 
truth and credibility would persist in American press and propaganda coverage of the 
liberation of the concentration camps and the war crimes trial.
 
  89 
Chapter 2 
Capturing Guilt: Photographs of German War Crimes and Criminals 
 
 Immediately after V-E Day, the American government began to plaster posters 
showing U.S. Army Signal Corps photographs of Nazi concentration camps throughout 
German cities in order to make German civilians confront the atrocities. The photographs 
featuring emaciated survivors and piles of bodies strewn across fields and in mass graves 
served as evidence that war crimes had been committed. The headline on one such poster 
proclaimed: “Diese Schandtaten: Eure Schuld!” (These Shameful Acts: Your Guilt!) (Fig. 
2.1). “Eure,” the German informal pronoun for the collective you, directly assigns fault to 
the German civilian viewer. The text continues: “In twelve years, the Nazi criminals have 
tortured, displaced, and murdered millions of Europeans…You have quietly watched and 
tacitly tolerated it. This is your great guilt - you are jointly responsible for these cruel 
crimes!”1 This was the frequently reiterated Allied message of collective guilt, which 
proclaimed that, since they had actively or tacitly supported National Socialism, all 
German civilians and military were equally responsible for the war and its consequences. 
 However, this campaign centering on German collective guilt ended just a few 
months after it started. And by 1946, Heute, an American government picture magazine 
for German civilians, was welcoming Germany “back into the family of nations.”2 On 
October 15, 1946, Heute's cover photograph shows a sea of Germans clamoring for a 
newspaper that announced the verdicts of the Nuremberg Trial, which had prosecuted 
                                                
1 “In zwölf Jahren haben die Nazi-Verbrecher Millionen Europäer gefoltert, verschleppt 
und ermordet...Ihr habt ruhig zugesehen und es stillschweigend geduldet. Das ist Eure 
Große Schuld- ihr seid mitverantwortlich für diese grausamen Verbrechen!“ “Diese 
Schandtaten: Eure Schuld!,“ poster, 1945, Das Bundesarchiv, Germany.  
2 Heute, October 15, 1946, American digest. n.p.  
 
  90 
twenty-two of the highest ranking Nazi Party leaders for crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity (Fig. 2.2).3 A far cry from the 1945 posters that 
condemned German civilians for their participation in National Socialism, this 
photograph suggests that they were now actively and positively engaged in the 
democratic process.  
This chapter charts the publication of photographs of concentration camps and of the 
war crimes trial in American press and propaganda publications from 1945 to 1948. 
Through a close study of American propaganda portrayals of Nazi atrocities and the war 
crimes trial, it examines the American government’s use of photography to negotiate 
Germany’s transition from enemy to potential ally. It also demonstrates how latent Cold 
War tensions and difficult conditions on the ground in occupied Germany influenced the 
government’s choices of which images to publish or censor for each of their target 
audiences.   
 Like the portrayals of German prisoners-of-war studied in the last chapter, 
American propaganda framed Nazi concentration camps and the war crimes trial 
differently for German and American audiences, and the coverage of these two subjects 
shifted in the immediate postwar period as the American government’s occupation 
policies and objectives evolved. Just as it aimed to teach German prisoners-of-war to 
reject Nazism and embrace democracy, the United States government sought to use 
photographs of the German concentration camps and the trials themselves as re-education 
tools to teach the German population about the horrific consequences of National 
                                                
3 Martin Bormann, Chief of the Nazi Party Chancellery, was the only leading Nazi to be 
tried in absentia.  
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Socialism and to steer them towards building a postwar democratic society. However, 
with Germany and much of Europe in ruins, and millions of lives lost, questions loomed 
as to who should be held criminally and morally responsible for the war, how these 
people should be punished, and how the prosecutions could be carried out in a way that 
would mitigate future conflicts. As the realities and responsibilities of the postwar 
occupation of Germany set in—including the challenges of implementing a 
denazification program, a ban on fraternization, and the need to maintain an adequate 
supply of food—the American government had to keep readjusting its prosecutorial aims 
and its postwar approach to the German people. As a result, photography became a key 
tool in navigating and communicating complicated ideas of guilt, responsibility, and 
ultimately, justice to German and American audiences. 
  As in the previous chapter, I will discuss images published in Army Talks (a U.S. 
Army magazine for American soldiers), Life (an independent commercial publication for 
the American public), Heute (the American government-sponsored picture magazine for 
German civilians), Psychological Warfare Division materials (also created for the 
German public) and unpublished photographs from the National Archives Records 
Administration (NARA). Analysis of the photographs and text featured in and omitted 
from these materials demonstrates how the scars of World War II and Cold War tensions 
affected the construction and transnational dissemination of photo-illustrated propaganda. 
The first section, which spans the period from V-E Day (May 8, 1945) to the early fall of 
1945, examines the way in which photographs of concentration camps were published for 
German consumption in Heute and Psychological Warfare Division posters and 
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pamphlets in order to bring Nazi war crimes to light and stimulate a sense of collective 
German guilt in civilians. The second section analyzes Army Talks and Heute’s coverage 
of Nuremberg Trials, which ran from November 1945 to October 1946, comparing their 
presentation for German and for American audiences. Both magazines used images of top 
defendants to shift attention away from collective German guilt and toward a focus on the 
individual criminal punishment of top Nazi Party leaders.  
 The third section examines photographs of the executions of the Nuremberg 
defendants on October 16, 1946, which were not reported on in Heute for German 
civilians or Army Talks for American soldiers. However, Life magazine, geared toward 
the American public in the U.S., ran several stories on them. The final section examines 
unpublished archival Signal Corps photographs of the executions of defendants 
prosecuted in the American military-governed Dachau trials (1945-1947), a series of 462 
trials. In total, the American military commissions prosecuted 1,676 lower-ranking war 
criminals, and by 1951 had executed 272 persons.4 These pictures were not shown to 
German or American audiences. I contend that by this stage of the postwar period the 
American government censored U.S. Army Signal Corps photographs of these executions 
for fear that they would weaken German-American relations as the Soviet Union loomed 
as an adversary. As demonstrated in chapter one, the United States government promoted 
itself as a benevolent occupier and a kind captor to its prisoners. During the Nuremberg 
                                                
4 Lisa Yavnai, “US Army War crimes trial in Germany, 1945-1947,” in Atrocities on 
Trial: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes, eds. Patricia 
Heberer, and Jürgen Matthäus (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 
published in Association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), 49. 
Memo from McCloy to Larry Dalcher, German Public Affairs, Office of the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany, May 18, 1951. RG466 Box 11, NARA. 
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and Dachau trials, the government similarly aimed to portray itself as a great arbiter of 
justice, and it censored any photographs that could compromise this aim.   
 
Concentration Camp Photographs and the American Collective Guilt Campaign for 
German Civilians 
 
 By examining Signal Corps photographs of German concentration camps that 
were published on posters, pamphlets, and magazines for German civilians, this section 
explores the ways in which these materials were designed to force Germans to recognize 
the existence of the concentration camps and feel a measure of collective guilt for them.5 
The dissemination of American propaganda on the camps began in Germany shortly after 
V-E Day (May 8, 1945) and subsided by early fall of that year, as the American 
government realized that Germans were not receptive to their message of collective guilt. 
The American government quickly shifted their propaganda strategies in response to 
changing relations with the German population.   
American Troops First Enter and Photograph Concentration Camps 
 At the Moscow Conference in October 1943 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister 
Churchill, and Premier Stalin signed the “Statement of Atrocities,” which stated that they 
had received “from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded 
mass executions.”6 However, the American government did not realize the extent of Nazi 
                                                
5 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Psychological Warfare Division 
(SHAEF PWD), Directive no. 1 for Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information 
Service, May 1945, 2. NARA   
6 Moscow Conference Declarations can be found at: “The Moscow Conference; October 
1943,” Yale Law School, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and 
Diplomacy, , last accessed March 12, 2019, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp. 
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war crimes until American troops first entered the camps, only a month before the war in 
Europe ended. Ohrdruf concentration camp was the first to be liberated by American 
soldiers, on April 4, 1945. The following week, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, along with General George S. Patton and General Omar 
Bradley, visited the camp. After which, Eisenhower ordered American civilian press and 
Army photographers to thoroughly document what they saw there, so that the images 
could be used as evidence in subsequent war crimes trial and to allow American, German, 
and international audiences to see the true extent of Nazi barbarism.   
  Declaring the need to bear witness to the horrors discovered there, Eisenhower 
later cabled General George C. Marshall:  
The things I saw beggar description…The visual evidence and the verbal testimony 
of starvation, cruelty and bestiality were so overpowering as to leave me a bit sick…I 
made the visit deliberately, in order to be in a position to give first-hand evidence of 
these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these 
allegations merely to “propaganda.”7 
 
Eisenhower knew that reports on the concentration camps would be greeted with 
skepticism, in part because the veracity of World War I atrocity propaganda had been 
widely debated in the interwar period.8 It appears, however, that World War I atrocity 
                                                                                                                                            
For more information on the Moscow Declaration see: Chapter 1, Thomas Jardin, The 
Mauthausen Trial: American Military Justice in Germany (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). For a fascinating exhibition about what the Americans knew 
about the Holocaust before the liberation of the concentration camps see: United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), last accessed March 12, 2019, 
https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/americans-and-the-holocaust/main. 
7 Letter from Eisenhower to Marshall, April 15, 1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower and George 
Marshall, Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1971), 223. Quote and italics in Dear General. 
8 For a great account of the interwar scholarship doubting World War I propaganda see: 
Nicoletta F. Gullace, “Allied Propaganda and World War I: Interwar Legacies, Media 
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reports of German barbarism were widely comprised of eyewitness accounts and 
illustrations and did not include photographs. Though photography had been used as 
evidence and in police records since the late nineteenth century, strict censorship policies 
in World War I drastically limited who could photograph the war and what images were 
permitted to circulate. In World War II, however, the number of military and press 
photographers on the ground vastly increased, and while there was still censorship, 
Eisenhower and the American government believed that images of the camps should be 
widely seen. Photographs would make American atrocity reports more credible than 
illustrations and written accounts alone.  
 To marshal his evidence, Eisenhower invited a wide array of persons to the 
concentration camps, creating a series of eyewitness testimonies. From the American 
side, he brought in Congressmen, journalists, and American soldiers.9 On April 15, 1945, 
General Patton ordered the Mayor of Weimar and a thousand local German citizens to 
tour Buchenwald so that they too would see the atrocities first-hand.10 Concentration 
camp prisoners were still on site when the initial tours began, and even acted as tour 
guides, demonstrating Nazi torture methods (Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4). German forced tours 
continued in other camps for about a month until General Bradley recommend that they 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies, and the Politics of War Guilt,” History Compass 9/9 (2011): 686–700. This 
skepticism was readily and widely addressed in World War II American press and 
propaganda stories on the concentration camps.   
9 This request was issued in a cable from Eisenhower to General George C. Marshall, 
April 19, 1945. Cable reprinted in Dwight D. Eisenhower and Alfred D. Chandler, 
ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. IV (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1970), 2623. 
10 George S. Patton, Paul D. Harkins, War as I Knew It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947, 
294; Cora S. Goldstein, Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in 
Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 30.  
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be stopped because the camps and bodies needed to be cleaned up.11 German civilians 
and former concentration camp guards were also forced to collect bodies that had been 
left in the open, exhume mass graves, and rebury the victims in individual graves.12  
 To convey the atrocities to a wide international audience who could not see the 
camps first-hand, U.S. Army Signal Corps photographers were ordered to extensively 
document the camps. A Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) 
Public Relations directive instructed all Signal Corps motion picture and still 
photographic units to provide “immediate and complete” coverage of “each enemy PW 
and concentration camp.”13 The directive also suggested specific things to shoot 
including: mass graves, gates, barbed wire, torture rooms, workrooms, and “dispositions 
of property” (such as shoes and false teeth).14 This call for coverage resulted in an 
immense body of material, documenting the innumerable victims and also the forced 
tours and reburials. While it is difficult to estimate the number of photographs taken by 
Signal Corps photographers, thousands of prints of the camps, many of which remain 
unpublished, are currently held in NARA, the main repository of Signal Corps 
photographs. 
                                                
11 Goldstein, Capturing the German Eye, 35. NARA holds photographs, dated May 27, 
1945, of American soldiers touring concentrations camps after the bodies had been 
cleared.  
12 Annex. No 4. to 82nd Airborne Division After-Action Report May 1945.   
13 SHAEF Public Relations Division, “Subject: Motion Pictures of Concentration 
Camps,” April 25, 1945, 1. RG331 Box 3 Entry S2, NARA. 
14 Ibid.  
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 The varied uses and intended audiences for Signal Corps stills and motion 
pictures of the camps were outlined in the SHAEF Public Relations directive. It stated 
that the footage would be used for:  
 a. Evidence for Judge Advocate General War Crimes commission.  
 b. Showing to U.S. troops.  
 c. Possible release in civilian theaters in the U.S.  
 d. Showing by the Psychological Warfare Division to German civilians  
 e. Released by the Office of War information.15 
 
Signal Corps photographs were edited and framed differently for these varied campaigns 
in order to make the reports most convincing to both German and American audiences. 
While there has been extensive scholarship on civilian and Signal Corps photographs of 
the concentration camps in the American press and some on the legal function of the 
photographs as evidence in the war crimes trial, far less attention has been paid to the 
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) visual campaign for German audiences.16 The 
following examination of PWD posters, pamphlets, and magazines demonstrates the 
ways in which the American government used photographs to force Germans to confront 
Nazi war crimes. 
Posters 
 Shortly after V-E Day, the American government hung posters with Signal Corps 
photographs of the concentration camps throughout German cities in order to make 
                                                
15 Ibid.  
16 See: Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the 
Camera's Eye (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Goldstein, Capturing the 
German Eye; Janina Struk. Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Dagmar Barnouw, Germany 1945: Views of War and 
Violence (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996); Christian Delage, “Image as 
Evidence and Mediation: The Experience of the Nuremberg Trials” Law and Popular 
Culture (Oxford UP, 2005): 491-503. 
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German civilians see and feel a sense of collective guilt for Nazi crimes. The posters 
often showed somewhat local atrocities (e.g., posters hung in Munich depicted Landsberg 
concentration camp, about 39 miles away), in order to tie those crimes to the Germans 
living nearby.    
 According to a New York Times article headlined “All Reich to See Atrocities: 
Allies Will Billboard Scenes in Each Community to Teach Germans They Have Guilt,” 
the American and British information services “perfected” their plan for the billboard 
campaign on April 23, 1945, two weeks before V-E Day.17 With victory imminent, this 
telling headline conveys both the intended scope and top-down tenor of the poster 
campaign.18 The Allied victors sought to reeducate “all citizens of conquered Germany” 
by making editorials, newspapers, and photographs of the atrocities “required reading.”19 
The photo-illustrated billboards and posters were to be posted in “every community in 
conquered Germany at points where inhabitants will be compelled to view them as they 
go to and from their homes.”20 Inserted into the German visual landscape, the placement 
and the size of the billboards made the images of concentration camps difficult to avoid.   
 An archival Signal Corps photograph, dated May 11, 1945, shows the physical 
scale of the billboards. Approximately six feet high, this billboard in Beckum, Germany 
stands on the ground so that civilians can walk up and closely examine the images (Fig. 
2.5). Two young boys stand inches away from the billboard and beside them, an older 
                                                
17 Charles Eagen, “All Reich to See Camp Atrocities,” New York Times, April 24, 1945.  
18 The actual or realized scope the campaign—how many posters were printed and posted 
throughout Germany—is not known. 
19 Eagen, “All Reich to See.”  
20 Ibid.  
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gentleman, a middle-aged man, and a woman pushing a toddler also study the 
photographs. The cross-section of civilians in this image is consistent with the American 
government’s aim to make every German see the atrocities.  
 Displayed on this billboard were ten photographs of the Gardelegen massacre, 
which involved the active participation of German civilians (Fig. 2.5). On April 13, 1945, 
1,016 prisoners who had been evacuated by the SS from Dora-Mittlebau concentration 
camp were forced into a barn guarded by Hitler Youth, members of the Volksstrum 
(Hitler’s national civilian militia), and local firefighters the SS had recruited. The barn 
was subsequently set fire, and any prisoner who tried to escape was shot.21 The Signal 
Corps photographs on the billboard shows the outside of the barn, still smoldering, with 
bodies piled against a brick wall, and gruesome close-up images of victims who tried to 
escape by burrowing under the barn. This horrifying scene was presumably chosen for 
display because the crime directly involved townspeople in Gardelegen, which was only 
about 180 miles away.  
 Another archival Signal Corps photograph shows a man outside the 
Feldherrnhalle (Field Marshall’s Hall) in Munich looking at a poster, which has three 
Signal Corps photographs of concentration camp victims (Fig. 2.6). The poster headlines 
asks, “Wessen Schuld?” (Whose fault?), and its text continues, “The feeling of 
tremendous guilt must shake all conscience in Germany to the core” (Fig. 2.7).22 In 
response to this assertion of collective German guilt, an anonymous viewer wrote in large 
                                                
21 For more information see: “Gardelgen,” USHMM, last accessed March 12, 2019, 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10006173. 
22 „Das Gefühl einer ungeheuren Schuld muss alle Gewissen in Deutschland aufs tiefste 
erschüttern.„“Wessen Schuld?,” Poster, Das Bundesarchiv.  
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letters of graffiti across the Felderrnhalle, “KZ – Dachau –Velden – Buchenwald. I am 
ashamed to be German.”23 (The location of this graffiti is particularly poignant because 
the Feldherrnhalle was the site of the Beer Hall Putsch, when Hitler attempted a coup on 
the German government in 1923, and it served as an important memorial site during the 
Nazi era.) On May 22, 1945, the Signal Corps radioed this image to the press with the 
triumphant headline “A German Regrets!,” but its extended caption notes that this was an 
“unusual and uncommon” response.24 
Although the anonymous graffiti-writer expressed shame, in general, the Germans 
took a negative view of this poster campaign. In her 1950 article “The Aftermath of Nazi 
Rule,” Hannah Arendt wrote of Germans’ “very violent reaction” to the posters.25 Arendt 
posits that many Germans responded negatively because American propaganda was their 
first “authentic knowledge” of the crimes and so they asked, “how could they feel guilty 
if they had not even known?”26 She continued: “All they saw was the pointed finger 
clearly indicating the wrong person. From this error they concluded that the whole poster 
was a propaganda lie.”27 These issues of what Germans knew of the camps and why the 
collective guilt campaign failed—not least because many Germans felt that they 
                                                
23 “K.Z. Dachau-Velden-Buchenwald. Ich schäme mich daß ich ein Deutscher bin.” 
Signal Corps photograph, NS-Dokumentationszentrum München (Munich 
Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism).  
24 Signal Corps photograph, NS-Dokumentationszentrum. 
25 Hannah Arendt, “The Aftermath of Nazi Rule,” Commentary, vol. 10, 1950, 349. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
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themselves were victims—has been widely explored in both contemporary and period 
scholarship.28  
 Another reason for Germans’ negative response was that the poster format and 
message of guilt were reminiscent of Nazi propaganda. In 1933, Hitler had established 
the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, headed by Joseph Goebbels, which launched a multi-
faceted propaganda campaign in Germany to promote National Socialism and denigrate 
perceived enemies. Throughout the Nazi era, propaganda posters were everywhere, 
displayed at bus stops, hospitals, restaurants, payroll offices, etc., and many of them 
spewed messages of guilt, repeatedly blaming the war on the Jews.29 One wallsheet, 
Parole der Woche (Slogan of the Week), has photographs of Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Stalin next to a text that reads: “Who Bears the Guilt for the War? Roosevelt, Churchill 
and Stalin Bear the Responsibility for the War in the Eyes of History: Behind them, 
However, Stands the Jew” (Fig. 2.8).30 The continuous accusations of guilt, both during 
the war and in the postwar occupation, created an atmosphere of disinformation, enabling 
Germans to reject blame for the war and dismiss posters made by their enemy as 
propaganda.  
 It appears that the American government realized its mistakes later in May 1945, 
when a SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division directive cautioned against making 
                                                
28 See: Moses Moskowitz, “The Germans and the Jews: Postwar Report: ‘The Enigma of 
German Responsibility’” Commentary, vol. 2, 1946, 7-14; Arendt, “The Aftermath of 
Nazi Rule;” Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
29 Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the 
Holocaust (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2006), 8, 14, 2.  
30 “Wer ist am Kriege Schuld? Roosevelt, Churchill, und Stalin tragen vor der Geschichte 
die Verantwortung für diesen Krieg. Hinter ihnen aber steht der Jude.” Ibid., n.p.   
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“direct statements to the Germans such as ‘You are guilty!’” for fear that these would 
“only arouse resistance to what they will regard as propaganda.”31 It also warned that a 
“wallsheet or poster will be found to be the form most liable to create an impression of 
‘propaganda.’”32 The poster campaign did continue, however, at least through June 1945. 
An archival photograph, dated June 18, 1945, shows two young boys looking in a shop in 
Pößneck, Germany window at an atrocity poster with photographs of Ohrdruf 
concentration camp (about fifty-six miles away) (Fig. 2.9). The poster headline had 
shifted by this stage of the postwar period. Instead of declaring, “You are guilty,” it says, 
“You Should Know It!,” indicating that while the Allied government still found it 
imperative to show Nazi atrocities to the German people, propagandists were attempting 
to make their language slightly less antagonistic than before.33   
KZ: A Pictorial Report of Five Concentration Camps 
 In addition to the poster campaign, the American Office of War Information 
(OWI) published KZ: A Pictorial Report of Five Concentration Camps, twenty-eight-
page pamphlet for German civilians. KZ includes a brief introduction and forty-three 
photographs of Buchenwald, Belsen, Gardelegen, Nordhausen, and Ohrdruf, far more 
images than could be displayed on a single billboard or poster.34 The sheer number of 
images demonstrated to German civilians that the atrocities were not isolated events, but 
                                                
31 SHAEF PWD, Directive no. 1, 2. 
32 Ibid.  
33 “Ihr Sollt Es Wissen,” poster, 1945, USHMM. 
34 These are the camp names employed by KZ. Today, Belsen is commonly called 
Bergen-Belsen and Nordhausen is referred to as Dora-Mittlebau or Dora-Nordhausen. 
Gardelegen was not a concentration camp but an atrocity site discovered by American 
troops.   
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rather part of a widespread extermination plan. Twenty-two of the pamphlet images show 
German or American tours of the camps and forced burials, when Allied troops 
compelled German civilians and SS guards to bury the victims’ bodies. These images in 
particular were used to show collective responsibility, Allied authority, and to imbue the 
liberator’s photographs with a sense of authenticity. The exact print runs and dates of 
KZ’s publication are not known, but it appears the pamphlet was first printed in April 
1945 and again in May 1945.35 It was sold in select German cities and dropped from 
Allied airplanes over Germany.36 
 As the introduction explains, KZ “contains mainly photographs because the 
printed word cannot convey what it really looked like in Buchenwald and Belsen, 
Gardelegen, Nordhausen, and Ohrdruf.”37 Photographs could not only describe the camps 
better than written accounts, but they were also considered a more persuasive and 
                                                
35 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum holds copies of two versions of KZ 
from 1945. But it does not have their explicit dates of publication. This author has not 
seen mention of these two versions in any previous scholarship. KZ states that at the time 
of its printing Dachau, Auschwitz and Oranienburg were still in Germans hands. 
Buchenwald was liberated April 11, 1945 and Dachau on April 29, 1945, which would 
mean KZ was likely printed in that interim period. KZ; Bildbericht Aus Fünf 
Konzentrationslagern (Amerikanisches Kriegsinformationsamt, 1945), n.p. Author Sarah 
James contends that the American government began publishing KZ on May 21, 1945. 
This could refer to its dissemination date or the printing of the second edition. Sarah 
James, Common Ground: German Photographic Cultures Across the Iron Curtain (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 243.  
36 Ibid., 20. The Americans also ran a “test-sale” of KZ in select German cities. 
According to an American intelligence report, 2,000 copies were quickly sold in 10 food 
stores in Kaiserslautern and 2,000 copies in four bookshops in Heidelberg. KZ was sold 
for 50 Pfg. SHAEF PWD, Intelligence Division, “Atrocities: A Study of German 
Reactions,” June 21, 1945, 5. The quantity of the full print run is not known. 
37 „Dieses Heft enthalt vor allem Photographien, denn das gedruckte Wort kann keine 
Vorstellung davon geben, wie es in Buchenwald und Belsen, in Gardelegen, Nordhausen 
und Ohrdruf wirklich aussah,” KZ, n.p.  
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credible medium. As correspondence reveals, OWI editors believed photographs could 
“tell their own story,” while text risked “spoil[ing] the effect[s]” of the images because it 
would sound like propaganda to Germans.38 The hope was that the photographs would 
read as direct and objective recordings of the camps, but German viewers were concerned 
with their provenance. The Allied propaganda photographs could not be viewed as 
strictly neutral because they were all taken by American and British photographers at the 
end of the war, showing only the “victor’s point of view.”39  
 To make their images appear more credible, Allied photographers frequently 
photographed German civilians viewing the atrocities first-hand. These images were 
intended to give Germans who did not go on the tours a sense of being there.40 For 
example, the opening photograph in KZ shows German civilians on a tour of Buchenwald 
(Fig. 0.3).41 Their backs are to the camera, enabling the reader to imagine him or herself 
standing in their place. Across from the German civilians, American officials stand on 
slightly higher ground, hands on hips, exuding control. To the right of the frame, a truck 
is piled with emaciated corpses of concentration camp victims. The composition of the 
                                                
38 Letter to Barney from Mr. B. Barnes, OWI London, May 3, 1945. RG331 Entry 87 
Box 7, NARA.  
39 John-Paul Stonard, Fault Lines: Art in Germany 1945-1955 (London: Ridinghouse, 
2007), 66.  
40 “Tausende von Deutschen, die in der Nähe dieser Orte leben, wurden durch die Lager 
geführt, um mit eigenen Augen zu sehen, welche Verbrechen dort in ihrem Namen 
begangen worden sind. Aber für die meisten Deutschen ist es nicht möglich, ein K.Z. zu 
besichtigen. Für sie ist dieser Bildbericht bestimmt.“ (Thousands of Germans living near 
these places were led through the camps to see for themselves what crimes were 
committed in their name. But for most Germans it is not possible to visit a K.Z. This 
picture report is intended for them.) KZ, n.p. 
41 Signal Corps caption on the verso of a print of the same image dates it to April 16, 
1945, NARA 
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photograph allows German KZ readers to imagine themselves in the camp, witnessing the 
atrocities first-hand. This act of bearing witness was a repeated trope in Signal Corps 
photographs. As Barbie Zelizer has argued, the inclusion of German civilians “bolstered 
the authority” of the image for readers.42 In other words, it made the images appear more 
believable.  
 A similar tactic was used in Army Talks, a weekly periodical produced for 
American GIs, but with the American soldier as witness. Convincing American soldiers 
of the crimes their enemy had carried out was a very different task than compelling 
Germans to accept the atrocities “committed in their name,” but it was also difficult.43 
Several images in the July 1945 Army Talks issue, titled “The Legacy of Fascism,” depict 
American GIs in the camps. On one page there are four stacked photographs (Fig. 2.10). 
The first shows an American soldier looking at a door emblazoned with a skull and 
crossbones, and below are images of a crematorium, emaciated corpses, and a group of 
survivors. The caption says, “With his own eyes, a GI sees,” and text elsewhere repeats, 
“Seeing is believing,” underscoring the value of eyewitness testimony.44 But as Army 
Talks explains, many American soldiers and civilians were skeptical of the initial 
concentration camp reports.45 Army Talks cites a May 1945 Gallup Poll, which reported 
                                                
42 Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, 105.  
43 KZ, n.p 
44 “Crime and Punishment,” Army Talks, July 10, 1945, 2.  
45 KZ, n.p. 
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that 84% of Americans thought the atrocity reports were “somewhat exaggerated,” a 
statistic that may seem surprisingly high to many today.46 
 Like the Allied poster campaign, KZ sought to stimulate a sense of German 
collective guilt, by showing viewers the crimes for which they should feel guilty. The 
images of forced burials also demonstrate the distinct notions of collective responsibility 
and punishment. Two photographs in the booklet depict German SS male and female 
guards in Belsen pitching bodies into mass graves (Fig. 2.11). The caption says, “They 
will be brought to justice” and the female guards “will not escape the courts.”47 This 
statement confirms that the postwar war crimes trials would be wide-ranging, and include 
lower-ranking guards who participated in the camps.   
KZ photographs also show German civilians who lived in close proximity to the 
camps being forced to bury the bodies of victims and thereby take responsibility for what 
had happened. One such photograph shows an American guard watching over German 
civilians as they dig trenches to bury the bodies of concentration camp victims (Fig. 2.12). 
Both the act of compelling Germans to participate in the burials and the soldier’s looming 
presence in the foreground of the image demonstrate the ways in which the Allied forces 
exerted their authority over the Germans.    
 In June 1945, the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division Intelligence section ran 
surveys evaluating German responses to the KZ booklet and the Allied atrocity 
                                                
46 Of the remaining surveyed, 1% were dubious of atrocity reports, 3% refused to believe 
them, and 3% were undecided. “What the Homefront Thinks,” Army Talks, July 10, 
1945, 5. 
47“Sie werden vor Gericht gestellt werden…Weibliche Lagerwachen laden Leichen von 
den Lastwagen ab, um sie beizusetzen. Auch sie werden dem Gericht nicht entgehen.” KZ, 
n.p.  
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propaganda campaign. The study, published in a confidential report titled “Atrocities: A 
Study of German Reaction,” sought to “probe the amount of knowledge the German 
population had about the concentration camps before Allied occupation, the impact of 
Allied information about atrocities and their feelings of guilt and responsibility in this 
respect.”48 One hundred German civilians were shown copies of KZ and subsequently 
“interrogated in detail” about their reactions.49 The majority of those surveyed admitted 
that they had known about the camps before the propaganda campaign. However, the 
surveyors believed that the civilians did not know the extent of the atrocities. And though 
many KZ viewers felt “deep horror and shame” about the concentration camps, they did 
not feel collective guilt and responsibility, according to the study.50 Most blamed the 
crimes on Nazi Party leaders and the SS officers.51 
 Regarding the credibility of American atrocity reports, “Atrocities: Study of 
German Reaction” concluded that over fifty percent of the Germans surveyed trusted the 
accuracy of American reports, but many admitted to having reservations. For some, the 
images evoked the Katyn Massacre, when thousands of Polish political prisoners were 
murdered and then buried in mass graves in the Katyn forest.52 The massacre was 
perpetrated by the Soviet Red Army but initially blamed on the Nazis. In 1943, Nazi 
                                                
48 SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division, Intelligence Division, “Atrocities: A Study of 
German Reactions,” June 21, 1945, 1. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid, 5, 8, 10.  
51 Ibid., 3.  
52 Ibid. 2, 5. The Katyn Massacre was perpetrated in 1940, but the bodies were only 
discovered in 1943. For more information on the Katyn Massacre see: “Records Relating 
to the Katyn Forest Massacre at the National Archives, last accessed March 12, 2019, 
https://www.archives.gov/ research/foreign-policy/katyn-massacre. 
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propagandists published a full report on the excavation of these mass graves, with images 
that do look very similar to American photographs of Nazi concentration camps (Fig. 
2.13).53 In addition to the surprising formal similarities, this evocation of the Katyn 
Massacre suggests that some of the Germans surveyed thought the concentration camps 
were also being falsely pinned on the Nazis. Indeed, after the war, some Germans 
suspected that the American atrocity photographs were staged with bodies of German 
victims from Allied air raids.54 Others surveyed “expressed their disappointment” that the 
atrocity photographs only showed the concentration camps as found by the Americans, 
and not while still in operation.55 By taking such surveys, the Americans were attempting 
a methodical approach to understanding the efficacy of the photographs they printed. 
They came to realize that, despite their indexical nature, photographs alone could not 
convince audiences, and they would need to continue fighting accusations of propaganda.  
Concentration Camp Photographs in Heute 
 To combat these doubts that the concentration camp images were staged or falsely 
attributed, the first issue of Heute, an American government postwar propaganda 
magazine for German civilians, included photographs taken by Nazi photographers of the 
camps while in operation. This issue, produced in June 1945, featured a year-by-year 
military history of World War II from the Allied perspective and included a five-page 
                                                
53 Auwärtiges AMT, Amtliches Material Zum Massemord Von Katyn (Berlin: 1943).  
54 Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 8; “Atrocities: A Study of German 
Reactions,” 3.  
55 Fred F. Robitschek, U.S. Intelligence Officer, “Reactions to Concentration Camp 
Films” Office of Military Government for Bavaria, Information Control Division, 
Intelligence Section, U.S. Army, January 28, 1948. RG260 Box 104, NARA [IMG_3236] 
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article on the camps, explaining the Nazis’ “systematic mass extermination” of the 
Jews.56 This identification of the victims as Jewish is particularly notable because it is not 
mentioned in KZ. Instead, KZ referred to the concentration camp prisoners as “Germans 
and non-Germans,” as a means to evade virulent anti-Semitism.57  
 The inaugural Heute story on the camps interspersed Nazi photographs taken 
during the National Socialist era with Signal Corps images taken after the liberation (Fig. 
2.14). In a double-page spread, two Nazi photographs show SS guards interrogating 
prisoners who had just arrived in Dachau and SS officers guarding a group of shorn and 
uniformed prisoners.58 The third photograph on the page, a Signal Corps image that also 
appeared on the “These Shameful Acts: Your Guilt!” poster (Fig. 2.1), shows a pile of 
corpses awaiting cremation at Dachau. Together these three images illustrate the short 
and brutal life of prisoners in the camp—from arrival, to work, and, finally, to death. 
Assembling the Signal Corps and Nazi photographs into a cohesive narrative was another 
attempt to make American photographs of the camps appear more authentic to German 
readers.59  
                                                
56 “Systematischer Volkvernichtung im großen.” Heute, issue 1, n.d. (June 1945), 24.  
57 KZ, n.p. It was typical in the American press not to mention the Jewish identity of 
victims. For example, in the first photo-essay on the liberation of the concentration camps 
Life magazine referred to inmates as “political prisoners and slave laborers.” “Atrocities,” 
Life, May 7, 1945, 33.  
58 The photographs are not credited in Heute.  
59 The irony, however, is that these Nazi photographs may not be truly authentic. An 
archivist at Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site suggested to this author that the 
image of shorn prisoners may have been a Nazi propaganda photograph of the camp and 
that the interrogation room pictured in the top right was probably misattributed to 
Dachau. Author’s visit to Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site, June 12, 2018.  
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 In the accompanying article on the concentration camps, Heute vigorously 
reasserted collective guilt through such statements as the “Victors in the war now over in 
Europe will not be satisfied with the conviction of a handful of S.S. Guards and Party 
officials…[and they] cannot accept the plea that the German people were ignorant of 
these occurrences.”60 They must have seen “the train loads and truck loads of victims 
passing…” and they must have smelled the stench of camps.61 Further, it stated that 
civilian complicity shows that the Germans are not to fit to govern themselves. In other 
words, the Allied occupation was entirely justified. 
  Though 250,000 copies of Heute’s first issue were printed in July 1945, they 
were not disseminated in Germany until September of that year.62 In the interim, the 
magazine was shown to a group of German prisoners-of-war (POWs), who served as a 
focus group. After reading the first issue, they reviewed it in a survey. The magazine was 
not well received. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the POWs did not like the concentration camp 
article, or anything else in the issue that dealt with the war. According to the survey 
report, dated August 1945, the POWs found “implications of German guilt too blunt” and 
said that the concentration camp article in particular was “distasteful.”63 They also said 
the Heute stories on the war would not interest German people who had experienced the 
real war and were disinclined to read more about it. Instead, they liked Heute articles that 
                                                
60 “Human Beings in the Inferno of Concentration Camps,” Heute, issue 1. English 
translation of first issue, RG208 Box 5, NARA. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Margarethe Szeless, „’Das Auge lernt und wird sensibler’. Die Anfänge von Inge 
Moraths Karriere in Wien 1946–1949.” Fotogeschichte: 135 (2015): 44.   
63 “German Prisoner Reactions to the Magazine Heute,” Research and Analysis Section, 
Report No. 142, Office of War Information, August 18, 1945, 11, 2.  
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dealt with social progress, reconstruction, and Germany’s future. They also wanted more 
articles on leisure, entertainment, and art.64  
 The editors of Heute seemed to heed the prisoners’ requests. After the first issue, 
the magazine turned away from the war and focused its attention on German 
reconstruction and encouraging the growth of a postwar democracy. Whereas the posters, 
KZ, and first issue of Heute were intentionally punitive, forcing German civilians to 
confront Nazi war crimes, by the fall of 1945, as the tremendous responsibilities and 
challenges of the postwar occupation of Germany set in, the American government was 
beginning to adopt a more diplomatic approach to its propaganda. Appeasing German 
readers, propagandists pulled back on the message of collective guilt, and ran fewer 
photographs of the concentration camps. Instead, American propaganda for Germans 
focused on the guilt of the Nazi leaders.65   
 
The Nuremberg Trials in Heute and Army Talks/I&E 
 The most eminent Nuremberg trial, which prosecuted the twenty-two highest-
ranking Nazi Party leaders, ran from November 20, 1945 until October 1, 1946.66 
Governed by the International Military Tribunal, each of the four occupying powers in 
Germany (United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, France) had one representative 
judge and prosecutor. All the defendants were tried on four counts: crimes against peace, 
                                                
64 Ibid, 3, 11, 13.  
65 Ibid., 2. 
66 Additionally, the United States ran subsequent trials in Nuremberg, known as the U.S. 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals, which prosecuted 185 defendants. Jardim, The 
Mauthausen Trial, 2.  
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war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy or common plan to commit any of 
these crimes.67 The trials were widely publicized in the American, German, and 
international press and in American propaganda publications, including Heute for 
German civilians, and Army Talks for American soldiers. These magazines used 
photographs and text to frame the trials differently for their target audiences. Careful not 
to antagonize its German readers in this unstable period as the American govenrment 
shifted from a punitive to concilitatory approach to the Germans, Heute trod more lightly 
than Army Talks in its coverage of Nuremberg, and stopped running the message of 
collective guilt and photographs of the concentration camps sooner. By the end of the 
trials both Heute and Army Talks had shifted their focus away from collective guilt to the 
individual criminal punishment of top Nazi leaders.  
The Opening of the Nuremberg Trials in Heute 
 When the Nuremberg trials opened in November 1945, conditions in occupied 
Germany had become grim. An advisor to President Truman suggested that the American 
                                                
67 Definitions for these charges, as explained in Information Bulletin, a magazine for 
American soldiers in the ETO, are as follows: “A) Crimes against peace. Namely, 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurance, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing B) War crimes. Namely, 
violations of laws and customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not limited to, 
murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purposes of civilian 
population of, or in, occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity C) 
Crimes against Humanity. Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of, or in connection 
with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” “What Are We Doing at Nuremberg?” 
Information Bulletin, March 3, 1946, 7-8.  
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propagandists remove any messaging of collective guilt from their materials for German 
audiences and, instead, encourage a feeling of hope for the future of their country.68 The 
subsequent coverage of the Nuremberg trials in Heute reflected a new strategy of 
educating the German people about Nazi war crimes while at the same time explaining 
the democratic process through the trials. Throughout its coverage, Heute showed only 
images of the courtroom and of the top defendants, and avoided any images from the war 
and of the concentration camps. In contrast, Army Talks took a more gradual approach 
toward eradicating the message of German collective guilt in its issues for an American 
military audience in to deter them from fraternizing with civilians in occupied Germany.  
 In the early fall of 1945, President Truman sent Byron Price, the former Director 
of the Office of Censorship, to Germany to survey the relationship between American 
occupation forces and the German people. In his November 9, 1945, report, Price wrote 
about widespread hunger and German civilians who lived in “rubble heaps and caves” 
without proper heating.69 With winter fast approaching, Price warned that the United 
States should tread carefully since these dire conditions could easily spark riots. 
Regarding propaganda, Price stated:  
 Our own propaganda needs to be given an increasingly positive character,  in 
 contrast to the long-continued attempt to impress the Germans of their collective 
 guilt, which from now on will do more harm than good... We can win converts to 
 democracy only if we again find a way of instilling hope—hope that Germany can 
 rise again from the dust and become a respected nation if she will devote herself 
 to peace and tolerance, and decent ways of life.70  
                                                
68 Byron Price, “Relations Between American Forces of Occupation and the German 
People: Report of the Byron Brice to the President,” The Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. XIII No. 336, December 2, 1945, 886. 
69 Ibid., 890. 
70 Ibid., 891. 
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Price’s report illustrates the way in which social conditions on the ground helped shape 
American propaganda strategies. Seeming to follow Price’s advice, American 
propaganda for German civilians began to take a more positive, or at least less 
antagonistic, approach.  
 Heute’s December 1945 issue includes a statement by General McNarney, who 
had recently replaced General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Commander of the U.S. Forces 
of Occupation in Europe. Such direct messages from American leaders to German 
civilians were rare in Heute and this one showed the effect of Price’s report. In his 
address, McNarney took a firm tone, asserting that Germany had plunged itself and much 
of Europe into this state of suffering; but he also acknowledged that a difficult winter lay 
ahead and expressed America’s hope that Germany would one day return to the 
“community of peoples.”71 This issue also has the magazine’s first story on the 
Nuremberg trials, which focused on the roles of top Nazi Party leaders rather than the 
collective guilt of the nation. Instead of continuing to publish photographs of the victims 
of Nazi concentration camps, Heute focused on the perprators—the defendants on trial.  
 The opening photograph in this Heute story shows an orderly display of the 
courtroom proceedings (Fig. 2.15). It was likely taken from the newly constructed 
balcony/visitors’ gallery, from which the press could look down at the proceedings (Fig. 
2.16). With this birds-eye view, the Heute image depicts the pews in neat diagonal rows. 
In the back of the courtroom, two rows of Nazi defendants are sandwiched between a line 
                                                
71 “Eine Botschaft General McNarneys an das Deutsche Volk„ (A message from General 
McNarney to the German people), Heute, issue 4, no date (c. December 1945).  
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of American guards and two rows of lawyers at tables with stacks of legal paper.72 The 
sense of order and control that the photograph conveys expresses the American aim to 
portray the Nuremberg process as a just and exalted display of democracy. This 
orderliness starkly contrasts the chaos conveyed in photographs of bodies piled in Nazi 
concentration camps. The accompanying Heute article explains the counts on which the 
defendants were charged, and seeks to educate readers about the fact that these war 
crimes were not isolated incidents but the result of a “cool calculated plan.”73 The title of 
the article, “Twenty Defendants Before the Court of the World,” further emphasizes that 
the world was closely watching to see how these proceedings would be carried out.74  
 The courtroom photograph also reveals the defendants’ gestures of protest and 
attempts to disrupt the solemnity of the trial. Hunched over in their pews, a few 
defendants sit in slouched postures; none appear particularly engaged in the trial. The 
article describes the defendants’ “grotesque poses…[such as] when Schacht and Streicher 
began to eat in the middle of the court session, [or] when Hess was reading a light 
novel….”75 The most dramatically positioned figure in this opening image is Hermann 
Göring, who leans forward with his head lying on his folded arms over the front of the 
pew. With an extra guard in position beside him, Göring, who was the most highly 
                                                
72 Signal caption on verso of NARA print of a nearly identical image states that the 
guards are American. Photograph dated November 20, 1945.  
73 “Kühl errechneten plan.” „Zwanzig Angeklagte vor dem Gericht der Welt,“ (Twenty 
defendants before the Court of the World“ Heute, n.d. (c. December 1945), 18. 
74 „Zwanzig Angeklagte vor dem Gericht der Welt,“ (Twenty defendants before the Court 
of the World“ Heute, n.d. (c. December 1945), 19-24.  
75 “Alles andere als feierlich waren die grotesken Posen, die einzelne der Angeklagten 
einnahmen: Wenn etwa Schacht und Streicher mitten wahrend der Gerichtssitzung zu 
essen begannen, wenn Hess sich damit beschäftige, einen leichten Roman...zu lesen.” 
“Twenty Defendants,” Heute, 18.  
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ranked Nazi official prosecuted, was often at the center of international press coverage of 
Nuremberg because of his dramatic antics at trial. For example, as the New York Times 
and Chicago Tribune reported, he would use the witness stand as a “rostrum for 
broadcasting Nazi propaganda” and he tried to intimate a witness.76 In his ultimate act of 
protest, Göring escaped Allied executioners by committing suicide the night before his 
scheduled hanging in October 1946.  
 The following page of the “Twenty Defendants” story features individual portraits 
of twelve defendants in their prison cells (Fig. 2.17). Mimicking the solitary and 
confining nature of the cells themselves, the photographs are tightly cropped on the 
defendants. The light is harsh and unflattering, with strong shadows cast on the white 
walls behind them. Only one of the prisoners, Eric Raeder, former Grand Admiral of the 
German Navy, looks directly at the camera: the others do not engage with the U.S. Army 
photographers. The National Archives holds many more photographs of Göring in his 
cell than of any other defendants, and while Heute could have chosen a photograph of 
Göring with a cavalier smile relaxing on his prison bed, they instead published an image 
of him eating his breakfast hunched over a makeshift table in his cell to show that despite 
his attempts to disrupt the trial, he was still a prisoner under the International Military 
Tribunal’s control (Fig. 2.17, 2.18).  
Nuremberg Trials in Army Talks 
 Unlike Heute, Army Talks continued to reassert German collective guilt in its 
coverage of the trials. The American government did not have the same concern about 
                                                
76 “Jackson Subdues Goering on Stand,” New York Times, March 21, 1946; “Goering 
Threat Throws Trial Into an Uproar,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 25, 1946. 
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starvation and riots in its magazine articles for American soldiers. The coverage of the 
trials was affected by a different set of social issues, namely, concerns about 
fraternization, brewing Cold War tensions, and changes to the American denazification 
policy.  
 As explored in-depth in the third chapter of this dissertation, there was a strict ban 
on fraternization, meaning that any relationships or interactions between American 
soldiers and German civilians in the initial occupation period was forbidden.77 Despite 
this, relationships or sexual encounters between GI’s and German women were 
prevalent.78 When the fraternization ban was lifted in October 1945 (just before the start 
of the Nuremberg trials), American soldiers began to enter German homes more 
frequently. Many of the Germans they encountered claimed to have never supported 
Hitler, and a survey published in Army Talks on February 10, 1946 showed that the GIs 
believed them.79 
                                                
77 Non-fraternization was defined as “avoidance of mingling with Germans on terms of 
friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or in groups, in official or 
unofficial dealings.” Even handshakes with Germans were prohibited. “Policy and 
Instructions on Relations with the Germans of Allied Armed Forces and Control 
Commission Staffs in the Initial Period of Control,” (November 1944?), 3. RG260 Entry 
A1-1, Box 4, NARA. 
78 See: “Reaction to the Non-Fraternization Policy Among Troops Doing Occupation 
Duties in Germany,” Research Branch, Information and Education Division, 
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, April 1945.  
79 The survey conducted by Army Research Section, Information Branch, Information 
and Education found that 51% of American soldiers thought Hitler “did do Germany a lot 
of good before the war,” 28% found themselves in agreement with some German-made 
statements about why Germany fought the war, 24% thought Germany was “the most 
efficient country in Europe” and “had a right to be the controlling influence in Europe, 
22% agreed that German had good reasons “for being down on the Jews,” and another 
10% were undecided on that. “German Line?” Army Talks, February 10, 1946, 2-4. It 
should be noted too, that some GIs serving in occupied Germany had not fought in the 
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 To combat these German disavowals, the February 10, 1946, issue included a 
photograph from Nazi era of German civilians saluting Hitler (Fig. 2.19). The image is 
cropped so that only the top section of the crowd—a sea of smiling and cheering faces, 
extended arms and flags branded with swastikas—can be seen. The photograph appears 
without a caption specifying its date or location because it was intended to generally 
convey German civilians’ widespread and fervent support of Hitler.  
 The crowd photograph accompanies reprinted excerpts of American Justice 
Robert H. Jackson’s November 21, 1945, keynote opening statement at Nuremberg. The 
excerpts provide a broad overview of the history of the Nazi Party and its war crimes, 
including the persecution of the Jews. In his full address, Jackson explicitly stated: “We 
would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the whole German 
people.”80 Army Talks not only omitted this line in its excerpts, it introduced the story 
thus: “Public Enemies Nos. 1-22, on trial at Nuremberg, are the headliners. BUT THE 
                                                                                                                                            
war themselves but were brought in to Germany in the postwar period to relieve the 
soldiers that had long been away. These new soldiers had not previously encountered the 
German enemy firsthand or been fed the steady diet of Army Talks propaganda 
throughout the war warning against German propaganda lines. Historian Atina Grossman, 
among others, discusses this prevalent idea that Germans widely denied being Nazis after 
the war. She cites a sociological study that surveyed 200 families in immediate postwar 
Berlin. Of them, 71% of men and 73% of women claimed not to have been members of 
the National Socialism Party. She also writes that in the period there were “countless 
cynical jokes about how hard it was to find a Nazi anywhere in Germany…Even Hitler, it 
was said, had been found dead in a Munich street, holding a scrap of paper that read, ‘I 
was never a Nazi.’” Grossman, Jews, Germans, and Allies, 37, 286. 
80 Full text of opening statement available at: “Opening Statement before the 
International Military Tribunal,” Robert H. Jackson Center, last accessed March 12, 
2019, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/opening-statement-before-the-
international-military-tribunal/. The complete opening statement was also printed in an 
Army Talks-related publication: “The People Vs. Nazism” Special Supplement, 
Information Bulletin, February 1946.  
 
  119 
WEIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY STILL RESTS ON EVERY GERMAN’S 
SHOULDERS.”81 This forceful declaration reveals the staying power of the collective 
guilt message for American soldiers at the same time as it was omitted from articles 
published for the German people. 
 The cover and back cover photographs on the same issue also demonstrate the 
Allies' concern that history might repeat itself if the Germans were too easily forgiven 
(Fig. 2.20). During the war and in the immediate postwar period, Army Talks and other 
outlets of the American press repeatedly asserted that Germany had not been properly 
prosecuted or rehabilitated after World War I, and this had sewn the seeds for World War 
II. The media warned that if postwar Germany and German-American relations were not 
properly governed, World War III could erupt. Illustrating this concern, the cover 
photograph, labeled 1918, shows an American soldier adjusting a smiling German 
woman’s boot on a dock. On the back cover, there is another photograph of an American 
soldier and a German woman dated 1945. The couple is pictured from the back, strolling 
in the garden, clasping hands. Despite the idyllic, almost romantic setting, these paired  
images served as a warning of the consequences of German-American fraternization and 
the danger that lay in repeating past mistakes.  
 As the Nuremberg Trials proceeded in the following months, American priorities 
shifted. As relations with the Soviets became increasingly strained in the early spring of 
1946, the American government expanded its efforts improve German-American 
relations. On July 29, 1946, just three days after Justice Jackson delivered his closing 
                                                
81 All caps in original. “The Jackson Statement,” Army Talks, February 10, 1946, 6.  
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statement at Nuremberg, the American occupying government officially launched its 
German Youth Activities (GYA) program, which encouraged GIs and German youth to 
participate in cooperative activities to build positive German-Americans relations 
(explored in chapter three).82 Recruitment advertisements for the GYA showing GIs 
playing baseball with apple-cheeked German children ran next to stories on the 
Nuremberg trial and undoubtedly affected the way the trials were portrayed (Fig. 2.21). 
Army Talks (which was renamed I&E in March 1946) had to drop the message of 
collective guilt in order to successfully promote the GYA program. 
 In addition, the American occupying government vastly scaled back its 
denazification program in the summer of 1946. Each occupying government was 
responsible for denazification efforts in its own zone, and initially, the Americans had 
sought to remove everyone who had been “nominally” involved with the Nazi Party from 
positions of public office, influence, and service (including education, press, etc.).83 The 
American government disseminated questionnaires, known as Fragebogen, to all 
Germans in the American zone, but later realized that it did not have the resources or 
manpower to “vet” the thirteen million forms that were returned.84 Not wanting to 
abandon denazification altogether, the American occupying government decided to turn 
the program over to the Germans to manage (with a degree of American supervision) in 
June 1946. Furthermore, German youth born after 1919, Germans with low incomes, the 
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disabled, and prisoners-of-war were all granted amnesty.85 As it exculpated these groups, 
and turned over the denazification responsibility to Germans, the American government 
needed to stop promoting the message that all German civilians and soldiers were equally 
responsible for the war and its consequences.  
 In a series of articles leading up to the Nuremberg verdicts in the fall of 1946, 
I&E used photographs and text to shift attention away from collective German 
responsibility to the individual criminal punishment of top Nazi leaders (as Heute had 
done the previous year). Rather than publish photographs of crowds of German civilians 
saluting Hitler from the National Socialist period, I&E repeatedly paired photographs of 
the top defendants on trial with images of the concentration camps. For example, on the 
left-hand side of a double-page spread in the September 1, 1946, issue of I&E, there are 
three stacked photographs: of Justice Jackson, a birds-eye view of the courtroom (the 
same photograph that ran in Heute in December 1945), and a photograph of defendant 
Joachim Von Ribbentrop, former Foreign Minister of the Nazi Party, on the witness stand 
(Fig. 2.22). On the opposite page, there are three photographs of survivors and bodies of 
victims in concentration camps, accompanied by quotes from Göring, including his 1934 
admission to the creation of the camps.86 With these pairings, I&E visually associated the 
top leaders with the war crimes that had been previously blamed on the German people 
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 On September 1, 1946, Heute ran a “Before the Verdict” story, but unlike I&E, 
the magazine for German readers did not include any photographs of the camps. Instead, 
it republished the portraits of Nazi leaders it had run in December 1945, near the start of 
the trials. This time, however, the portraits of the twenty-two defendants in their cells and 
in court are paired with photographs of Nazi Party leaders at the height of their power 
from the war (Fig. 2.23). These pairings show the “progressive strain or breakdown of 
defendants,” most dramatically apparent in then-and-now pictures of Rudolf Hess, former 
Deputy Führer of the Nazi Party, who faked amnesia during the trial and tried to plead 
insanity.87 With these paired images, Heute reminded its readers how far their former 
leaders had fallen. 
 A month later, on the day the Nuremberg verdicts were announced (October 1, 
1946), Heute ran three articles on U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes’ “Speech of 
Hope” and none on Nuremberg. In his speech, delivered September 6, 1946 in Stuttgart, 
Germany, Byrnes pledged American economic support for German recovery and 
expressed that the “American people want to help the German people to win their way 
back to an honorable place among the free and peace loving nations of the world.”88 Both 
I&E and Heute promoted Byrnes’s speech as a positive turning point in German-
American relations. The Heute October 1st cover photograph shows Byrnes looking 
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straight at the camera (Fig. 2.24). His eyes are pleading, but he clenches his fist in a show 
of American strength.89 Inside the magazine, one of the accompanying articles, 
“Deutscher Wendepunkt” (German Turning Point), includes a photograph of German 
government officials in the American zone clapping (Fig. 2.25). A picture of diplomacy, 
the photograph and accompanying article portray Germans as grateful recipients of the 
American government’s support.90 Byrnes is also on the cover of the October 13, 1946, 
issue of I&E, photographed with his arm resting on a globe while looking out in the 
distance, as if contemplating the future of the world (Fig. 2.26). Like Heute, the I&E 
devoted its issues to explaining American policy and plans for Germany without any 
mention of Nuremberg.   
Nuremberg Verdicts 
 I&E did not run a story on the Nuremberg verdicts until October 27, 1946, nearly 
four weeks after the judgments were declared. The cover of that issue, however, featured 
a remarkable photomontage (Fig. 2.27). It shows the faces of the twenty-two top Nazi 
defendants arranged around the words, “Final Judgment.”91 A faded blue photograph 
above them shows a line of concentration camp prisoners gazing down accusatorially, as 
                                                
89 Caption below image of Byrnes on Heute cover (October 1, 1946) says: “Man Darf 
Mich Nicht Missverstehen” (I want no misunderstanding”). From his speech: “Security 
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if looking at the defendants in hell and pointing in judgment. The accompanying article 
does not explicitly state that ten of these war criminals were executed on October 16, 
1946, weeks before this issue was released, but the cover photomontage ominously 
suggests it.   
 This October 27th I&E issue also included a fold-out poster that could be hung in 
the barracks.92 Headlined “The People Vs. Nazism,” the poster showed the twenty-two 
individual portraits of the defendants with the sentences they had received stamped across 
their faces (Fig. 2.28). Twelve of the defendants were sentenced to death, three to life in 
prison, three to sentences that ranged from ten to twenty years, and three defendants were 
acquitted. Below each portrait, the counts on which the defendants were charged and 
found guilty are also listed. These numbers and the headline font connote a baseball 
scorecard and proclaim the Allies as the victors. 
 Unlike I&E, the story of the Nuremberg verdicts in Heute did not show pictures 
of the defendants or the victims, or mention the defendants’ names and sentences. Rather, 
it focused on the future of the German nation. In addition to the cover photograph, 
described in the introduction, the accompanying “After the Verdict” story includes an 
image of a single guard stationed in a courtyard outside Nuremberg prison (Fig. 2.29). 
Compared to I&E’s fold-out poster and photomontage that appeared in the October 15, 
1946, issue, this is a remarkably banal image. Rather than assertively declaring justice 
had been served, as I&E did, the Heute article includes a series of rhetorical questions 
such as: “What is the effect of trial and judgment on the possibility of preventing wars? 
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What is the significance of the judgment on the collective responsibility of the German 
people?”93 These open-ended questions encourage the German reader to look forward 
rather than backward. 
 Perhaps in a gesture of returning agency to the Germans, Heute left the 
announcement of individual sentences to German papers in the American zone. Though 
the Nurnberger paper (shown on the Heute October 15, 1946 cover, described in the 
introduction) did not include photographs, another German newspaper, the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung out of Munich ran the oft-published headshots of the top twenty-two defendants 
in its verdict story (Fig. 2.30). Like Heute, the German paper looked toward the future, 
declaratively stating that the verdicts and trial would forever alter international law.94   
 
The Executions of German War Criminals 
 As the American government sought to improve German-American relations in 
occupied Germany, it turned its focus to reconstruction. Consequently, neither Heute nor 
I&E ran stories on the Nuremberg defendants’ executions. However, Life magazine 
provided sensationalist coverage of this event for the American public. This section 
concludes with a brief examination of previously unpublished photographs of the 
American military-governed Dachau Trials (1945-1947) and the subsequent execution of 
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262 lower-ranking German war criminals, exploring the reasons why these images were 
not released to the public.  
Nuremberg Executions in Life  
  Just as I&E had done, Life sought to give its home-front audience a sense of 
finality and justice served at the end of the eleven-month Nuremberg proceedings. On 
October 14, 1946, the magazine published an article announcing the death sentences of 
eleven Nuremberg war criminals. Like Heute, Life ran then-and-now photographs of the 
top defendants, showing them at the height of their power and on trial (Fig. 2.31 and 
2.23). Unlike Heute, Life also ran photographs of the defendants’ wives and children 
saying their final goodbyes. The story “Nürnberg Trial Ends with Death Sentences” 
includes photographs of Frau Doenitz, Frau Funk, Frau Göring, Frau Schacht, and Frau 
Von Ribbentrop, the latter three pictured holding hands with their children (Fig. 2.32). 
Conveying a sense of urgency, all the women appear harried, perhaps anxious to see their 
husbands and avoid the press cameras. The Life article says that the women had “once 
stood at the top of Nazi society,” but like their husbands, they too have fallen. The 
caption to the Frau Funk image also reports that Frau Funk, the wife of Hitler’s economic 
advisor Walther Funk, and Emma Göring “wept in each other’s arms.”95 Such images or 
captions would not have run in Heute in case they stirred sympathy in German readers. 
But Life readers applauded them. In a letter to the editor, an unnamed reader from 
Milwaukee whose father had died in Dachau, wrote that the images of the Nazi wives and 
children saying their goodbyes “[reassured her] that there [was] justice and retribution in 
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the world.”96 The illustrated news stories gave American readers a sense of comfort and 
closure to see that the guilty were being held accountable.  
 Two days after this Life story was published, shortly after midnight on October 
16, 1946, ten of the Nuremberg defendants were executed by hanging.97 But the biggest 
headline in the American press that day was the news of Göring’s suicide. Only two 
hours before his scheduled execution, Göring had swallowed a cyanide pill in his cell. 
Beneath its blaring headline, “Göring Ends Life in Cell; 10 Nazis Hang; Hitler’s No. 1 
Aid Gulps Poison,” the Daily News included two photographs taken long before the 
suicide (Fig. 2.33). The left-hand image shows a guard peering into Göring’s cell and, 
adjacent to it, is a profile portrait of Göring with his arms crossed and a patronizing 
expression. With this pairing of photographs and the caption “The Watch that Failed,” the 
Daily News blamed the suicide on a lapse in security.98 This criticism was particularly 
pointed because the same guard image that the Daily News ran had appeared in Life 
earlier that year, to tout the U.S. government’s close watch over its prisoners (Fig. 
2.34).99  
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 In addition to its feature story on Göring’s suicide, the Daily News provided a 
detailed account of the execution of the ten remaining Nuremberg defendants, reporting 
that Streicher’s last words were “Heil Hitler!,” and Von Ribbentrop hung for fourteen 
minutes before he was pronounced dead.100 There were no photographs of the executions 
themselves because press photographers were not permitted in the gallows.  
The policy surrounding news reportage of the executions was explained in a series of 
New York Times articles. According to the paper, only eight correspondents—two from 
each of the four occupying powers (the U.S., Great Britain, France, and the Soviet 
Union)—were allowed into the executions.101 News photographers were not permitted, 
but U.S. Army photographers documented the hangings “for archives only.”102 While the 
United States government wanted records of the executions, it did not initially intend for 
these images to be widely circulated.  
 Without access to photographs of the executions, Life ran illustrations of the 
hangings drawn from eyewitness accounts. In a double-page spread in the October 28, 
1946, issue, one illustration shows Göring on a stretcher surrounded by two German 
witnesses and a group of correspondents (Fig. 2.35). As in the earlier concentration camp 
photographs, the eyewitnesses are included as a way of authenticating the event. Other 
                                                                                                                                            
smuggle it to Göring, mistakenly thinking it was medicine. Bob Pool, “Former GI Claims 
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drawings in the magazine show Streicher yelling his last words, American soldiers 
looking through a curtain to see a body hanging from the gallows, and a birds-eye view 
of the guards adjusting the ropes around Von Ribbentrop’s feet.  
To substantiate its illustrated report, Life published a follow-up story a week later 
with photographs of dead war criminals and an explanation of the controversy 
surrounding the release of the images. According to the magazine, Signal Corps 
photographer Edward McLaughlin took only one image of each body. The Allied Control 
Council in Berlin decided to release the photographs but banned their circulation in the 
German press, so as not to risk causing unrest. Otherwise, the photographs’ publication 
was left up to individual governments and media outlets. The British Government 
objected to their publication on moral grounds, and some American papers, such as The 
New York Times and Newsweek also refused.103  
Life justified its publication of the images by stating that the photographs of the dead 
war criminals “disprove rumors that the hangings were bungled, ” and also would “giv[e] 
the world a last look at the top German war criminals,” implying that these images would 
finally put the Nuremberg trials to rest.104 And in many ways, they did. Unlike 
illustrations, photographs could attest to the veracity of the executions for an American 
public willing to see justice served.  
The photographs show the bodies of the ten executed Nuremberg defendants and 
Göring laid in wooden coffins (Fig. 2.36). Some of them have their arms neatly folded 
across their bodies, some have them dangling off the sides. A few of the dead appear to 
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have their heads resting on nooses made of rope. Each body is marked with a nametag 
with the first initial and last name of each defendant. The image of Wilhelm Keitel 
suggests a violent death, as blood can be seen extruding from his mouth and eyes. 
Though Life explains that the blood is a “natural consequence of death by hanging,” it is 
easy to see why the Allied Council would forbid the publication of such graphic images 
in Germany.105  
Life was one of the few publications to run photographs of the dead defendants and 
they were not universally well received.106 Many people objected to the gruesome images. 
In Life’s letters to the editor, readers complained that the photographs were “unrevealing, 
unappetizing, and unnecessary,” and that the magazine was morbid and unwise for 
displaying them.107 One reader disagreed: “If we are able to view the scenes from the 
horror camps, then it is our duty to see those who caused such scenes lying dead on their 
caskets. Let those who are squeamish about these pictures remember why these men were 
hanged!”108 This demonstrated that even after many graphic concentration camp 
photographs had been published, questions about their appropriateness in the press still 
lingered.109 Perhaps because of the controversy that swirled around the release of these 
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photographs, similar images of the 262 subsequent Dachau trial executions were not 
published in the American press.110  
 
Dachau Trials 
 After the most famous Nuremberg trial concluded, the United States prosecuted 
an additional 185 defendants in Nuremberg and 1,676 war criminals in the Dachau trials. 
These proceedings were not publicized as widely as the initial Nuremberg trial, which 
received the most attention because it prosecuted the highest-ranking officials. 
Furthermore, after 1946, while the Dachau trials were still in progress, the American 
government wanted to shift public attention toward reconstruction efforts and the 
improvement of German-American relations. The following brief examination of 
previously unpublished photographs of the Dachau trials and executions demonstrates the 
range of war crimes and criminals that the American government prosecuted largely out 
of the public eye. It also shows how photography was used to create a historical record of 
every detail, however gruesome, of each defendant’s trial and execution.  
 The Dachau trials (1945-1947) were entirely separate from the Nuremberg 
proceedings. The 1943 Moscow Declaration “Statement of Atrocities” declared that the 
Germans responsible for committing atrocities, mass executions, and massacres and 
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would be “judged and punished” after the war ended.111 It further outlined that the 
offenders would be divided into two groups. The “major” war criminals, whose crimes 
had “no particular geographical localization,” would be punished by a joint decision of 
the Allied governments.112 (This later translated to the International Military Tribunal’s 
governance of the most prominent Nuremberg trial). The second group, comprised of 
lower-ranking offenders, would be sent back to the location where their crimes were 
committed and punished by postwar courts established there. This meant that after the 
war ended, each occupying government in Germany was responsible for prosecuting 
crimes committed within its jurisdiction (i.e., the American government handled all cases 
related to crimes committed in what became the American zone of occupied Germany).  
 Governed exclusively by American military commissions, the resulting 462 
Dachau trials were named as such because a majority of the proceedings were held on the 
grounds of the former Dachau concentration camp.113 The American government initially 
imprisoned 15,000 offenders but they eventually brought the number down to 1,676 
defendants. In 232 trials, 1,030 perpetrators were prosecuted for atrocities committed in 
concentration camps, including Buchenwald, Dachau, Mauthausen, and Flossenburg. The 
remaining 226 trials prosecuted 646 German civilians, Nazi and military police, and 
German military personnel for crimes against American soldiers. Unlike the Nuremberg 
defendants, who were charged with crimes against war, peace, and humanity, defendants 
in the Dachau trials were charged with violating preexisting laws of war (such as the 
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Geneva Convention). Initially, cases regarding American military personnel took 
precedence over trials concerning mass atrocities, in part because the American 
government had begun collecting evidence for these cases during the war, before they 
realized the extent of Nazi concentration camps.114 The individual Dachau trials 
prosecuted many more defendants more expeditiously than at Nuremberg. And unlike at 
Nuremberg, former inmates of concentration camps could testify as eyewitnesses.115  
 All these trials were extremely well documented by Signal Corps photographers 
who were ordered to cover them from a “historical and spot news point of view.”116 
Today the National Archives holds thousands of photographs showing every aspect of the 
trials, from hearings to sentencing, and finally, the executions. However, most of these 
photographs were never published because of the shifting circumstances of the postwar 
period and latent Cold War tensions. The emphasis on Germany’s rehabilitation did not 
allow for reminders of the past and for pictures that continued the narrative of justice and 
retribution. From this vast archive of previously unpublished and censored photographs, 
only a few images are studied here. Representative of the wide range of criminals 
prosecuted by the American military government, they show how photography was used 
to build a record of the judicial process for the archives. Many of the execution 
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photographs in particular were never intended to be released to the press; instead, they 
were to serve as evidence, indisputable proof that that the sentences were carried out.  
Dachau Trials Concerning the Death of American Soldiers 
 Stories about the Dachau trials that focused on prosecuting German civilians and 
soldiers for the deaths of American soldiers were not published in Heute because they 
were generally not supported by the German public. However, the unpublished Signal 
Corps photographs of these trials provide a glimpse into the cases. One image shows 
Käthe Reinhardt, who was one of fifteen women prosecuted for crimes against American 
military personnel (Fig. 2.37).117 She stands before the court with her hands clasped 
tightly together and her arm restrained by a military policeman. As the Signal Corps 
caption on the print verso states, she appears “horror-stricken” as she listens to her death 
sentence being pronounced.118 The National Archives holds many similar photographs. In 
addition to marking a critical moment in the proceedings, they seem to have been taken in 
order to gauge the defendants’ reactions. Did they show remorse for their crimes?  
 Reinhardt was not accused of murder but was convicted for verbally inciting a 
mob riot that killed six American airmen whose plane had been shot down in Rüsselheim, 
Germany. The prosecution advocated that the American airmen should have been treated 
as prisoners-of-war, whose deaths were violations of the Geneva Convention. The 
defense council, on the other hand, argued that Reinhart and the ten other German 
civilians convicted had been traumatized by recent Allied air raids and Nazi propaganda 
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that instructed Germans to kill American fliers.119 Many Germans sympathized with these 
civilians on trial, believing that the deaths of American soldiers should be considered part 
of the “suffering of the war.”120 To avoid public sympathy or outrage over these trials—
and the prosecution of German civilian women in particular—Heute made the diplomatic 
choice not to run photographs from such cases, or from the Malmedy Massacre case, 
which was the most controversial Dachau trial.  
The Malmedy Massacre proceedings, which ran from May 12 to July 16, 1946, 
prosecuted seventy-three Waffen-SS soldiers for the December 17, 1944, murder of 
eight-four American soldiers, who had surrendered in Malmedy, Belgium. (The Massacre 
is also discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation). All the SS soldiers were 
convicted; forty-three were given death sentences and twenty-two life terms.121 The 
Signal Corps photographs of Malmedy defendants such as George Fleps hearing their 
death sentences being pronounced were a powerful and poignant way to record justice in 
action (Fig. 2.38). However, they were not released to the press because of the 
controversy that ensued.122  
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 After the trial, Malmedy Massacre defendants claimed that American 
interrogators had tortured and coerced them into signing false confessions. These 
accusations led to a series of investigations and appeals that ultimately resulted in the 
commutation of all forty-three death sentences. The last of the convicted prisoners was 
released in 1957.123 The American judicial misconduct in Malmedy cast a negative light 
on all the other Dachau proceedings, and that led to the establishment of Clemency 
Petitions and War Crimes Modification board. By 1951, this board had reviewed 512 
cases, and subsequently reduced prison terms and commuted many death sentences, 
including Reinhardt’s.124  
Dachau Atrocities Trials and Executions 
  Though a number of death sentences were commuted, 272 were carried out. U.S. 
Army Signal Corps photographers documented these executions but, for several reasons, 
these images did not run in the press for either American or German audiences. First, 
with the controversy over the Malmedy Massacre trial, the American government did not 
want to attract more scrutiny about the validity of its trials. Second, if German Heute 
readers considered the publication of concentration camp photos to be “distasteful,” they 
would have undoubtedly objected to images of their compatriots being executed.125 The 
publication of 272 execution photographs would have appeared like a parade of trophy 
images, and could have disturbed the peace that had been so hard-won. Finally, though 
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the Dachau trials ended in 1947, it took until 1951 to carry out all of the death sentences, 
and in this period tensions with the Soviets became acutely pronounced. As the Cold War 
heated up and the need to improve German-American relations became more pressing, 
there was an even greater imperative to censor such execution photographs. 
 Though Signal photographs of the Dachau trial executions were censored at the 
time, they can now be viewed in the National Archives.126 The archives has personnel 
files on the executed war executed criminals, and they paint a much fuller portrait of 
individual defendants than was portrayed in American press and propaganda of the 
period. The contents of the war criminals personnel files vary, but Hans Wolf’s file is 
particularly interesting because of its rich trove of documents. There are identification 
sheets detailing his psychical attributes, marital status, level of education, and profession 
before the war, as well as transcripts of an interrogation and his last words before 
execution. The folder also holds a letter from his daughter, his German identity card, mug 
shots, fingerprints, and what appears to be a psychological evaluation, which gives a 
substantial life and medical history detailing his epilepsy and mental episodes, perhaps 
undertaken as way to try to understand why such criminal acts were carried out.  
 These documents also detail Wolf’s role in the war and the charges against him. 
He was among the nine percent of defendants prosecuted by an American military 
commission who were former concentration camp inmates. Many of them, like Wolf, 
were charged for their role as kapos, prisoners designated by SS guards to carry out Nazi 
                                                
126 The declassification date of these materials is not known.  
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rules and tasks.127 A Catholic, Wolf was sent to prison in 1940 for listening to enemy 
broadcasts and was later transferred to Buchenwald. Court records included witness 
testimonies accusing Wolf of beating other prisoners, resulting in severe injury or death. 
However, he also allowed Jewish prisoners to practice religious ceremonies, gathered 
extra food for them, was beaten by SS guards for refusing to beat prisoners, and helped 
two Americans escape from a nearby POW camp.128 Wolf’s story was so complex and 
difficult to tell it would not have fit neatly within Heute’s optimistic and airbrushed 
picture of reconstruction. 
 The United States government also did not want to showcase that it executed 
concentration camp survivors, especially as many of the higher-level Buchenwald 
defendants were given comparatively lighter sentences.129 Therefore, the pair of 
photographs in Wolf’s file documenting the moments before and after his execution on 
November 19, 1948, were censored. The haunting “before” image shows Wolf standing 
in the gallows with a wide-eyed, yet distant, expression as a bright flash lights up his face 
                                                
127 Yavnai, “U.S. Army War crimes trial,” 62-63. See Yavnai also for additional 
information on prosecution of kapos. She specifies that the former prisoners were 
political, criminal, Jewish or homosexual prisoners. Out of thirty-one defendants in his 
particular Buchenwald trial, Wolf was one of two former inmates prosecuted. The other 
was Edwin Katzen Ellenboget, who had been a political prisoner and a doctor in 
Buchenwald. Ellenboget’s life sentence was later commuted to twelve years 
imprisonment. United States v. Josias Prince zu Waldeck et. al. Review and 
Recommendations of the Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes, November 15, 1947.  
“The Dachau Trials: Buchenwald Cases” Jewish Virtual Library, last accessed March 12, 
2019, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/buchenwald-war-crimes-trials 
128 United States v. Waldeck et. al., 90-92.  
129 For example, Josias Prince zu Waldeck, SS and Police leader, was sentenced to life 
imprisonment (commuted to 20 years imprisonment) and the notorious Ilse Koch, known 
as the Witch of Buchenwald, was also given life imprisonment (commuted to four years). 
For a list of sentences see: “The Dachau Trials: Buchenwald Cases” Jewish Virtual 
Library.  
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(Fig. 2.39). Leather straps bind his legs and chest; his restrained hands are clenched 
together. The two guards who grip his arms look away from the camera to conceal their 
identities, while a third holds out a black placard with Wolf’s name and the execution 
date in white block letters.130 After the execution, Wolf’s naked corpse was laid in a 
wood coffin and photographed again with the same ID placard across his chest (Fig. 
2.40).131  
This pair of photographs provides an orderly yet gruesome closure to a morally 
complex case. There are similar before-and-after photographs in the files of each of the 
German war criminals executed by the American military. As NARA records indicate, 
they were taken as part of the standard operating procedure for the executions and were 
intended only for the military prisoner files.132 The manner in which they were taken—
the clinical quality of the images and the nakedness—further indicates that such images 
were never intended for the press. Like the mug shots in the prisoner files, the 
photographs were intended to identify each war criminal and to forestall any future doubt 
that the executions had been carried out.  
 One additional set of photographs documents the final seven Germans executed 
by the American military commission in 1951 (Fig. 2.41 and 2.42). In the archives a 
sheaf of correspondence documents the debates about what information to include and 
                                                
130 In other haunting “before” execution photographs, the guards’ faces are scratched or 
whited out by censors to protect their identity. 
131 Some executed war criminals were photographed naked and others clothed. It is 
unclear why this may have been but perhaps it was related to when and how a medical 
inspection of the body was conducted.  
132 “Procedure for Executions,” Headquarters European Command, June 20, 1950, 
NARA.  
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exclude from a press release about these final executions. It was firmly stated that the 
total count of executions should not be mentioned and that the photographs and last 
words of each criminal should not be published.133 The file also includes a letter of appeal 
from an Austrian writer Emilie Salzmann, editor of the Austrian Der Tatmensch 
magazine, who wrote that, if carried out, the “execution of the seven convicted men 
would undermine confidence in a future alliance between the United States and the 
German Federal Republic and, last not least, would shock all civilized nations.”134 
Despite petitions for commutation, these death sentences were upheld. But Salzmann’s 
letter exemplifies the reason why photographs of the executions were never released. 
Salzmann declares that the United States “desires to be a true model of Democracy and 
humanity”; and consequently such images had to be suppressed.135 To protect its 
carefully protected self-image in the early years of the Cold War, the American 
government exercised diplomacy by censoring the execution photographs.  
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has demonstrated the vital role photographs played in furthering the 
American government’s shifting agenda in the immediate postwar period. When 
                                                
133 Memo to HICOG Frankfurt from Cinceur Signed Handy, HQ European Command, 
June 19, 1951; Memo from State Dep from McCloy to HICOG Frankfurt, June 1951, HQ 
European Command. Ultimately, the press release included only short blurbs of each of 
the accused, detailing their roles in the war (many had higher-ranking responsibilities in 
concentration camps). To Secretary of the Army from Cinceur Signed Handy. RG 549, 
Box 13, NARA. 
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American troops first entered concentration camps in April 1945, Eisenhower declared 
that the camps must be extensively photographed. He ordered those images to be 
internationally disseminated so that the world would see the true extent of Nazi 
barbarities. After V-E Day, photo-illustrated American pamphlets, posters, and 
magazines forced German civilians to confront Nazi crimes and attempted, but ultimately 
failed, to stimulate a sense of collective guilt. Subsequently, Heute and Army Talks/I&E 
published selective photographs of the Nuremberg trials to shift attention to the top Nazi 
Party leaders and to showcase the democratic process. During the Dachau trials, Signal 
Corps photographers comprehensively documented the prosecution of 1,676 lower-
ranking war criminals and the execution of 272 persons. Unlike the Nuremberg and 
concentration camp photographs, most of the Dachau trial images were never intended 
for publication in the period because they did not fit with the aims of improving German-
American relations in that stage of the reconstruction.  
 From 1945 to the execution of the last German war criminal in 1951, 
photographs, whether intended for public dissemination or the archives, served as 
concrete evidence of German war crimes and testified to the fact that the executions of 
war criminals were carried out, but they were also used to convey more amorphous 
notions of guilt, responsibility, and justice in propaganda for German and American 
audiences. Like the first chapter’s study of prisoners of war, the concentration camp and 
war crimes trial were framed differently in propaganda for German and American civilian 
and military audiences. Comparison of published and unpublished images and text 
similarly demonstrated how the American government used the strategy of selective truth 
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to frame itself as a benevolent captor and occupier. As the enemy shifted from the 
Germans to the Soviets in this period, the American government transitioned from a 
condemning approach to a greater focus on the rehabilitation of the German people, as 
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Chapter Three 
 From Hostile to Hopeful: American Depictions of German Women and Children 
 
 The cover of the September 15, 1947 issue of Heute, the photo-illustrated 
propaganda magazine created by the American government for German civilians, shows 
an American soldier teaching a German boy how to play baseball (Figure 3.1). Standing 
closely behind the boy, the GI wraps his arms around him in a paternal pose and together 
they grip the bat. In 1947, this photograph demonstrated the occupying force’s aim to 
build positive German-American relations in the wake of World War II. Similar 
photographs and cartoons of GIs and German youth playing baseball ran in U.S. Army 
magazines, such as Army Talks, for American soldiers serving in occupied Germany. For 
both German and American audiences in postwar Germany, these images served as 
recruitment advertisements, to encourage German and American soldiers’ participation in 
the German Youth Activities (GYA) program. The GYA was launched by the American 
occupying government in 1946 in a campaign to re-educate German children, teaching 
them to embrace democracy and the American way of life.  
 Before the 1946 campaign, contact between American soldiers and German 
civilians was strictly prohibited under the banner of a “non-fraternization” policy. 
General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, issued the initial 
policy in September 1944, when American troops first entered Germany, and it remained 
in effect until October 1945. The ordinance forbade GIs from conversing with Germans, 
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visiting German homes, drinking with Germans, and even shaking hands with them, but 
most American soldiers violated the ban, particularly in their relationships with women.1  
 To discourage fraternization, the American army ran a propaganda campaign, 
disseminating hyper-sexualized cartoons that portrayed German women as dangerous 
seductresses. These images primarily ran in Army Talks and on posters. In April 1945 
(one month before V-E Day), the army issued a poster that showed a buxom German 
woman leaning seductively against a wall beneath a “Don’t Fraternize!” banner (Fig. 
3.2). Setting a trap for an eager GI, she drops her polka-dot handkerchief. Should the GI 
pick it up, however, a German thug draped in a cape adorned with swastikas will stab 
him. Above the banner, a cartoon of Hitler peeks from behind a curtain like a puppet 
master. In stark contrast to Heute’s 1947 happy picture of German-American 
cooperation, the 1945 poster exaggerates the threat of German women to convince GIs 
that fraternization could prove lethal.   
 This chapter examines previously unstudied photographs and cartoons of German 
women and children published in American government posters, Army Talks for 
American GIs, and Heute for German civilians. As with the previous chapters, I 
additionally compare photographs in these publications with those that ran in Life and 
previously censored and unpublished archival images. I focus on the period from 1944 to 
1948, when Germany transitioned from World War II enemy to potential ally against the 
Soviets. As demonstrated in the last two chapters, American policy towards Germans 
shifted markedly in this four-year span, from a condemning to a welcoming approach. As 
                                                
1 Joseph R. Starr, “Fraternization with Germans in World War II,” Office of the Chief 
Historian, European Command (Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany, 1947), 148-9.  
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in the wartime propaganda portrayals of prisoners-of-war, German women and children 
were initially depicted as dangerous and deceitful but in the postwar period they were 
shown as capable of reform. However, this chapter differs from the last two because here 
the audiences and the subjects depicted—America soldiers and German civilians—
interacted with each other on a daily basis in the American zone of Germany. German 
women and children stood at the front line of German-American relations because they 
far outnumbered German men on their home front, since so many of the men were off at 
war, had been killed, or had been taken as prisoners.  
 From 1944 to 1948, as American policies significantly changed course, depictions 
of German women and children were used to persuade American soldiers to first fear and 
then befriend their former enemies. This chapter's first section examines the non-
fraternization policy and cartoons of German women, which exaggerated their sexuality 
in order to deter American soldiers from fraternizing. This image of German women as 
vixens stands in stark contrast to photographs in American propaganda for German 
audiences, showing resilient Trümmerfrauen (women of the rubble), who rebuilt German 
cities brick by brick after the war.  
 The second section studies images of German youth and re-education. Wartime 
propaganda for American soldiers portrayed German children as dangerous soldiers in 
the making. However, in the postwar period, former Hitler Youth were exculpated and 
instead promoted as the most vital demographic to save in order to ensure future peace in 
Germany and the world. I compare images of the GYA to those promoting the Freie 
Deutsche Jugend (FDJ; Free German Youth), a youth group sponsored by the Soviet 
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government in their zone of occupied Germany. Unlike the GYA materials, posters for 
FDJ employed a very similar aesthetic to the Hitler Youth propaganda. This chapter 
argues that the American government used images as a way of managing the complex 
interpersonal relationships between American soldiers and German civilians in wartime 
and postwar Allied-occupied Germany.  
 While previous scholarship has documented the relationships between American 
soldiers and German civilians in this period, my study focuses on the pivotal role images 
played as tools of persuasion, used to convince German and American audiences to 
follow the American government’s rapid policy changes.2 As with the other chapters of 
this dissertation, my analysis of American depictions of German women and children is 
equally concerned with what was featured and what was omitted from American 
propaganda. How did American propagandists strategically use photographs and cartoons 
to showcase or ignore women and children’s involvement in the NSDAP (Nazi Party)? 
How did the American policy of German collective guilt, discussed in chapter two, 
pertain to German women and children? Were they equally culpable or drawn as victims? 
Further, how were depictions of German women and children framed differently for 
German and American audiences and how did they evolve from the last year of World 
War II to the beginning of the Cold War?  
While portrayals of German POWs dealt with issues of truth and credibility, and 
stories on the concentration camps and war crimes trial showcased guilt and justice, the 
                                                
2 Petra Goedde’s GIs and Germans is a particularly useful study but she not devote 
attention to images. Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign 
Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UP, 2003). 
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cartoons and photographs of German women and children negotiated complex issues of 
victimhood, agency, innocence, and changing gender roles. Common among all three 
case studies is the American government’s selective use of photographs first to invoke 
fear, but then very quickly after the war ended, to endear itself to the Germans and 
encourage the growth of a postwar democracy.  
 
Depictions of German Women  
 During the non-fraternization campaign (1944-1945), propaganda for American 
soldiers featured cartoons that portrayed German women as venereal disease-laden “axis 
agents” and prostitutes.3 After the non-fraternization ban was lifted in October 1945, 
German women continued to be sexualized but were no longer portrayed as dangerous. 
However, Heute, which had a strong German civilian woman readership, showed a more 
positive picture of women's contributions to postwar reconstruction.4   
 Before examining American portrayals of German women, it is helpful to have a 
brief understanding of women’s roles in the National Socialist regime. In the patriarchal 
NSDAP (Nazi Party), women’s primary roles were as wives and mothers, and “racially 
pure” German women were encouraged to have as many children as possible to 
                                                
3 “Axis Agents: A Toast to Hitler And Hirohito,” Poster of an Unknown Origin. Records 
of the Office of the Surgeon General (Army) Posters. 112-P-95, National Archives 
Records Administration (NARA). 
4 According to a 1949 survey, 51% of Heute readers in cities with 100,000 or more 
residents were women. “Readership of Heute” Opinion Surveys Branch, Information 
Services Division, OMGUS (Office of Military Governor United States), Germany. RG 
260 Box 114, NARA.  
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propagate the German race.5 Though excluded from political power, many women tacitly 
or actively supported the regime. One third of female voters voted for the NSDAP in the 
last democratic election before Hitler took power, and in 1936, 11 million of the 35 
million German women were members of the NS-Frauenschaft (National Socialist 
Women’s League).6 During World War II, women were increasingly drawn away from 
the domestic sphere and conscripted in the war effort.7 By 1945, there were 
approximately 500,000 women in German military auxiliary services, including 3,700 
women who served as guards in concentration camps.8 
 Representations of German women in Nazi propaganda show these evolving 
roles. Posters from the 1930s featured illustrations and photographs that portray idealized 
German women as Madonna figures tending to Kinder, Küche and Kirche (children, 
kitchen, and church). Set against an agrarian landscape, one poster from 1933, which 
appears to have been modeled after Raphael’s Madonna and child imagery, shows a 
                                                
5 The Nazi state regulated the propagation of the German race with ordinances like the 
Lebenstrom ordinance of 1936, which declared that all members of the SS should father 
four children. Conversely, non-racially desirable women could be subject to mass 
sterilization and non-voluntary abortions. “Women in the Third Reich” United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), last accessed March 11, 2019, 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/ en/article/women-in-the-third-reich. Gisela 
Block, “Antinatalism, Maternity, and Paternity in the National Socialist Racism,” in 
Nazism and German Society, ed. David F. Crew (New York: Routledge, 1994), 110-140. 
For a critique of Block see also: Adelheid von Saldern, “Victims or Perpetrators? 
Controversies about the Role of Women in the Nazi State” in Nazism and German 
Society.  
6 Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics (New 
York: St. Martin's, 1987), 457, as cited in von Saldern, “Victims or Perpetrators?, 151-
152. Others estimate approximately 13 of 40 million German women were involved in 
NSDAP activities. “Women in the Third Reich,” USHMM. 
7 For a discussion of close entanglement between the private and public spheres in the 
National Socialist period, see also: von Saldern, “Victims or Perpetrators?” 
8 “Women in the Third Reich,” USHMM. 
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German woman in a peasant dress with three cherubic children in her lap (Fig. 3.3). 
These images reinforced ideals that a women’s primary place was with her children. 
However, after the war began, Nazi propaganda sought to mobilize German women into 
the war effort. A poster from 1941 depicts three women: a farm worker, a nurse, and a 
factory worker walking arm-in-arm (Fig. 3.4). Behind them looms a picture of a male 
German soldier, and the caption implores, “Help us too!” This poster does not include 
any references to the women’s domestic responsibilities, and instead shows women 
answering a greater call of duty from their country and countrymen. 
 Though used to radically different ends and employing dissimilar aesthetic styles, 
American women were also shown in domestic roles and mobilized in the war effort in 
American home front propaganda.9 With men off at war and many open jobs to fill, the 
Office of War (OWI) Information launched a recruitment campaign to encourage women 
to participate in a range of jobs. OWI posters depicted factory workers with impeccable 
red lips and nails, demonstrating that women could maintain their femininity while 
involved in industrial labor (Fig. 3.5).10 Picture-perfect white middle-class women were 
also portrayed as caregivers, keeping the household, tending to the children, and 
contributing to the war effort by scrimping and saving (Fig. 3.6).11 Both the Nazi 
                                                
9 For a comparison of German and American mobilization propaganda see: Leila J. Rupp, 
Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda, 1939-1945 (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).  
10Austin Porter, “Paper Bullets: The Office of War Information and American World War 
II Print Propaganda,” PhD. diss. (Boston University, 2013), 256, 236. 
11 Rupp, Mobilizing Women, 53. See also: Melissa Dabakis, “Gendered Labor: Norman 
Rockwell's Rosie the Riveter and the Discourses of Wartime Womanhood,” in Gender 
and American History Since 1890, ed. Barbara Melosh (London: Routledge, 1993), 182-
201. 
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Madonna and the ideal American housewife served as foils for the ways in which 
German women would be portrayed in the non-fraternization campaign.  
 Prior to the non-fraternization campaign, German women did not appear in 
American wartime propaganda. Instead, anti-German propaganda presented a distinctly 
masculine and militaristic picture of Germany.12 If not represented by a caricature of 
Hitler, Germans were portrayed as anonymous and robotic soldiers. In one hyper-stylized 
OWI poster from 1942, a German soldier is shown as merely a pair of white eyes beneath 
a gray steel helmet (Fig. 3.7).13 Women and children were not included in such portrayals 
because they would have compromised the propagandists’ attempt to dehumanize the 
enemy.  
 Familiar with this picture of masculine military strength and having encountered 
mostly male German soldiers on the battlefield, American GIs entering Germany in the 
fall of 1944 were surprised to find such a vulnerable population of impoverished German 
women, children, and elderly.14 With German men off at war, killed, or taken as 
prisoners, there was a stark gender imbalance on the German home front. In 1946, there 
were seven million more German women than men, and among young adults between 
twenty and forty years old, there were 160 women for every 100 men.15 These German 
                                                
12 Goedde, GIs and Germans, xx.  
13 The gray steel helmet was frequently featured in Nazi propaganda as an emblem of 
German military prowess. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, and Paul Paret, Persuasive 
Images: Posters of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 108.  
14 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 44.  
15 Ibid.; Elizabeth Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's ‘Crisis 
Years’" and West German National Identity,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 
101, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), 374.  
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women, now heads of family, lived in dire conditions. Amid the omnipresent ruins and 
rubble, daily concerns of food and shelter stood at the forefront of every German’s mind. 
Homelessness was widespread, fuel and heat were limited, and winters were bitterly 
cold.16 Rations had also been drastically reduced from wartime levels. “Unproductive” 
housewives in particular were given the lowest ration card, dubbed the “ticket to heaven” 
card for its inability to provide a substantial diet.17 
 Occupying the same terrain, 1.6 million American soldiers were stationed in 
Germany in 1945; German-American interactions were thus unavoidable.18 American 
soldiers had generous rations and lived in comparatively comfortable conditions, 
commandeering buildings in the best repair for their own use, which emphasized the 
power imbalance between the groups.19  
 Toward the end of the war, despite the fact that they were still enemies, many 
American soldiers felt sympathy for destitute women and children in Germany. One 
American sergeant commented in the New York Times that he felt sorry for German 
                                                
16 It is estimated that in cities over 100,000 residents an average of 45% of housing stock 
was lost. As a result, in Hamburg, for example, nearly half the population was left 
homeless. Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War : The Reconstruction of German 
Cities after World War II (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 11. By the end of the war about 
14 million Germans had lost their homes. Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman,” 362. 
17 Rations in Berlin in December 1945 were averaging 1,600 calories a day compared to 
remarkably high wartime rations of 3,000 calories daily. Atina Grossman, Jews, 
Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 31, 76. 
18 This number dramatically dwindled in the postwar period, hovering around 135,000 
American soldiers between 1947 and into the early 1950s. Sabine Lee, “A Forgotten 
Legacy of the Second World War: GI Children in Post-war Britain and Germany,” 
Contemporary European History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 2011), 167. 
19 American soldiers received daily rations of 4,000 calories a day. Goedde, GIs and 
Germans, 140; Diefendorf, In the Wake of War, 16.  
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civilians because they appeared “just sort of helpless and glad they were not being 
killed.”20 This sense of helplessness was undoubtedly compounded by the view that 
women and children had less agency than men in the brutally patriarchal Nazi Party. 
German women’s status as victims or perpetrators of the Nazi regime is still a topic of 
debate today, but at the time many Germans saw themselves as the former.21 Both 
American sympathy and Germans’ own feelings of victimhood created problems for the 
American government’s collective guilt campaign, which sought to hold all German 
military and civilians equally responsible for the war and its consequences. 
 Dealing with complicated notions of victimhood and culpability, desperate 
conditions in war-torn Germany, and an ongoing war, the American government sought 
to maintain a barrier between American occupiers and German civilians, the soon-to-be 
victors and the vanquished. In September 1944, when American troops first entered 
Germany, General Eisenhower issued a ban on fraternization between American soldiers 
and German civilians. The policy defined fraternization as: “the avoidance of mingling 
with Germans upon terms of friendliness, familiarity or intimacy, whether individually or 
                                                
20 “Americans Ignore Army Ban on Fraternizing As 'They Feel Sorry' for Cologne 
Civilians” The New York Times, March 9, 1945. 
21 As Michael Kater synthesizes, some argue that German women equally responsible for 
the war and its consequences because they tacitly or actively supporting National 
Socialism and men’s actions. While other scholars contend that women are less 
responsible, or are even possibly even victims, because women were forced into 
subordinate roles in a male-dominated National Socialist regime. Kater, Hitler Youth, 71-
72. See also: Von Saldern, “Victims or Perpetrators?” and Koonz, Mothers in Fatherland. 
For more on German feelings of victimhood see: Robert Moeller, War Stories: The 
Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
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in groups, in official or unofficial dealings.”22 The ban was initially established as a 
security measure, because the American army expected to face civilian resistance when 
they entered Germany (though they met very little). The American government also 
wanted to make Germans realize that they had been completely defeated, and they 
thought an aloof attitude from American soldiers would command more respect. Further, 
U.S. policy makers feared that German women would try to gain information from 
American soldiers or influence them with German propaganda. Finally, the American 
government sought to avoid negative reactions from the American public on the home 
front, which remained staunchly opposed to fraternization.23  
 From the outset, the fraternization policy was widely violated, mainly through 
sexual encounters. An official U.S. Army historical report on non-fraternization estimates 
that 90% of American soldiers fraternized and 50 to 100% of the violations were 
sexual.24 After four years of war, GIs longed for physical and emotional connection as 
well as entertainment and a semblance of normalcy.25 Moreover, the ban was notoriously 
unenforceable. While GIs could be fined $60 for fraternizing, this did little to deter 
them.26 They could also be court martialed, but officers generally looked the other way 
when subordinates violated the ban, because they were often breaking it themselves.27  
 Although these violations were widespread, photographs of early German-
American interactions are rare. Just days after the ban was issued, press reports began to 
                                                
22 Starr, “Fraternization,” 16. 
23 Ibid., 11-12.  
24 Starr, “Fraternization,” 148 -149. 
25 Ibid., 28.  
26 “$60 Fine for Fraternizing,” New York Times, February 27, 1945. 
27 Starr, “Fraternization,” 25. 
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surface about widespread instances of fraternization, and Eisenhower quickly sent a 
memo to General Omar Bradley, Commander of the Twelfth Army which read: “This 
must be nipped in the bud immediately.”28 A week later, September 26, 1944, 
Eisenhower further ordered: “All pictures or news items which appear to indicate Allied 
troops are fraternizing with German soldiers or population will be placed on the censor 
list forthwith.”29 Such photographs were censored because the American government did 
not want the public to think that they were not in control of their troops. Soldiers also 
attempted to keep their violations discreet, and U.S. Army Signal Corps photographers 
would not have photographed their comrades breaking the rules. As a result, there do not 
appear to be any photographs in the National Archives, the main repository of Signal 
Corps photographs, showing fraternization violations before the ban was relaxed. 
Non-Fraternization and Venereal Disease Cartoons 
 Without photographs, the U.S. Army primarily used cartoons in their wartime 
campaign to dissuade GIs from fraternizing. These cartoons appeared in Army Talks and 
on posters. According to an Army historical report, a quarter-million anti-fraternization 
posters were mounted in all Army gathering places, such as barracks, and were even 
posted in German cities.30 Though they must have also been seen by Germans, the non-
fraternization campaign was geared to American soldiers, mostly young men in their 
twenties. The women depicted were always roughly of the same age, and though German 
women in their twenties would have participated in the the female arm of the Hitler 
                                                
28 From Dwight D. Eisenhower to 12th Army (personal for Omar Bradley), Sept 17, 1944. 
RG331 Box 113, NARA.  
29 Memo from Eisenhower. Sept 26, 1944, RG331 Box 113, NARA.  
30 Starr, “Fraternization,” 26.  
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Youth called the Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM or League of German Girls), this 
affiliation was not made explicit.31 Contrary to Nazi ideals, the “Fräulein” was also never 
shown as a mother and instead was cast as a prostitute. Depicting German women as 
prostitutes stripped them of their status as innocent civilians. In some sense, women had 
to be shown with agency in order to make them appear more threatening. Drawn without 
individualization or realism, cartoons were a medium that rendered the slander more 
digestible and humorous for their target audience.  
 As tools of propaganda, cartoons had advantages over photographs. While 
photographs have an indexical nature and require photographers to be standing in front of 
a subject to photograph it, cartoons are not tethered to reality, so cartoonists can imagine 
and draw any exagerrated scenario to fit their desired message. Army cartoonists could 
also depict taboo subjects that could not be photographed, such as GI encounters with 
prostitutes, and more easily employ humor. By making Germans the butt of the joke, and 
by ignoring the harsh realities of wartime Germany that might have appeared through a 
photographer’s lens, Army cartoons undermined GI sympathies for German civilians, 
depicting them as villains instead of victims.32  
 In the last year of the war (1944-1945), the American government continued to 
reiterate the danger of the German enemy. One approach to make German women appear 
more threatening was to show them in cahoots with German men. For example, in the 
                                                
31 Beginning in 1939, participation in the BDM was made mandatory for all girls aged ten 
to eighteen. So in 1945, any woman younger than twenty-four years old would have 
necessarily participated in the BDM.  
32 This turn of phrase is borrowed from a chapter title, “Villains to Victims: The Cultural 
Feminization of Germany” in Goedde, GIs and Germans. 
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non-fraternization poster described in this chapter’s introduction, an older German man in 
lederhosen and a German soldier brandishing a knife flank the German woman (Fig. 3.2). 
The woman is dropping the handkerchief between two men, showing that she is not 
acting alone. Rather, she is working with the men to plot the GI’s demise. The cartoon 
warns American soldiers that by sleeping with German women, they are also exposing 
themselves to German men.  
 To show women as physically dangerous in their own right, Army Talks and army 
posters emphasized the risk of contracting venereal diseases (VD). A cartoon on the 
cover of the December 9, 1944 issue of Army Talks, shows a parade of women carrying 
giant posters with the letters “VD” (Fig. 3.8). The women have long legs, but their 
features are indiscernible, giving no sense of individuality. The accompanying article 
describes the Germans’ extensive patronage of French brothels and cautions American 
soldiers in France against sleeping with women because German occupiers had already 
infected them with VD. To show the growing threat of VD, Army Talks included 
staggering statistics purporting to show that the rate of VD on the continent rose six-fold 
from September to October 1944, from 10,000 to 60,000 cases per year.33 
 Army posters further signal that Hitler was plotting to take out American soldiers 
with VD as a weapon. One shows Hitler with Hirohito, the Emperor of Japan, pointing at 
a Venereal Disease clinic, explaining: “There’s our second front” (Fig. 3.9).34 These 
posters suggest to American soldiers that by sleeping with German women they abetted 
                                                
33 “V.D.” Army Talks, December 9, 1944, 7.  
34 Though the pair of Axis leaders did not widely appear in Army Talks, they were 
prevalent in American propaganda posters. Hitler was often drawn as the mastermind and 
Hirohito as the enemy sidekick.   
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Hitler’s master plan. In a similar vein, a second cartoon inside the December 9, 1944, 
Army Talks issue implies that Hitler intentionally ran brothels throughout Europe. It 
shows a caricature of Hitler opening a door to “Hotel V.D.” and beckoning a GI inside 
(Fig. 3.10). Behind Hitler, three women depicted as prostitutes are smiling and smoking 
cigarettes, implying that women across the continent were working for Hitler to defeat 
U.S. soldiers.  
 Army posters not only characterize all women as prostitutes but also label them 
“axis agents.”35 One poster shows a woman with dark brown hair and piercing blue eyes 
(Fig. 3.11). She holds up a martini glass filled with a bubbling pink drink labeled 
“venereal diseases” and raises “a toast to Hitler and Hirohito.”36 Behind her, there are 
silhouettes of women, with texts labeling them as a streetwalker and a pick-up. American 
soldiers perceived the women they met on the street or through casual encounters as 
different—and perhaps more innocent—than those they paid in brothels.37 However, the 
poster implies that there is no distinction; they are all working on behalf of the Axis 
armies. 
 Notably, the “Axis Agents” poster and Army Talks VD cartoons do not emphasize 
the nationality or the “German-ness” of the women depicted, nor are they drawn with the 
suggestion of “Aryan” physical traits. This was likely because VD was a problem 
throughout the European continent and many American soldiers were itinerant, 
                                                
35 “Axis Agents: A Toast to Hitler And Hirohito,” Poster of an Unknown Origin. Records 
of the Office of the Surgeon General (Army) Posters. 112-P-95, NARA.  
36 Ibid. 
37 “V.D.” Army Talks, 3-4. 
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campaigning across Germany, France, and Belgium, for example. 38 A table in an Army 
historical report on fraternization ranks the rates of VD in thirteen European countries 
and states that the highest VD rates were among American soldiers in France, closely 
followed by those in Germany.39 By not specifying the nationality of these disease-laden 
women, Army posters could better combat VD across the continent. 
Overseas Woman and the Female German Soldier 
 The term “Axis Agents” blurred the boundaries between civilians and soldiers, 
but neither Army Talks nor Army posters discussed the involvement of German women in 
the military or the NSDAP. Photographs of female soldiers could have been used in the 
non-fraternization campaign to show women as dangerous figures. However, the male-
dominated American military would not have viewed women as legitimate threats on the 
battlefield because they were perceived as an inherently fragile sex compared to men. 
However, materials geared to female American soldiers could depict German women as 
formidable rivals. Overseas Woman was a U.S. Army publication (1945-1946) produced 
by the Information and Education Division for American women who served in and with 
the Armed Forces in the European Theater, primarily as WACs (Women’s Army Corps) 
or ANC (Army Nurse Corps).40 This monthly magazine not only included photographs of 
                                                
38 Between D-Day and V-E Day, a soldier in the 13th Field Artillery Observation 
Battalion, for example, campaigned across France, Germany, and Belgium before 
traveling back to Germany and Belgium once again. “Battery A Positions Since D-Day,” 
William J. Klein Papers, private collection.  
39 Of 122,953 “sexual contact histories” covering the period between July and December 
1945, 45.8% or 56,320 VD cases were in France and 35.8% or 43,998 cases were in 
Germany. The rates of VD in these two nations far exceeded those reported for the eleven 
additional European countries listed. Starr, “Fraternization,” 77.  
40 The Information and Education Division also produced Army Talks and I&E Bulletin.  
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German female soldiers but also asserted German civilian women’s collective guilt for 
Nazi war crimes. While these depictions might have been beyond the limited scope of 
how women were portrayed to men in the period, an audience of female soldiers could 
better grapple with and understand women’s multifarious and sometimes nefarious 
capabilities.  
 Photographs and captions in an Overseas Woman story titled “Der Doughgirl,” 
published in June 1945, suggests that German women in civilian dress were considered as 
dangerous and committed to the Nazi Party as those in uniform. It pairs a photograph of a 
German woman in a skirt and an apron leaning against a shopping cart, with an image of 
the same, or a very similar looking, woman in a German army uniform (Fig. 3.12). The 
caption says: “In uniforms or as civilians, German women look pathetic, still defiant.”41 
While such biting words may have been considered inappropriate for male-oriented 
publications, materials for female soldiers could be more openly critical of other women.  
 “Der Doughgirl” also includes a third photograph that shows a line of five 
German female prisoners-of-war (Fig. 3.13). Some smile smugly, and others appear 
sterner. As compared to the cartoons drawn for male American soldiers, the women in 
this image do not appear particularly sexualized. However, the accompanying article 
discusses their promiscuity at length. It tells the story of a group of fifteen female 
soldiers, who were installed in the headquarters of German artillery unit to “bolster the 
morale of men in the battalion,” spending long nights in two-person foxholes to “cheer 
                                                
41 “Der Doughgirl,” Overseas Woman, June 1945, 11.  
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them up.”42 Although imagery in propaganda for American male and female soldiers 
vastly differed, casting women alternatively as alluring seductresses or as soldiers, the 
text in both describes them as prostitutes, which again directly contrasted with Nazi 
propagandists’ depiction of them as Madonna figures tending to Kinder, Küche and 
Kirche. 
 According to the American government’s collective guilt campaign, instituted in 
the spring of 1945 after American troops uncovered concentration camps, all Germans—
male and female civilians and military alike—were equally responsible for the war and 
its consequences. However, women’s culpability was not emphasized in Army Talks. 
Overseas Woman, on the other hand, painted a multivalent picture of women’s culpability 
and complicity, showing that both tacit and active supporters of the NSDAP contributed 
to the war and its consequences. A story titled “The Guilt of the Women of Nazi 
Germany,” published in Overseas Woman in July 1945, directly pairs a photograph of 
young German girls in the Bund Deutscher Mädel with an illustration of a concentration 
camp (Fig. 3.14). In Overseas Woman, the BDM image features one young German girl 
in the foreground, enthusiastically saluting Hitler. Behind her, faces, extended hands, and 
uniforms of other BDM girls can be seen, emphasizing the multitude of fervent Hitler 
supporters. Positioned against a yellow backdrop, the BDM image is framed by a border 
of white swastikas. On the adjacent page, an illustration shows concentration camp 
inmates on a patch of dirt behind barbed wire, with barracks visible in the distance. Both 
the living and dead prisoners are drawn as skeletons.  
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 Pairing the BDM and concentration camp images directly correlated women’s 
enthusiastic participation in the NSDAP with the horrors of the camps. Overseas Women 
could have evidenced women’s culpability with a single photograph of German female 
SS guards pitching bodies into mass graves, which ran in KZ, an American photo-
illustrated propaganda pamphlet for German civilians, discussed in chapter two (Fig. 
2.11). American propagandists used this image for German audiences, to show that 
German women were brutal actors in the war, and its caption asserted they would face 
legal prosecution. Overseas Woman however, did not mention criminal proceedings. It 
may have chosen the illustration of the camps rather than the KZ photograph because it is 
less graphic. But it was also likely because the BDM photograph better emphasized the 
collective guilt of all German women, rather than the actions of the smaller group of  
women who worked in concentration camps. “The Guilt of the Women of Nazi 
Germany” article discussed rich and poor women across Germany who benefited from 
Nazi slave labor, and it criticized them for “sitting idly by, putting the unvoiced stamp of 
approval on the atrocities.”43 Their complicity rendered them equally responsible for war 
crimes. 
The Complexities and Dismantling of the Non-Fraternization Policy 
 During the war, cartoons for American soldiers presented a very simplistic picture 
of fraternization, which often showed a gullible GI being seduced by a dangerous 
German temptress (Fig. 3.2). However, after the war, the non-fraternization policy was 
                                                
43 Virginia Lewis, “The Guilt of the Women of Nazi Germany,” Overseas Woman, July 
1945, v. 1, no. 4, 19. Lewis was former ETO (European Theater of Operations) 
correspondent for the St. Louis Dispatch who entered Germany with the 26th Army 
Division. 
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loosened and photographs of German-American relations were permitted to circulate. 
Images, and the rhetoric in Life magazine, geared to the American public, hinted at a 
much more complex picture of fraternization than previously shown. Outside of a war 
zone, a more nuanced view was permitted.  
 After Nazi war crimes came to light, one might imagine that American soldiers 
would have hesitated to have sexual relationships with their recent enemy; however, 
instances of fraternization skyrocketed after the war in Europe ended.  Relieved of many 
of their wartime responsibilities, lonely, bored, and weary American soldiers increasingly 
turned to leisure and entertainment and sought the company of German women. 44 
Moreover, according to Army surveys, the majority of American soldiers did not blame 
“ordinary” German civilians for starting the war or for the concentration camps. 45 They 
also tended to disassociate the collective guilt of a nation from the men and women they 
met through personal encounters.46 
 After the war, Germans no longer posed a significant security threat, so the 
American government acquiesced to widespread violations of the non-fraternization 
policy and relaxed it piecemeal. On June 8, 1945, it was amended to permit interactions 
between American soldiers and “small children,” and after July 14, 1945, soldiers were 
                                                
44 Starr, “Fraternization,” 45, 47. 
45 According to an Information and Education survey, 43% of American soldiers imputed 
Germans for starting the war and 25% blamed them for the concentration camps “What 
the American Soldier in Germany Says about the Germans and Germany” (based on 
survey conducted September 1945), Research Branch, Information and Education 
services. Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, November 1945, 1. 
RG 549 Box 956, NARA. 
46 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 74. 
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allowed to converse with German adults in public.47 Physical relationships between 
Americans and Germans were still discouraged but they occurred in plain sight, and 
photographs of fraternization began to run in the American press.48  
 Though these relationships between American men and German women were 
increasingly permitted in the European theater, they were still widely disapproved of on 
the home front.49 Life ran several articles on fraternization in July 1945, demonstrating 
this concern. However, the image of German women presented in Life in the immediate 
postwar period showed a marked improvement from the way they had been portrayed— 
as disease-ridden prostitutes—in wartime propaganda for soldiers, signaling an 
immediate shift away from depictions of Germans as enemies. 
 The first Life story on fraternization in July 1945 included a photograph of a 
young dimpled and smiling “unwed German mother” holding a crying child (Fig. 3.15). 
The caption says she “succumbed to the Nazis ‘patriotic baby’ program,” implying that 
the child’s father was German. The image is not sexualized and the decision to show a 
photograph of a German woman as a mother was significant because wartime cartoons 
never depicted women as such. It would have made them appear too much like innocent 
civilians.  
                                                
47 Starr, “Fraternization,” 94; From USFET Main, Signed Eisenhower to 6th Army group 
et. al, July 14, 1945. RG260 Box 4, NARA.  
48 The relaxed version of the non-fraternization policy remained in effect until October 1, 
1945, after which only marriage and billeting remained prohibited.  
49 Polls also show public opinion was divided along gender lines: 70% of women and 
only 40% of men under 30 years old said that American men should not be allowed to 
fraternize with German women. “The Quarter’s Poll,” Public Opinion Quarterly (Fall 
1945) as cited in Goedde, GIs and Germans, 78.  
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 The accompanying article did not paint German women as dangerous, but it 
alluded to potential violence against German women. It says: “The word rape has 
become a loosely used word in the German vocabulary.”50 Life was defensive of 
American soldiers, speaking of how German women tease them and that Germans 
“confuse friendliness with fraternization,” but the fact that rape was mentioned at all is 
noteworthy.51 According to Army historical reports, an estimated 484 German women 
filed complaints of rape against American soldiers between July 1942 and October 
1945.52 As terrible as that number is, it pales in comparison to the statistics about brutal 
and violent rapes in the Soviet zone. Conservative estimates suggest Soviet troops raped 
110,000 German women, many more than once, and up to 10,000 women died as a result 
of these assaults. However, other estimates suggest anywhere from half a million to two 
million German women were raped.53 Life magazine did not mention rape in the Soviet 
                                                
50 Percy Knauth, “Fraternization,” Life, July 2, 1945, 26. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Around half of rape complaints filed by women of all nationalities in the European 
Theater against American soldiers was brought trial. Starr, “Fraternization with Germans 
in World War II,” 81. Contrary to official Army numbers, others suggest American 
soldiers may have raped more than 11,000 German women as only roughly 5% of rapes 
were reported. Robert J. Lilly, Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during 
World War II (English ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 12, as cited in Ann 
Elizabeth Pfau, Miss Yourlovin GIs, Gender and Domesticity during World War II (New 
York: Columbia UP, 2013. ACLS Humanities E-Book), Chapter three notes, n.p.   
53 The most violent period of rape and plunder was April 24 to May 8, 1945 when the 
Soviets took Berlin, but the threat to German women in the Soviet zone continued 
through 1947. Soviets often acted out of revenge for Nazi brutalities, and were 
horrifyingly indiscriminate in their violence, raping young girls and elderly women alike. 
Grossman, Jews, Germans, and Allies, 49-50; Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in 
Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 72, 81. For more information see also: 
Chapter two, “Soviet Soldiers, German Women, and the Problem of Rape” in Naimark, 
The Russians in Germany. 
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zone, nor would it have run any images that showed violence against women in the 
American zone.  
 However, the next Life story on fraternization in July 1945 included an image that 
suggests American men’s aggressive behavior. The photograph depicts a young woman, 
diminutively described in the caption as a “pretty, laughing German girl,” standing with 
her back to a cement wall in a backyard in Wiesbaden (Fig. 3.16). In a domineering pose, 
an American soldier leans his whole body towards her and presses his hands against the 
wall on either side of her, as if blocking her from leaving.54 In a direct reversal of non-
fraternization cartoons which show soldiers as gullible boobs falling for the tricks of 
dangerous seductresses (Fig 3.2), the photograph depicts an American man exerting his 
dominance over a German woman who appears to have little agency. The headline 
further says that the “U.S. Army Boycott fails to stop GIs fraternizing,” indicating that 
the Army had little control over their own troops.  
 Illuminating the complex power dynamics of occupied Germany, the Life story 
off-handedly alluded to the fact that many German women engaged in relationships with 
American soldiers in exchange for material support and food. In addition to the economic 
benefits, German women, like American men, were also lonesome and weary after the 
war and sought companionship. With the promise of security, some women found 
American men in their tidy uniforms more appealing than the physically and emotionally 
wounded German prisoners returning from war.55 Life asserted: “Girls flaunt themselves 
partly to taunt the Americans but chiefly in order to get ‘frau bait’ of candy, gum, and 
                                                
54 “German Girls,” Life, July 23, 1945, 35.  
55 Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman,” 381. 
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cigarettes.”56 Attributing the initiative to the women, the magazine did not scold 
American men for using their power and greater economic position to bed them. 57 
  The women who associated with Americans were at risk of violence or scorn 
from their fellow Germans. In the fall of 1945, the New York Times reported that placards 
that scolded and threatened German women for fraternizing had been plastered around 
Bavaria. The newspaper also predicted that fraternization would be a major source of 
tension between American occupiers and German civilians.58 A historical Army report 
catalogued acts of aggression against fraternizers, and while there were some assaults 
against American soldiers, it appears that most of the hostility was directed at German 
women. Several had their hair clipped by former Hitler Youth, and there were also 
reports of women who had their heads shaved and even their hair set afire by German 
men for committing such offenses.59 
  In efforts to mend German-American relations, the American government fully 
repealed the non-fraternization policy in October 1945 (two months after V-J Day). With 
Germany divided into four zones of occupation (American, British, French, and Soviet), 
ideological boundaries began to harden. The repeal of the non-fraternization policy was 
in part motivated by nascent tensions with the Soviets. American officials worried that 
                                                
56 “German Girls,” Life, July 23, 1945, 36.  
57 This tone is echoed in an Army historical report, which says that women’s’ “readiness 
to seek the company of American soldiers bearing chocolate and cigarettes in their 
pockets undoubtedly placed temptation in the way of the American soldier.” Starr, 
“Fraternization,” 32.  
58 “SS Remnants Warn German Women” New York Times, September 30, 1945; 
“Fraternizing Irks Reich’s Soldiers,” New York Times, August 23, 1945.  
59 Starr, “Fraternization,” 44-45. This is similar to “horizontal collaborators” in France, 
who had their heads shaved in punishment for sleeping with Nazis during the war. 
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the non-fraternization policy, in combination with the collective guilt campaign and 
widespread denazification, which involved ousting Nazi-affiliated Germans from 
political positions, risked alienating German civilians, while Russians might be trying to 
“win over” the Germans.60 Despite pervasive brutality in the Soviet zone, the Soviets 
were more lenient with denazifaction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they also had a loose 
fraternization policy, which prohibited only marriage and billeting.61 Fearing that Soviet 
interactions with German men, women, and children could unduly improve Soviet-
German relations, the American government wanted to standardize the fraternization 
policy in all four zones “to insure uniform treatment of Germany.”62 Thus, to match the 
Soviets, the American non-fraternization policy was repealed on October 1, 1945, and 
only marriage and billeting remained prohibited.63 
 After the ban was lifted, materials for American soldiers continued to sexualize 
German women; however, they did so in a manner that did not invoke the recent Nazi 
past. Unlike Life, Army newspaper Stars and Stripes and the Occupation Chronicle (a 
more local Army newspaper for American personnel and their families in the Frankfurt 
                                                
60 An American official expressed his concern in a memo: “an important development 
which will bear watching is that while Russians may be undertaking a vigorous program 
of winning over Germans, we may be going on a tack which will result in estranging 
them. All in all it is going to be a mess. Memo from Lt. Muelder to Colonel []arter, May 
26 45. RG240 Box 4, NARA. 
61 To Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Group “Uniform Policy on Fraternization with 
Germans,” Sept 21, 1945. RG 260 Box 4, NARA.  
62 To USFET for ADCOCK from US Group CC Signed Clay, Sept 29, 1945. RG 260 
Box 4, NARA.  
63 Ibid.  
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military community) did not run photographs of German women. 64 Instead, they 
employed cartoons to keep German women as the butt of jokes and to better appeal to 
their audiences.  
 In 1946, the Occupation Chronicle ran a cartoon series titled “Baby,” which 
featured a sexy blonde German woman. “Baby” was always drawn wearing a short black 
skirt, high heels that emphasized her long legs, and a tight shirt that hugged her breasts. 
References to her sexual dalliances with American soldiers were overt. One cartoon 
published in the October 2, 1946 issue, shows Baby appearing at her female friend’s door 
late at night. The moon shines behind them, illuminating the cityscape, which is not 
drawn in ruins (to avoid bringing attention to dire living conditions) (Fig. 3.17). Baby’s 
usually tidy hair and skirt appear rumpled and the caption says: “Ach, Ingelore, I had 
such a vonderful English lesson tonight.”65 Though “Baby” was often portrayed as dim-
witted and promiscuous, she was not the dangerous VD-laden vixen portrayed in wartime 
propaganda.  
 A cartoon series in Stars and Stripes painted a decidedly less flattering picture of 
German women. Drawn by a GI cartoonist, Don Sheppard, the series featured a woman 
named “Veronika Dankeschön” (Veronika Thank-you-very-much, initials V.D. for 
Venereal Disease) who, “unlike the neat apple-cheeked blondes GIs are supposed to find 
alluring, [was] fat, sloppy, and of enormous blowziness.”66 Like “Baby,” Veronika was 
                                                
64 The circulation of Occupation Chronicle was 20,000. The Occupation Chronicle, 
August 14, 1942, 2. RG498 4246, NARA. 
65 “Baby,” Occupation Chronicle, October 2, 1946, 3. RG498 Box 4246, NARA. 
66 “Speaking of Pictures...,” Life, June 17, 1946, 12. Germans would come to adopt 
Veronika Dankeshön as a nickname for fraternizers. Heineman, “The Hour of the 
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often drawn in the company of American soldiers, but dissimilarly, the Stars and Stripes 
cartoon directly referenced Veronika’s Nazi past.67 Depicted as an overweight Fräulein, 
Veronika often wore pigtail braids and a dress decorated with swastikas around the hem. 
 Veronika Dankeshön’s affiliation with the NSDAP (Nazi Party) was particularly 
emphasized in one cartoon reprinted in Life magazine. It shows Veronika sitting at home, 
stroking the hair of her American GI boyfriend (identified by the insignia on his uniform 
sleeve), who is happily slumped down on the couch (Fig. 3.18). He tips his cigarette ash 
into a little German soldier statue that holds an ashtray, and the walls are adorned with 
pictures of German soldiers and Hitler. The caption, written as if spoken by Veronika to 
the GI, says: “Oh, ja, papa was in the party—but chust as a social obligation.”68 It 
bitingly pokes fun at German’s widespread claims that they never really supported Hitler. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Germans were offended by such unattractive portrayals of Nazi-
affiliated German women. Life reported in July 1946 that in response to German 
discontent, U.S. Army officials asked Sheppard and Stars and Stripes to tone down the 
cartoons and to limit the number published per month, as not to risk “jeopardiz[ing] our 
occupation program.”69 German disapproval of the “Veronika Dankeschön” series and 
American reconciliatory measures to limit blowback illuminate a fascinating moment in 
the trajectory of Germany as an ally, when both parties agreed to suppress references to 
the country's Nazi past in order to improve German-American relations. 
                                                                                                                                            
Woman,” 381. In German archives, period captions on versos of photographs of German 
women with American soldiers in 1950s often refer to the women as “Veronikas.” 
Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.   
67 See also: Goedde, GIs and Germans, 93.  
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 As Veronika Dankeschön’s initials suggest, venereal disease was still a major 
issue in the postwar occupation. According to an Army historical report, rates of V.D. 
significantly increased after V-E Day. In addition to the prophylactics and treatments 
widely available for American soldiers, the U.S. Army also established V.D. treatment 
centers for German civilians.70 The historical report does not mention that women could 
be arrested for suspicion of V.D. However, a censored archival Signal Corps photograph 
shows a German woman standing with an American soldier and two Military Police in a 
jail cell (Fig. 3.19). The caption on the print verso names her only as a “V.D. Suspect.”71 
In high socks and pleated skirt, the woman appears uncomfortable and vulnerable amidst 
the towering men. The photograph was marked as restricted, likely because the image 
could have elicited sympathy for the German woman and also compromised the 
American self-promoted image as a benevolent occupier. Instead of publishing 
photographs that showed real German women suspected of having venereal diseases, the 
army continued to employ cartoons to make light of it.  
Women in Heute  
 Contrary to these one-dimensional cartoons of sexualized German women in 
Army newspapers, Heute, an American government-sponsored magazine for German 
civilians, published photo-essays that portrayed women in a variety of roles, such as labor 
leaders, mayors, switchboard operators, housewives, and Trümmerfrauen. Women were 
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71 Giessen, Germany, November 21, 1947. Restricted Public Information Division, 
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often featured in Heute because they were a target demographic for the magazine.72 As 
discussed in previous chapters, Heute’s propaganda agenda was different from materials 
for American soldiers. It used varying images and captions to encourage German women 
to take an active role in the postwar reconstruction.  
 Heute showed German women in a variety of professional and domestic settings. 
An October 15, 1946, photo-essay features ten images of switchboard operators in 
Frankfurt, working for the American occupation (Fig. 3.20). The photographs, taken from 
a range of camera angles and perspectives, looking down or up at the operators, cropping 
tightly in on the faces of smiling German women or zooming out to show a broader scene 
of rows of women at work, are laid out in a double-page to present a dynamic workplace. 
The story serves as a recruitment advertisement to encourage more women to join the 
American work force. Unlike propaganda for American soldiers, which only emphasized 
sexual relationships, the Heute photographs also show that American men and German 
women worked side-by-side professionally in postwar Germany.73  
 German women also engaged in the grueling labor of clearing the pervasive 
rubble left in the wake of the war. In the 1950s, Trümmerfrauen began to be celebrated in 
East and West Germany as heroic figures for their work rebuilding Germany; however, in 
                                                
72 Under the direction of the Director of Information Control Division, Robert McClure 
(who headed of the Psychological Warfare Division during the war), Heute’s content 
policy mandated that the magazine feature stories of “special interest to women and 
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debated since the beginning of the American occupation in Germany in 1944. For a full 
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the 1940s, clearing rubble was not a desirable job.74 Prisoners-of-war and men and 
women and their dependents who had belonged to Nazi organizations were mandatorily 
assigned to the task. Some women also volunteered because of the higher ration cards 
they received as heavy laborers. Though they made up only five to ten percent of the 
female labor force in Berlin, these German women of the rubble became the dominant 
face of the reconstruction for German audiences.75 This differed from the coverage of the 
war crimes trial, studied in the last chapter, which largely depicted men. While there are 
photographs of women participating in the reconstruction in American archives, they are 
not as easily found because they have not been registered in NARA as Trümmerfrauen or 
women of the rubble as they are in German archives. One striking photograph of 
Trümmerfrauen, found in German archives, shows a line of nine women circled around a 
massive pile of rubble with bombed out buildings in the backdrop. They pass the bricks 
hand-to-hand in a gesture of cooperation (Fig. 3.21). Such images became symbols of 
German fortitude.  
 But a Heute photo-essay titled “Women of Berlin,” published in Heute on August 
15, 1947, shows that although the occupation government was compelling women to 
work, there was tension in the period between traditional convictions about expected 
                                                
74 It does not appear that this term was used in the 1940s. For a discussion of the 
differences between female labor in the Soviet and Western zones and how the legacy of 
“Trümmerfrauen” functioned differently in East and West Germany see also: Elizabeth 
D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?: Women and Marital Status in 
Nazi and Postwar Germany (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1999), 87-92.  
75 Heineman, “The Hour of the Woman,” 375.  
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gender roles and the new occupations that women assumed.76 In the double-page spread, 
photographs depict women hitting bricks with mallets, wielding wheelbarrows, and 
repairing locomotives (Fig. 3.22). Though the images appear to extol the women’s work, 
the accompanying article is more critical. Heute reports that only a small part of the 
female population in Berlin, 31,000 women, was enlisted in “difficult men’s work.” But 
these women had begun to acquire “male” characteristics of physical strength, endurance, 
and logic, and Heute further implied that the worrisome “masculinization” of German 
women in Berlin showed no sign of stopping.77 One image in the Heute double-page 
spread shows pairs of women dancing together, insinuating that the men may no longer 
be needed. This article reveals a discomfort with women’s new roles, and both American 
and German men may have been threatened by women’s self-sufficiency.   
 Heute also features photographs that depict German women in the more 
traditional role of resourceful housewives. In nearly every issue in the spring of 1947, 
Heute ran stories on CARE (Committee on American Remittance to Europe) packages, 
                                                
76 This discomfort may have been specific to West Germany. According to an article in 
Deutsche Welle, images of “cheerful” Trümmerfrauen were marketed to solicit volunteers 
but initially, this campaign was only successful in the East. In the West, “the hard-
working, self-assured, emancipated woman didn't fit the conservative female image.” 
“Dismantling the German myth of ‘Trümmerfrauen,’” Deutsche Welle, November 24, 
2014, last accessed March 11, 2019.https://www.dw.com/en/dismantling-the-german-
myth-of-tr%C3%BCmmerfrauen/a-18083725. 
77 “Kraft Ellbogen, Ausdauer in Schwerstarbeit, männliche Logik gehören zu den 
erworbenen Eigenschaften der Nachkriegs-Berliner…. Wenn bisher auch nur ein kleiner 
Teil des Frauentums schwerer Männerarbeit geopfert wurde (31,000 Frauen sind im 
Baugewerbe beschäftigt), so wird man in Berlin doch verführt, zu glauben, dass der 
‘Vermännlichung’ keine Einhalt zu gebieten ist.” “Die Frauen von Berlin” (The Women 
of Berlin), Heute, August 15, 1947, 8.  
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which were food parcels sent from America to feed German civilians.78 They contained 
American food surplus items like Spam, chocolate, and shortening.79 Stories on CARE 
packages promoted the American government’s role as a benefactor, providing 
sustenance for the German civilian population. The photographs in these stories also 
exemplify the American and German idealized picture of women as wives and mothers 
first. For example, in the same issue of the “Women of Berlin” rubble story, Heute also 
ran an article about the new addition of ten-and-a-quarter meters of cotton to the CARE 
packages. The photograph on the left of the double-page spread shows a woman elegantly 
draped in the entire cotton supply (Fig. 3.23). Wearing a hat, she glances over her 
shoulder, posed like a fashion model. On the right page, images show perfectly dressed 
and posed little children, a mother tending to her child, and man and woman walking 
hand-in-hand with their five children. All of the clothes (except papa’s pants, the text 
assures) were made from the new allotment from the CARE package.80 This image not 
only evidences American generosity but also reassures readers that the nuclear family is 
intact.   
                                                
78 The CARE packages utilized donations from American civilians. This fact—that it was 
American civilians and not the government providing the food—was emphasized in 
Heute.  
79 “Das neue CARE-Paket” (The new CARE package), Heute, May 1, 1947, 20. 
80 Heute also tried to attract German women to follow American fashion trends. For 
example, the magazine re-published a Life story on American women who match their 
shoes to their coats. However, if German women are making fashionable coats from wool 
blankets from CARE packages, as another Heute article shows, then perhaps it would 
appear out-of-touch for the magazine to suggest German women such trends. “Wer 
möchte nict in diesen Schuhen stecken?” (Who does not want to be in those shoes?), 
Heute, November 15, 1946, 28; “Mode streckt sich nach der Decke” (Fashion stretches 
the blanket), Heute, June 1, 1947, 16-17.  
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 Finally, Heute featured photo-stories on a new type of family—marital unions 
between American soldiers and German women. On December 11, 1946, the prohibition 
against such marriages was lifted. Before this, as with the rest of non-fraternization 
policy, American soldiers disobeyed or found loopholes to circumvent the ban.81 
However, in the January 1, 1947 issue, Heute publicly celebrates the end of the marriage 
ban. Its story included photographs of three happy couples (Fig. 3.24). The image on the 
bottom left shows the newlyweds boarding a plane to America because such marriages 
were only permitted if the soldier’s term of duty was up and the German woman had 
obtained an exit permit.82  
 Though German women were shown as housewives and laborers, they were left 
out of American efforts to build a democratic Germany. A 1952 American historical 
report states that because women outnumbered men, “plans for the democratization could 
ill afford to neglect the contribution which they could make. However, it was not until 
1948 that this omission was corrected.”83 That year the American government established 
the Women’s Affairs section of OMGUS (Office of Military Government for Germany), 
                                                
81 For an account full account on the marriage ban, loopholes to circumvent, and its 
repeal see: Starr, “Fraternization,” 107-123. 
82 The exact statistics of such marriages are not known but it is estimated that between 
12,000 and 13,000 couples got married and around 20,000 women emigrated as war 
brides. Heute does not mention estimated 37,000 German-American children born out-of-
wedlock. Lee, “A Forgotten Legacy,” 157, 171. Further, American regulations made it 
easy for soldiers to evade any responsibility for their offspring. In instances of disputed 
paternity, an American soldier could not be compelled to provide financial assistance to 
his child. But if a GI wanted to do so, an Army report simply states that he could consult 
with his commanding officer to orchestrate it. Starr, “Fraternization,” 115-116, 122.  
83 Henry P. Pilgert, “Women in West Germany,” (Historical Division, Office of the U.S. 
High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), 6.  
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which sought to “improve the status and rights of German women.”84 Its foundation was 
in part motivated by concerns about the Soviets. New York Times editor Anne O’Hare 
McCormick wrote that Western and Soviet occupiers were battling for Germany, and the 
Soviet occupying government was working “to make German women feel important,” 
establishing the “Democratic Women’s League” and better recognizing their 
contributions to postwar Germany.85 She warned that ignoring the problems and potential 
of German women could tip the scales in the Soviets’ favor. Tensions with the Soviets 
motivated the American government to establish the Women’s Affairs section; similarly, 
the foundation of the Soviet-sponsored the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ or Free German 
Youth) in 1946 prompted the American government to launch a youth organization for 
German children in the American zone.  
 
German Youth and the Start of Re-education  
 German Youth were reframed in American propaganda between 1944 and 1948. 
During the war, materials for American soldiers portrayed young Germans as dangerous, 
but in the postwar period, they were presented as the most promising demographic. 
Under the non-fraternization policy, GIs were forbidden from interacting with German 
children as well as women. However, when the fraternization ban was lifted in the 
postwar period, Eisenhower declared that American soldiers were “democracy’s best 
ambassadors” and the American government began to promote cooperative activities for 
                                                
84 Ibid., 5.  
85 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Forgotten Woman May Decide the German Battle,” 
New York Times, September 13, 1948.  
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GIs and German children.86 In 1946, the American government launched the German 
Youth Activities (GYA) program. The hope was that through activities such as baseball, 
GIs could teach young Germans to embrace democracy and the American way of life. 
American reeducation efforts focused on German youth, rather than women, because 
their minds were thought to be more malleable, and German boys especially were 
considered the most likely to become the future leaders of Germany.87 Because of their 
young age and lack of agency, German children were also more easily cast as innocent 
victims of the Nazi regime than women. Though the GYA was framed differently in 
propaganda for German and American audiences, both used images of GIs and German 
youth playing baseball to promote positive German-American relations. While the FDJ 
propaganda looked very similar to the Hitler Youth propaganda, GYA took a different 
approach, creating a distinctly American picture of reconstruction.   
Hitler Youth 
 An examination of the pervasive role of the Hitler Youth in the National Socialist 
period demonstrates the difficult starting ground for postwar American reeducation 
efforts. American propagandists were also very careful in their framing of Germans 
youth, strategically highlighting or omitting references to their involvement in NSDAP to 
fit evolving policy aims. Text in American wartime propaganda for American soldiers 
referred to young Germans as potential threats; however, photographs and cartoons of 
                                                
86 “From Dwight D. Eisenhower to All Members of the United States Armed Forces in 
the European Theater of Operations,” 1945. RG260 Box 4, NARA. 
87 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 144.  
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Hitler Youth do not appear to have been included in the non-fraternization campaign 
(1944-1945).  
 Pocket Guide to Germany, a 50-page un-illustrated 1944 U.S. Army pamphlet 
designed to orient American soldiers to Germany, warned GIs to be most wary of 
German youth because they have been “carefully and thoroughly educated for world 
conquest, killing, and treachery.”88 Though this language may seem hyperbolic, German 
children were indeed compelled to undergo serious ideological and military training in 
the Hitler Jugend (HJ or Hitler Youth). The Hitler Youth was first given its name in 1926 
and the Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM), was established in 1930. Membership in both 
groups steadily grew through the 1930s, and in 1939, all German boys and girls, aged ten 
to eighteen, were required to join the German youth groups.89 In the National Socialist 
period, HJ and BDM infiltrated every facet of a young German’s life, including 
education, after-school and weekend activities, and home life. Children were 
indoctrinated with virulent anti-Semitic ideology, and the youth groups sought to fracture 
                                                
88 Pocket Guide to Germany, U.S. Army Information Branch, Army Service Forces (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1944), 7.  
89 There were 18,000 HJ members in 1930; 35,000 in 1931; 100,000 by Hitler’s 
assumption of power in (January) 1933; 2 million by the end of 1933; 5.4 million by 
December 1936. Participation was made mandatory for adolescents 10 to 18 years old on 
March 25, 1939. After the mandate, 98.1% of German youth (according to Hitler’s 
figures) participated in the Nazi youth programs. This was approximately 8.7 of the 8.87 
million German youth. Kater, Hiter Youth, 23, 16; Alan McDougall, Youth Politics in 
East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946-1968 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press Scholarship Online, 2004), 1. 
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ties between children and their parents to promote the movement’s authority and Hitler as 
a father figure.90  
 Young Germans were also inundated with visual propaganda promoting the Hitler 
Youth. A poster from 1941 shows photographs of young German boys riding 
motorcycles as well as learning to shoot, navigate ships, and fly airplanes (Fig. 3.25). 
These images portrayed the mandatory military training as an exciting adventure. 
Another poster includes an image of a mass rally and a quote from Hitler stating that the 
young soldiers are fulfilling their national duty (Fig. 3.26).91 In addition to posters, the 
modern medium of film was employed to mobilize German youth. In 1933, Hitler Youth 
Quex was the first feature film supported by the new National Socialist regime. Like the 
Nazi propaganda leaflets explored in chapter one, Nazi propagandists, more so than 
Americans propagandists, bluntly denigrated perceived enemies and sought to appeal to 
their audiences’ emotions. Hitler Youth Quex was about a young boy, with an alcoholic 
Communist father, who is attracted to the discipline, order, and nationalism exhibited by 
the Hitler Youth. The Hitler Youth accept him into their fold, but in an ultimate act of 
martyrdom, he is killed by a Communist in the end of the film. In still and moving 
images, propaganda sought to win young hearts and minds.92  
                                                
90 For more on the anti-Semitic indoctrination of the Hitler Youth see: Kater, Hitler 
Youth, 62-67.  
91 “Die Front erwartet, dass die Hitler-Jugend im schwestern Schicksalskampf auch 
fernerhin ihre höchste Augabe darin sieht, der kämpfenden Truppe den besten 
soldatischen Nachwuchs zuzuführen.“ “Bewegung der Kriegsfreiwilligen” (Movement of 
the war volunteers), 1944, Poster 003-011-028, Das Bundesarchiv, Germany. 
92 See: Eric Rentschler "Emotional Engineering: Hitler Youth 
Quex." Modernism/modernity 2.3 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995): 23-44. 
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 Photographs in German archives provide a further glimpse into Hitler Youth 
military exercises. As part of their training, young Germans were compelled to participate 
in “war games,” and they also hiked, learned to read maps, and shoot guns.93 One 
archival image shows three “Jungvolk” (which was the HJ group for the youngest 
Germany boys aged ten to fourteen) wearing matching uniforms and gas masks as they 
pull a tug-of-war rope with all their might (Fig. 3.27). Evidencing the competitive nature 
of German military training, the young boys are being made a spectacle as they are 
watched by older Hitler Youth and soldiers gathered around the perimeter of the square. 
A second archival photograph of German military exercises depicts a line of young 
Germans engaged in rifle training (Fig. 3.28). Lying on their stomachs in the grass, the 
boys wear dark uniforms, caps, and Nazi swastika armbands. Small streams of water 
shoot from their training guns. However, these training weapons were soon traded for 
machine guns. As World War II continued and droves of (adult) German soldiers were 
killed or taken as prisoners, more and more young boys were sent to the battlefield, 
taking up positions as cannoneers and flak helpers (assisting the air force).94  
 America propagandists likely did not have access to photographs of HJ military 
training. They did have a plethora of U.S. Army Signal Corps photographs of young 
German soldiers who were captured at the end of the war but these were not used in anti-
fraternization propaganda for American GIs. One striking unpublished Signal Corps 
                                                
93 “War games” encouraged or often resulted in fights, which were intended to toughen 
German boys up for war. Ibid., 29-32.  
94 In 1941, the Waffen-SS began to intensify their recruitment efforts for elder HJ boys. 
The conscription of German boys, aged fifteen to seventeen, to serve as flak helpers and 
cannoneers began in 1943 and from that time to the end of the war, roughly 200,000 
teenagers served as cannoneers. Kater, Hitler Youth, 4-5, 199-200, 211. 
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image shows three fourteen-year-old boys captured by the Third Army in April 1945 
(Fig. 3.29). They stare straight at the photographer, posed in a youthful defiant stance on 
a cobblestone street. The ill-fitting uniforms, especially the oversized mis-buttoned coat 
worn by the boy on the right, make it appear as if they are playing dress-up. However, 
these young boys were trained to kill on the battlefield, like men. The caption to a second 
Signal Corps photograph that shows a group of baby-faced HJ POWs aged thirteen to 
seventeen notes that the boys had been “manning machine guns, machine pistols, and 
bazookas”95 (Fig. 3.30). As previously discussed, non-fraternization posters in April 1945 
used illustrations to warn GIs that any interactions with German women were potentially 
life threatening. German children could have been drawn manning machine guns or the 
Signal Corps photographs could have painted them as Hitler’s soldiers. But because 
children lacked power, photographs that showed them being pushed into such harrowing 
duties might have elicited sympathy from GIs, and in that stage of the occupation, the 
American government wanted to mitigate any suggestions of Germans as victims.  
Postwar and Post-Fraternization 
 Immediately following V-E Day, the American government established programs 
to re-educate these young prisoners of war. Like those for adult German POWs held in 
America discussed in the first chapter, the programs sought to teach prisoners to embrace 
democracy and reject totalitarianism. However, these re-education efforts were not made 
public until after the non-fraternization policy was repealed. In October 1945, Life 
magazine ran a story about an Allied-run prison camp, nicknamed the “Baby Cage,” 
                                                
95 Caption on print verso of Office of War Information photograph, RG-208-AA Box 
303.  
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which held 7,000 German youth aged twelve to seventeen in Compiegne, France.96 The 
young prisoners were offered general education courses such as American history, 
geography, and English, taught by carefully screened German prisoners-of-war. The 
copious photographs published in Life show German boys smiling behind barbed wire, 
singing, and attending class in an army tent (Fig. 3.31). While wartime propaganda for 
American soldiers described young Germans as threatening, in the postwar period, the 
commercial magazine for the American public showed that they have been successfully 
contained and rehabilitated. 
Life emphasizes that the children are learning the principles of democracy and 
being demilitarized. This story has a much more light-hearted tone and imagery than Life 
article on the special education programs for adult German POWs in the United States, 
discussed in chapter one (Fig. 1.35). That adult story, “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy,” 
presents the reeducation efforts as a rigorous “indoctrination” program and includes 
photographs of German POWs posed with American flags and attentively listening to 
lectures in an auditorium. Released in March 1946, when Cold War tensions had become 
more pronounced, “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy” reflects a stringent effort to establish a 
democracy in postwar Germany. Like the adult program, Life touted the youth 
reeducation program as a rousing success, reporting that after four months, the children 
                                                
96 Yank magazine calls the POW camp the “Baby Cage.” Life more judiciously refers to 
as “Baby lager,” which translates to Baby prison camp. Cpl. Howard Katzander, “The 
PW Baby Cage,” Yank, October 19, 1945, 15; “Educating Hitler Youth,” Life, October 8, 
1945, 75.  
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were already dubious of Hitler.97 This story, published in the fall of 1945, marks the start 
of the German youth’s transition from the most dangerous to most promising 
demographic.98 
  Compared to the young POWs, civilian children in Germany were much more 
difficult to corral, and efforts to organize and re-educate them began slowly and 
sporadically in the fall of 1945 after the non-fraternization ban was repealed. 
Immediately after V-E Day, the Hitler Youth (HJ) was disbanded, and German schools 
were closed. Children lacked any sense of structure in their days and the ruins of the city 
became makeshift playgrounds (Fig. 3.32). Many German children were unsupervised 
because their parents had been killed, taken as prisoner, or were preoccupied with daily 
concerns of food and shelter.99 The American government initially prohibited German 
youth groups because they did not want HJ to resurge; however, they also feared that the 
idleness of the young Germans would breed delinquency. After the non-fraternization 
                                                
97 In response to a monthly questionnaire Life reports that the young POWs voted Hitler 
the “greatest tyrant in history” but were evenly split on describing him as an “insane 
criminal.” The magazine also admits that the survey results may have been skewed by a 
“normal schoolboy desire to please teacher.” “Educating Hitler Youth,” Life, October 8, 
1945, 77.  
98 Letters to the editors published following “Educating Hitler Youth” show a range of 
reactions. One woman wrote in about one of the young boys pictured: “Hitler Youth or 
not…huba huba! What a hunk of a man!” To this, an incensed Life reader responded: “It 
was hunks of men like these who have the blood of many of the husbands, sons and 
sweethearts of loyal American families on their hands. I am an ex-prisoner of war and 
have seen and felt the kindness of these young Nazis. Believe me, they have no 
kindness.” “Letters to the Editors,” from Diane Bull, Life, October 29, 1945, 6; “Letters 
to the Editors,” from Cpl. Harold Boghosian, Life, November 19, 1945, 7.    
99 The absence of German men and the havocs of war left many German children 
fatherless or orphaned. Of 15.5 million youth who were twenty years old by 1950 were 
20 years old, 1.25 million had lost at least one parent, 250,000k lost both. Goedde, GIs 
and Germans, 133. 
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policy was relaxed in October 1945, informal and local groups for German youth were 
authorized. Unlike the Soviet zone, which only permitted the Free German Youth, the 
American zone had both German and American Army-run groups. However, the German 
groups often needed logistical support from the American army because they lacked 
resources, such as sports equipment, to function on their own.100 
 Young Germans, however, were not eager to embrace democracy, since they had 
been thoroughly indoctrinated with Nazi ideology and propaganda. Illustrating lingering 
traces of the National Socialist regime, the back cover of the November 18, 1945 issue of 
Army Talks shows German children playing on a cast-off German anti-aircraft gun (Fig. 
3.33). Army Talks replaced the original background of the photograph, which shows a 
bleak barren lot with a long metal fence in the distance, with a graphic orange backdrop 
and off-kilter white square (Fig. 3.34). These design elements highlight German 
children’s military proclivities while eliminating contextual cues that might raise 
questions about where the children were and what circumstances drew them to play there. 
The headline read: “German Children are still fascinated by the weapons formerly 
manned by their fathers of the Wehrmacht [indicating] the huge task facing MG [Military 
Government] before instilling Nazi Youth with respect for Democratic ways, Twelve 
Years of Fascist Propaganda must be blotted out.”101 Though Army Talks declared the 
                                                
100 Byron Price, “Relations Between American Forces of Occupation and the German 
People: Report of the Byron Brice to the President,” The Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. XIII No. 336, December 2, 1945, 891; “The U.S. Armed Forces German Youth 
Activities Program, 1945-1955,” (Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Historical 
Division, 1956), 2-6.  
101 Army Talks, November 18, 1945, back cover.  
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need for reeducation of German youth, by the fall of 1945, the American government had 
still not determined a method for doing so. 
The Soviet-Sponsored Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) 
 The plan to reeducate German youth and propaganda to promote these efforts 
shifted in in 1946 when tensions with the Soviets began to grow. On March 7, 1946, the 
Soviet Military Administration reinstated the German-run Free German Youth (FDJ), 
which became the sole official organization for young Germans in the Soviet zone of 
occupied Germany.102 FDJ leaders also hoped that the organization would become active 
in all four zones of occupation. Though it initially touted itself as a “non-partisan, united, 
and democratic youth organization,” the FDJ sought to teach all young Germans to 
embrace Marxist-Leninist ideology.103 To recruit young Germans to join, the FDJ 
employed a poster campaign with remarkably similar aesthetics to visual propaganda of 
the Hitler Youth. The aim was to portray the organization as quintessentially German 
(rather than Soviet), so that it would feel more familiar and less like an intrusive foreign 
ideology. This was a very different approach than the American-sponsored GYA, 
explored next, which used photographs of GIs and Germans playing baseball to promote 
an American lifestyle.  
                                                
102 Though it was Soviet-sponsored, the FDJ was German-grown. Founded in 1936, the 
FDJ was initially an underground communist organization exiled from Nazi Germany. 
The 1946 iteration of the FDJ was essentially a separate entity with the same name. Erik 
Honecker, who went on to become the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany (East Germany)(1976-1989), founded it. “The History of the Free German 
Youth,” last accessed March 12, 2019, https://www.fdj.de/engl.html. 
103 McDougall, Youth Politics, 2, 19. 
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 Many former Hitler Youth (HJ) members were hesitant to involve themselves 
again with a political group. However, at its outset, FDJ primarily offered organized 
leisure activities like hiking, sports, and cinema to attract young members.104 The FDJ 
was more peripheral to young Germans’ lives than the all-encompassing HJ had been, but 
it did provide them with opportunities for education and career advancement. The Soviet 
occupying government had notably granted amnesty to all “ordinary” former HJ 
members in the fall of 1945.105 This was contrary to policy in the American zone, which 
initially classified former HJ as members of the Nazi Party. As such, they were barred 
from pursuing leadership opportunities and higher education, and thus were only able to 
work in unskilled labor. It was not until August 1946 that the American government 
followed the Soviets’ lead and gave amnesty to young Germans born after January 
1919.106  
 Unlike in the Hitler Youth, membership in FDJ was never compulsory but its 
numbers steadily grew in the postwar period. In 1946, there were 300,000 FDJ members 
and nearly one million by 1949. Initially, FDJ was for young Germans aged fourteen to 
twenty-five, and in 1948, the FDJ also founded its “Young Pioneers” program for 
German children aged six to thirteen.107 While young German boys and girls were 
                                                
104 Ibid., 6.  
105 Ibid., 8, 19.  
106 “German Youth Activities,” 13. The “Nazi Regime Youth Cohort” were young 
Germans initiated into the Hitler Youth between 1933, when Hitler came to power, and 
1944, when the last batch of youth were initiated. Since Hitler Youth were between ages 
of ten and eighteen, the “cohort’s” birth years roughly spanned from 1916 to 1934. Kater, 
Hitler Youth, 12.   
107 In the Soviet Union, the mass youth organization was also called the “Young 
Pioneers” (1922-1991). 
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separated during the National Socialist period into the Hitler Youth (HJ) and BDM (Bund 
Deutscher Mädel), the FDJ was a unisex organization.108   
 Although there were vast ideological differences between the Soviet-sponsored 
FDJ and Hitler Youth, the propaganda aesthetics the two groups employed are strikingly 
similar.109 For example, an FDJ poster from 1946 shows an illustration of an athletic 
young German man exuberantly posed, standing with his arms and legs wide and 
outspread (Fig. 3.35). Wearing only shorts, he displays his muscular physique as an FDJ 
flag waves behind him and the text proclaims: “Healthy youth creates a new 
Germany!”110 But this new Germany looked very much like Nazi-era German 
propaganda. In the National Socialist period, idealized pictures of German physical 
prowess were similarly celebrated. A Nazi propaganda poster from 1934 shows a healthy 
young German woman dressed in shorts and a t-shirt, athletically jumping in front of an 
undulating Nazi flag (Fig. 3.36). The illustration styles are the same, and except for the 
insignia on the flags, the two posters are nearly identical, showing a continued idealized 
German type.  
 In aesthetics and language, the Soviet-sponsored FDJ was also familiarly 
nationalistic. Like the Hitler Youth posters, the FDJ posters showed young Germans set 
against agrarian landscapes to showcase an ancestral connection to the land. One FDJ 
poster with this back-to-land aesthetic shows young German men and women playing 
                                                
108 McDougall, Youth Politics, 3, 19. This is far fewer than the 8.7 million German youth 
in the Hitler Youth.  
109 Ibid., 10.  
110 “FDJ Gesunde Jugend schafft ein neues Deutschland!,” FDJ Poster, September 1946. 
Plak 100-037-029, Bundesarchiv, Germany.   
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music with grassy hills in the backdrop (Fig. 3.37). The text says: “Youth, your homeland 
calls you.”111 This invocation of deeply rooted nationalism and duty is reminiscent of the 
HJ.  
 Finally, the FDJ employed uniforms and pageantry just as the HJ had, 
emphasizing the importance of the collective over the individual. A photograph in 
German archives depicts girls at an FDJ Pioneers meeting in August 1952 (Fig. 3.38). 
They wear white shirts with dark skirts and blue neckerchiefs. Though the shape and 
color of the ties slightly differ, a 1933 photograph of a group of German girls in the BDM 
shows nearly identical uniforms (Fig. 3.39). Both the FJ and BDM images show neat 
rows of German girls standing in salute, but while the FDJ girls bend their arms and hold 
their hands to their heads, the BDM girls keep their arms outstretched to salute Hitler. 
The FDJ girls also carry posters bearing the faces of Joseph Stalin and Ernst Thälmann, 
which demonstrate a continued idolization of leaders.112 In addition to its small parades, 
the FDJ also held large-scale rallies like the Deutschlandtreffen der Jugend, which 
attracted hundreds of thousands of young Germans in East Berlin in May 1950. The 
American government was increasingly worried by such demonstrations.113 While the 
pageants and parades were ostensibly not as militaristic as the HJ, the FDJ protestors 
could often be seen carrying signs that called for peace and unity, which implied an 
                                                
111 “Wandert mit der FDJ durch unsere schöne Heimat,” FDJ Poster, 1948. Plak 100-037-
039, Bundesarchiv, Germany. “Jugend, die Heimat ruft Dich!,” FDJ Poster, 1946. Plak 
100-037-024. Bundesarchiv, Germany.  
112 Ernst Thälmann was the a former leader of Communist Party in Germany and was 
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expulsion of Western occupiers, or the more direct slogan “Go Home Ami” (which was a 
nick-name for Americans).114  
 The aesthetic likenesses between FDJ and HJ propaganda represent a continuation 
of visual codes of “Germanness” and nationalism but, as asserted by historian Alan 
MacDougall, the ideological differences between Nazism and East German communism 
outweigh any similarities between the youth groups. MacDougall warns that comparing 
the two too closely can risk under-representing the extreme brutality enacted by the 
National Socialist regime. 115 The FDJ did not indoctrinate young Germans with virulent 
anti-Semitism and theories of German racial superiority as the HJ had. The FDJ was also 
at first dogmatically non-militaristic, professing to be an “anti-fascist” and “peace-
loving” organization.116 However, in 1952, as Cold War tensions grew, the FDJ rolled out 
a remilitarization campaign, which was unpopular among many young Germans who did 
not want to take up arms once again.117   
The German Youth Activities Program 
 Spurred by FDJ’s founding in March 1946, USFET (United States Forces 
European Theater) issued a directive on April 15, 1946, declaring its desire to extend 
German youth activities in the American zone of occupied Germany.118 A few months 
later, the German Youth Activities (GYA) section of USFET was established to supervise 
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German youth programs across the American zone.119 The aim of the GYA was to teach 
young Germans, aged ten to eighteen, about democracy and the American way of life.120 
The GYA does not appear to have run a poster campaign as extensive as that of the FDJ, 
but stories about its activities were published in materials for German and American 
audiences, namely Heute (for German civilians), Occupation Chronicle (for American 
soldiers and their families in Frankfurt), and I&E (another GI publication that was 
renamed from Army Talks in March 1946). Unlike the FDJ, advertisements for the GYA 
did not employ a Hitler Youth-like aesthetic; rather, they primarily used photographs and 
cartoons, often of German youth and GIs playing baseball. 
 Like the Soviet-sponsored FDJ and the Hitler Youth, the American-sponsored 
GYA offered sports alongside ideology. But they focused on American sports like 
baseball and basketball. This choice of athletics not only introduced young Germans to 
American culture but also aimed to attract GI participation. Unlike Allied-run POW 
camps for young and adult German soldiers, the GYA did not hold classes in American 
history or related subjects in order to formally teach the principles of democracy.121 
Instead, American officials hoped that interactions with GIs and American sports alone 
would expose the children to the “democratic spirit.”122 As the New York Times reported, 
baseball would teach German children to “replace militarism and racism with democratic 
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ideals of peaceful fair play.”123 Though this approach would later incur criticism, baseball 
remained a primary focus of GYA activities and its promotion.124 
 Advertisements for the GYA overtly demonstrated the American goal of leading 
German children away from Nazism with baseball. On July 11, 1946, the GI newspaper 
Occupation Chronicle published a cartoon titled “The New Pied Piper” (Fig. 3.40). 
Instead of an instrument it shows a larger-than-life GI playing music with a baseball bat 
held to his lips. A sea of German children eagerly follows him, walking away from their 
houses that are decorated with swastikas. The Occupation Chronicle caption says that 
participating GIs will demonstrate the “highest democratic ideals.”125 It is unclear how 
much GYA imagery overlapped for German and American audiences, but a New York 
Times article from September 1946, references the fact that German parents in Bad 
Kissingen took particular “exception to a poster depicting a United States soldier as a 
Pied Piper, interpreting it to mean their children would be lured away to the United 
States.”126 This example shows how the same image could be interpreted differently by 
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German and American audiences. Though they were initially wary of the GYA, many 
German parents came to appreciate the supervision it provided for their children.127 
 In the late summer and early fall of 1946, there was a promotional push for the 
GYA in Occupation Chronicle, I&E, and Heute. It coincided with U.S. Secretary of State 
James Byrnes’s “Speech of Hope” delivered in Stuttgart, Germany on September 6, 1946. 
Marking a turning point in German-American relations, Byrnes declared that America 
would remain in Germany for the foreseeable future.128 That month, the newspapers for 
American soldiers outlined a new occupation mission. It was declared that the initial 
occupation aims, the 3Ds (denazifaction, deindustrialization, and demilitarization), were 
nearly complete and the Army would shift its focus to the re-education of German 
youth.129 Lightheartedly illustrating this change in priorities, a cartoon in the Occupation 
Chronicle titled “The Chief Checks Up” pictures Eisenhower standing in an Army 
commissary (Fig. 3.41). Behind the counter, a clerk wearing a USFET (United States 
Forces European Theater) uniform and apron, points to the 3 Ds, which have been 
relegated to literal bargain bins, and a sign that lists the German Youth program as the 
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special of the day.130 The USFET clerk confirms, “Everything is in order, Sir” and 
Eisenhower smiles approvingly.131 
 With this shift in the occupation mission came a rebranding of German youth in 
American propaganda. Contrary to the 1944 Pocket Guide pamphlet, which described 
German youth as the most dangerous demographic, in 1946 the Occupation Chronicle 
labeled them as “victims” of the Nazi regime, a term that had been consistently avoided 
in the initial occupation period.132 To show the Hitler Youth as victims, I&E published 
wartime photographs of them. The September 1946 “Accent on German Youth” story 
included the previously discussed Signal Corps photograph of HJ POWs (Fig. 3.42). The 
I&E caption emphasizes the young boys’ helplessness, asserting they were caught in an 
inescapable “channel” that carried Germans from “childhood to manhood.”133 This Signal 
Corps image did not run in 1945 because the American government wanted to avoid 
eliciting sympathy from GIs. But in 1946 it ran, with the hope that pity might compel GIs 
to join the GYA.  
 To illustrate the need and GYA's potential to reform wayward youth, the I&E 
“Accent on German Youth” story for American soldiers staggered photographs of HJ 
POWs and the GYA across a double-page spread (Fig. 3.42). In the middle of the image, 
the caption to a photograph of a crying Hitler Youth says: “In a wavering dangerous state, 
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this boy is typical of the confused group which we must direct on the right path.”134 Both 
the image and text portray the young German as vulnerable, teetering on the precipice 
from which he could either be saved or fall into delinquency. The final photograph in the 
spread shows a group of German boys learning to play baseball with a smiling GI. The 
progression of photographs, from young soldiers to baseball players, touts the GYA’s 
ability to rehabilitate young Germans.  
  This program was primarily geared to German boys rather than girls, because 
they were considered more likely to become the future leaders of Germany.135 The I&E 
“Accent of German Youth” explained that the GYA was directed at the two million 
German youth aged ten to eighteen in the American zone, but it did not explicitly state 
this gender bias.136 And since I&E also targeted a male audience of American soldiers,  
its photographs of the GYA primarily featured male GIs and German boys. It did not 
publish  Signal Corps photographs of WACs (Women’s Army Corps) playing with 
German children (Fig. 3.43).  
 Despite, or perhaps due to, I&E’s male-focused campaign to recruit GIs, the GYA 
had difficulty staffing its programs, especially with female supervisors for girls’ 
activities. The involvement and recruitment of female supervisors was not well organized 
until 1947, when an estimated 250 women attended a GYA training conference in Berlin. 
At that time, 32 full-time WACs were assigned to the GYA and a monthly average of 
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1,000 American wives volunteered part-time. 137 To solicit more volunteers, the 
Occupation Chronicle, which had both female staff and readership, published stories 
about American dependents (wives) who volunteered with German girls clubs. The 
March 7, 1947 issue includes an image, titled “Lesson in Democracy,” which depicts a 
dependent, Mrs. Ethel McDonald, speaking with young German girls at the Frankfurt 
Girls’ Center (Fig. 3.44). Though they made vital contributions to German youth 
programs, the work of American women and the needs of young German girls were 
largely ignored in the male-oriented I&E. 
 During the aforementioned push to promote the GYA in the fall of 1946, stories 
on the program also ran in Heute to encourage young Germans to join. To appeal to its 
target demographic of German women and children, Heute framed the GYA as fun, safe, 
and nurturing.138 In a double-page spread in the September 15, 1946 issue, eight 
photographs show German children in a variety of activities— eating American candy 
bars, playing baseball, horseshoes, and darts, and participating in a GYA-sponsored 
summer camp (Fig. 3.45). The children laugh and smile and appear to be carefree, far 
from the ruins and the worries of impoverished living conditions. In the eight 
photographs, only one GI is visible, driving a jeep in the far bottom right of the page. The 
minimal presence of American GIs in the photo-essay keeps the focus on the children's 
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enthusiasm rather than framing the GYA as a program imposed upon Germans by 
American occupiers.  
 Heute subtly distinguished the GYA from the Hitler Youth, unlike the Soviet-
sponsored FDJ imagery of young Germans. The article accompanying the GYA 
photographs in the September 15, 1946 issue, explained that in addition to softball, 
baseball, and volleyball, the GYA offered more familiar (and, by implication, more 
German) activities like hiking. However, Heute said in order to “prevent unwanted 
tendencies,” any uniforms or badges will be prohibited.139 It further stated that children 
should enjoy the freedom to go their own way but it is “the responsibility of elders, 
educators, and authorities to ensure it is not an unethical path.”140 This language in Heute 
carefully differentiated the GYA from the Hitler Youth, but it also insinuated that any 
American guidance was benign and free of ideology. While GYA advertisements for 
American soldiers in I&E belabored the notion of passing democratic ideals onto German 
children, Heute carefully omitted the term democracy from its GYA photo-essay. Unlike 
I&E, Heute also did not include any photographs of the Hitler Youth. Careful not to 
alienate its readers, the magazine was often reluctant to directly mention Nazism and the 
National Socialist period.  
 Participation in the GYA reached a highpoint around Christmas in 1946, when all 
GIs were “urged to make gifts” for German children.141 Since no good deed went 
                                                
139 “…um allen unerwünschten Tendenzen vorzubeugen…,” “Jugendleben unbeschwert,” 
(Carefree Youth Life), Heute, September 15, 1946. 
140 “Die Pflicht der Älteren, der Erzieher und Behörden, ist es, dafür zu sorgen, dass es 
kein unrechter Weg ist.” Ibid.  
141 Starr, “Fraternization,” 141.  
 
  197 
unpublished, the cover of the December 1, 1946 Heute issue featured a photograph of 
handsome GI, cigarette dangling from his lips, building a wooden toy for German 
children (not pictured) (Fig. 3.46). Like many Heute stories on American material 
assistance, the cover focuses more on the generosity of Americans than the needs of the 
recipients. In addition to offering toys and candy, the American army also organized 
2,663 Christmas parties throughout the American zone. Attended by Germans, 
Americans soldiers, civilians, and dependents, the Christmas celebrations notably also 
included DP (Displaced Person) children, who received extra rations of fruit juice, 
chocolate, and sugar for the holidays.142 DP children—who were refugees or former 
concentration camp prisoners—largely remained ghettoized in the immediate postwar 
period and were excluded from most GYA programs.143 
 As the occupation progressed, participation in the GYA dwindled but the 
American government increased its material aid to Germany.144 In the spring of 1947, 
Heute photo-essays on CARE packages frequently featured photographs of German 
children enjoying the spoils of American generosity. A Heute photo-story from October 
1947 shows German babies—the most innocent and vulnerable segment of the 
population—playing in empty CARE boxes surrounded by cans of formula and sugar 
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(Fig. 3.47). The Heute caption said that “Uncle” (perhaps referencing Uncle Sam) “has 
not forgotten anything, from pacifiers to safety pins” and that someday “Mum will tell 
the little one about the story of the three wonderful CARE packages that one day came 
over from the faraway land of America...”145 While CARE packages were very much 
valued by German civilians, the text in Heute was both familial and romanticizing about 
America’s role as a provider. 
  In an even more publicized act of economic aid, the Berlin Airlift, which is often 
used as a marker of the start of the Cold War, began in June 1948. Following the Soviet 
Berlin Blockade, Western Allies delivered relief supplies by air to West Berlin from June 
1948 to September 1949. One particular American Airlift pilot, Gale Halvestrom, became 
a celebrated friend of German children. He initiated “Operation Little Vittles,” under 
which he would drop “Candy Bombs” wrapped in little handkerchief parachutes from his 
plane. Illustrating German enthusiasm for these parcels, photographs in German archives 
show crowds of children eagerly gathered as Airlift planes fly overhead (Fig. 3.48). The 
American press celebrated Halvestrom’s initiative and headlines like the Boston Globe’s 
“‘Operation Little Vittles’ Wins Berlin Children to Our Side,” staked a claim to victory in 
a West versus Soviet battle to befriend German children.146   
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 The public act of airlifting candy to children en masse is a far cry from the 
American government’s initial non-fraternization policy and propaganda. In 1944, 
American soldiers had been known to give candy and chocolate to German children in 
violation of the non-fraternization policy and Army newspapers discouraged these small 
acts of kindness, warning that they could have grave consequences and could “gum up 
the victory.”147 But four years later, the American press praised this same act, 
demonstrating a quick and decisive turnabout in German-American relations.  
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which the American government 
employed cartoons and photographs to influence German-American relations in the 
liminal period from the last year of World War II to the start of the Cold War (1944-
1948). Negotiating complex issues of victimhood, culpability, agency, and innocence, 
American propaganda remained simplified in its messages and carefully calibrated to its 
target audiences, much as it had done in its stories on German prisoners of war and the 
war trials. Materials for GIs cast German women as prostitutes to exaggerate their threat 
and combat GI sympathy, while propaganda for German civilians celebrated German 
women more for their roles as housewives than as tireless workers of the reconstruction. 
German children, initially described as dangerous in wartime propaganda, were in 1946 
recast as victims of the Nazi regime and deemed to be the most vital demographic to 
ensure future peace. While there were slight variations in the portrayal of the German 
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Youth Activities program for German and American audiences, emphasizing the 
importance of democratic teachings more to the latter, materials for both sought to 
encourage German-American participation and cooperation. Fueled by a need to create 
order from the disorder of postwar devastation, and by rising Soviet tensions, the 
Americans employed images to turn enemies into allies
 
  201 
Epilogue 
 
 As the Cold War began to heat up in the immediate postwar period, Heute 
published an increasing number of photo-essays that promoted American culture and 
democratic capitalism. Among these was W. Eugene Smith’s “Country Doctor,” which 
first ran in the commercial magazine Life in 1948 and was republished by the American 
government in Heute in 1949. A few years later, this same photo-story was published  
again in Amerika, an American government-sponsored, Russian-language picture 
magazine for citizens of the Soviet Union. A brief look at the transnational dissemination 
of “Country Doctor” demonstrates how the American government continued to use the 
format of picture-magazines and photo-essays, as well as the strategy of selective truth, to 
promote mutual understanding between enemies in the Cold War period.1 It also shows 
the ways in which the meaning of the photographs subtly shifts as the captions, political 
contexts, and audiences change.  
 While the last three chapters analyzed how German subjects were portrayed 
differently for American and German civilian and military audiences, the “Country 
Doctor” provides a glimpse of how Americans framed themselves for German and Soviet 
readers. The government ran photo-essays on life on the American home front in order to 
rebrand itself, and make America appear like a role model for the rest of the world. On its 
surface “Country Doctor” celebrates the work of a single doctor but in a larger sense, this 
story promotes individualism and hard work as American and democractic values. As this 
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example shows, propaganda was not simply used to drive people into opposing 
ideologies; rather it fostered connections between cultures. 
 W. Eugene Smith’s “Country Doctor” shows a day in the life of Dr. Ernest 
Ceriani in the small town of Kremmling, Colorado, 115 miles west of Denver. Published 
in Life on September 20, 1948, the photo-essay opens with a photograph of Dr. Ceriani 
trekking across an untended lawn with clouds looming overhead, a medicine bag in hand, 
and a tired yet focused expression on his face as he heads out on call to see a patient (Fig. 
4.1). In the twenty-seven photographs that follow across ten pages, the local doctor is 
shown performing a staggering range of procedures including resetting a dislocated 
shoulder; amputating a leg; delivering a baby; tending to the elderly; and stitching up a 
little girl who has been kicked in the head by a horse (Fig. 4.2-4.5). The story ends with a 
photograph of the doctor looking worn as he smokes a cigarette and has a cup of coffee at 
2 a.m. after an operation (Fig. 4.6). Set against the backdrop of the picturesque Rocky 
Mountains, the young, handsome, and caring doctor serves his community from sunup 
until far past sundown.  
 The Life text reinforces Dr. Ceriani’s tireless commitment to the town. 
Photographs show him fishing and attending a parade with his wife and children, but the 
magazine repeatedly states that he takes little time for himself (Fig. 4.3, 4.6). Though his 
income is less than that of a city doctor, he is “compensated by the affection of his 
patients and neighbors, by the high place he has earned in his community and by the fact 
that he is his own boss.”2 In addition to touting Dr. Ceriani’s service, Life praises the 
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ingenuity and resourcefulness of the townspeople of Kremmling who, after the last doctor 
retired, banded together to raise enough money to build a small modern hospital. The 
article ends with a plea to young doctors, encouraging them to follow Dr. Ceriani’s lead 
and become generalists rather than specialists.3  
 Life commissioned this photo-essay to address domestic issues, before it was 
reframed for German and Soviet audiences. As suggested by Glen Willumson in W. 
Eugene Smith and the Photographic Essay, “Country Doctor” can be read within the 
political context of the prevalent debates about healthcare in the 1948 presidential 
campaign. Democratic incumbent Harry Truman proposed that America should adopt 
mandatory health insurance. Great Britain had implemented socialized medicine that year 
and Canada had a similar compulsory health insurance policy.4 The American Medical 
Association lobbied against Truman by ideologically linking socialized medicine to 
communism.5 Life similarly espoused opposition to Truman’s plan. In an editorial 
published a year prior to “Country Doctor,” an unnamed author had directly voiced 
criticism of mandatory health insurance.6  But with “Country Doctor,” Life employed a 
more subtle approach, using photographs to show that small towns and rural doctors can 
solve all manner of medical issues without government oversight. Though not necessarily 
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expressing the views of W. Eugene Smith, the editors who commissioned this story and 
wrote the text used his photographs for political ends.7  
  Five months later, on February 1, 1949, “Country Doctor” was republished in 
Heute. From its outset, Heute had offered German readers photo-essays about life in 
America in order to show them the benefits of living under a democratic government. Its 
stories depicted skyscrapers and street scenes in New York, small town drugstores and 
town meetings, farms and rolling prairie lands, fashion trends, schools and universities, 
the auto industry, and Hollywood, all to show America and its citizens as prosperous, 
peaceful, cultured, and industrious. As tensions with the Soviets grew, the need to present 
a positive picture of democratic life became more pressing. Starting in 1947, Heute 
editors were compelled to run more American content.8 The American Office of War 
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Information Bureau of Overseas Publication acted as a distributor, providing both Heute 
and Amerika with stories from American press agencies and magazines such as Life, 
Look, Colliers, and the Saturday Evening Post. This collaboration exemplifies the private 
and public spheres working together to promote American values at home and abroad. 
 Though Heute was faithful to the original in its reproduction of Life’s “Country 
Doctor,” German readers were provided a different interprative lens to the photo-essay. 
The text of Heute’s “Ein Landarzt” (“A Country Doctor”) reiterates the same message 
about the doctor dedicating his time to the community and the town citizens working 
together to raise money for the new hospital. There were half as many photographs in 
Heute as published in Life, but they were a representative sample (4.7- 4.9). For example, 
while Life ran three photographs about an old man who had died in the night, Heute had 
one (Fig. 4.5, 4.9). Heute further arranged the photographs with bold letters marking the 
time of the procedures, implying that the doctor efficiently executed them all in a single 
day (even though Smith photographed the doctor over the course more than three weeks) 
(Fig. 4.9).9 Germans would not have made the link to debates about socialized medicine. 
However, their interpretation would have been colored by the stringent rhetoric in 
Truman’s inaugural presidential address, reproduced at the front of the February 1, 1949, 
Heute issue.  
 While Heute was generally reserved in its anti-Soviet rhetoric, Truman’s address 
strongly and directly labeled communism a “false philosophy” and set it in opposition to 
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democracy. Truman declared: “Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak 
and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of 
strong masters. Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and 
intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and 
justice.”10 This address in Heute prompted German readers to view Dr. Ceriani as a hard-
working and self-governing man and to consider these traits as characteristically 
democratic.  
 About two years later, “The Country Doctor” was again published, this time in 
Amerika, the Russian-language picture magazine modeled after Life. American proposals 
for this magazine were accepted in 1944, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were still 
allies, and the first issue was published in 1945. Amerika differed from Heute in that the 
entire magazine was dedicated to stories about life in America, while Heute also ran 
articles on Germany and contemporary global events. Heute was produced under the U.S. 
Information Control Division of the Office of Military Government in Germany, but 
Amerika was made by the U.S. State Department in New York and then sent to Moscow 
for translation, where it required approval of Soviet censors. With a much smaller 
circulation than Heute or Life, Amerika was first published at 10,000 copies and increased 
to 50,000 copies per issue in 1946.11 It was estimated that each copy was shared among 
                                                
10 “Truman spricht,” Heute, February 1, 1949, 3. See also: “Truman’s Inaugural Address” 
January 20, 1949, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, last accessed March 15, 2019, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/ whistlestop/50yr_archive/ inagural20jan1949.htm. 
11 Heute was published at 400,000 copies per issue and Life had a circulation of over 3 
million copies.  
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twenty readers, reaching a total audience of one million Soviet citizens per issue.12 
However, starting in 1947 the Soviets launched an anti-American campaign, indirectly 
attacking the magazine and attempting to curb sales by intimidating Soviet citizens out of 
buying it. In 1950 and 1951, the Americans believed that the Soviets were throttling 
sales.13 The Soviets, however, claimed that the magazine could only sell 25,000 issues, so 
the other half was sent back to the Americans, who then redistributed the surplus to 
Russian-speaking people in a handful of countries, including Germany and Austria.14  
 Because Amerika was subject to Soviet censorship, it obviously could not run 
stark anti-Communist rhetoric of the type published in Heute. But the hope was that by 
seeing photographs of life in America, readers would draw comparisons to their own 
lives in the Soviet Union. Amerika’s editors published thirteen of the original twenty-
eight photographs that ran in Life, editing them differently than Heute (Fig. 4.10-4.13). 
They cut broader establishing shots, such as those that show the hospital and images of 
the doctor being driven to and called away from his fishing trip. Amerika’s editors 
favored photographs that depicted the doctor leaning closely over his patients. While the 
photographs, layout, and captions in Heute and Life emphasize the doctor’s vast expertise 
and his busy schedule, Amerika’s selection of images focus on the tender care he gives 
                                                
12 Creighton Peet, “Russian ‘Amerika,’ A Magazine About U.S. For Soviet Citizens,” 
College Art Journal, 11:1 (1951), 18-19. 
13 “Use of the Magazine “Amerika” as an Information Medium to the USSR,” n.d., RG 
0059, Entry P-316, Box 1, NARA.  
14 Amerika was also redistributed to Iran, Israel and Brazil. Peet, “Amerika,” 19.  
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each patient.15 This more personal approach was perhaps intended to constrast the 
perception of a colder, more clinical form of state-controlled medicince.  
 In the Soviet Union, there were challenges in extending adequate standards of 
healthcare to rural areas and the text of “Country Doctor” emphasizes the Colorado 
community’s democratic freedom to modernize their local practice.16 As Willumson 
points out, Amerika also made a few small changes to the text to remove any negative 
references to the U.S.17 For example, the caption to the opening photograph in Life says, 
“Through weeds growing rank in an unkempt dooryard, Dr. Ernest Ceriani of Kremmling 
makes his way to call on a patient.”18 Not wanting to draw attention to the neglected yard, 
Amerika replaces the phrase about weeds with simply, “Toward the end of a long day.”19 
Heute also removed the reference to the yard. Instead, its caption to the opening image 
focuses on the doctor’s preparedness, stating: “A call brings the doctor to a remote farm. 
Dr. Ernest Ceriani must always be ready - in the middle of the consultation or in the 
middle of the night. From his car, he hurries to the patient with his handy medicine 
bag.”20 Although the opening image remains the same in all three photo-essays, the 
changes to the caption alter its reading for each target audience.  
                                                
15 In Amerika, captions and photographs were also given slightly more breathing room on 
the page and paired in thick black boxes, lending the story a more modernist feel. 
16 The Soviet Union adopted “socialized medicine” in after the Bolshevik Revolution in 
1918. Mark G. Field, Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1957, 17, 25-26. Mark G. Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine; an 
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 72-73.   
17 Willumson, W. Eugene Smith, 66-67.  
18 “Country Doctor,” Life, 115. 
19 Willumson, W. Eugene Smith, 66-67.  
20 „Ein Anruf holt den Arzt auf eine abgelegene Farm. Dr. Ernest Ceriani muss stets 
bereit sein—mitten in der Sprechstunde oder auch mitten in der Nacht. Von seinem 
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****  
 These three examples demonstrate how the American government used 
photographs, text, and the strategy of selective truth to reshape public opinion and 
impress upon American, German, and Soviet audiences to the benefits of democracy and 
individual choice. They also demonstrate that the government continued to propagate 
American culture through the Cold War, believing that photo-essays and picture 
magazines could improve relations among enemy nations. In the three chapters of this 
dissertation, I examined the ways in which German POWs, the war crimes trial, and 
German women and children were framed differently in propaganda materials for four 
distinct audiences: German soldiers, German civilians, American soldiers, and American 
civilians on the home front. From the last phases of World War II to the early stages of 
the Cold War, portrayals of these subjects also shifted as the government moved from a 
condemnatory to a friendlier approach.  
 As shown in the first chapter, Army Talks portrayed German prisoners-of-war as 
deceitful during the war, but in the postwar period Life magazine showed them as capable 
of reform, having successfully learned to embrace democracy in reeducation programs. 
Photographs of concentrations camps on posters and in pamphlets disseminated just after 
V-E Day, studied in the second chapter, emphasized that all German civilians were 
equally guilty for Nazi war crimes. But during the Nuremberg trials, Army Talks and 
Heute used photographs to shift attention to the punishment of the top Nazi party officials 
and to showcase the democratic judicial process.  
                                                                                                                                            
Wagen eilt er mit dem immer griffbereiten Instrument Koffer zum Patienten.” “Ein 
Landarzt,” (A Country Doctor), Heute, February 1, 1949, 27.  
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 In the third and final chapter, I studied wartime cartoons that sexualized German 
women in order to exaggerate their threat and deter American soldiers from fraternizing. 
German children were also described as dangerous during the war but in the postwar 
period, Heute and Army Talks featured photographs of them smiling and playing baseball 
with GIs, as a way of promoting positive and cooperative activities. Throughout this 
dissertation, close image and text analysis and a comparison of published and previously 
censored photographs mined from the National Archives demonstrated the ways in which 
American government used photographs to promote its shifting agenda.  
 These three case studies ostensibly focus on the rehabilitation of the German 
image. But propagandists also used the strategy of selective truth to rebrand Americans, 
so that Germans would see them as less of enemy and more of an ally. The aim of 
American propaganda for Soviet audiences was similar. Photographs that showed the 
caring and hardworking everyman would serve to humanize the Americans. While 
wartime propaganda often portrays the enemy as “the other,” propaganda that seeks to 











William Vandivert, “The German People,” Life, May 7, 1945, cover.  
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Figure 0.2 
Army Talks, May 1, 1945, front and back cover, National Archive Records 




KZ; Bildbericht Aus Fünf Konzentrationslagern, (KZ: A Pictorial Report of Five 
Concentration Camps), 1945, n.p.  
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Fig. 0.4 




Victory, v. 2, no. 1, c.1944 
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Figure 0.6 





Card catalog. Still Pictures Branch, NARA.  
 








“German civilians of Weimar witness truckload of prisoners dead at camp. Buchenwald, 
Nazi horror mill. Civilians were forced by U.S. Third Army MP’s to witness evidence of 
atrocities at camp. April 16, 1945,” front and verso, Signal Corps, NARA. 
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Figure 0.9 
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Chapter 1 




“Wieners for German Prisoners of War in the U.S., January 29, 1945. The German chef 
of a prisoner of war is located in the eastern U.S. state of Pennsylvania is all smiles as he 
prepares a meal of wieners for internees. The 150 prisoners at this camp, as do the rest of 
the 305,649 German prisoners of war in the U.S., receive food rations, which equal in 
quantity and quality the rations supplied to the U.S. armed forces. U.S. treatment of 
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Figure 1.2  
“Representative from each company picks up bread rations at German prisoner of war 
camp. One loaf of bread is allotted to every twelve men. Schwerin, Germany, May 12, 
1945,” Signal Corps, NARA. 
 
 
Figure 1.3  
„Wie Sieht es Drüben Aus?”/ What Does the Other Side Look Like?, (Detail), 
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Figure 1.4   
“A German paratrooper hands over a leaflet, which was fired into the German lines 
offering a guarantee of safety to any who would surrender. France, September 11, 1944,” 
Signal Corps, NARA. 
 
 
  220 
 
Figure 1.5  
Safe Conduct Pass, PWD Leaflet ZG61 (1944), NARA.  
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„Wie Sieht es Drüben Aus?” (What Does the Other Side Look Like?), PWD Leaflet 
ZG113 (1945), NARA.   
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Figure 1.7.  
“First Nazis Captured by the Ninth U.S. Army,” Keystone Photo, war pool photo, 
serviced by London Office of War Information (OWI), NARA. 
 
 
Figure 1.8  
“U.S. troops clear Leipzig. April 19, 1945,” Associated Press, war pool photo, OWI print, 
NARA. 
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Figure 1.9 
“20,000 Nazi prisoners taken by U.S. troops.” Keystone Photo, war pool photo, OWI 
print, NARA. 
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Figure 1.10 
“So Ging Es Euren Kameraden” (How Your Comrades Fared), PWD Leaflet ZG54 
(variation, c. 1945), NARA. [Transit Camp image referenced in middle left] [Ration 
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Figure 1.11  
“These are some of the 20,000 Germans who surrendered and now await transport in a 





“Hut with auto top, used by several of the 17,000 prisoners taken by 82nd Airborne 
Division, as they fled their Baltic Sea posts to avoid capture by the Russians. Near 
Dellien, Germany, May 11, 1945,” Signal Corps, NARA 
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Figure 1.13 
“German prisoners of war obtain their drinking water from a water point located in the 
camp at Broderick. There are 21,000 men in this camp. 1st Battalion, 159th Infantry 
Regiment. Buderick [sic] [Büderich], Germany. May 3, 1945,” Signal Corps, NARA  
 
 
Figure 1.14  
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Figure 1.15 





“Orchestra at German prisoners’ theater at internment camp. Composed mostly of former 
musicians, they now serve to entertain their own men. Camp Polk, Louisiana, October 30, 
1945,” Signal Corps, NARA. 
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Figure 1.17 
“A prisoners of war in his barracks does wood carving to pass the time. Camp Polk, 




“That’s the way German is treating her P.O.W’s.” Nazi leaflet, 1945, Klaus Kirchner 
Leaflets from Germany For American Soldiers in Western Europe, 1945, vo. 17 
(Erlangen, Germany: Verlag D u. C, 2007), 149 
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.  
Figure 1.19 
“Die Wahrheit Über Dachau” (The Truth about Dachau), Münchner Illustrierte Presse, 
July 16, 1933. 
 
   
Figure 1.20 
“Daddy, you just got’ to come home…” Nazi leaflet 1944, Imperial War Museum, 
London, England.  
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Figure 1.21 
“What about calling up Sam Levy,” Nazi leaflet, 1945, Kirchner, Leaflets from Germany 
For American Soldiers, v.17, 46.  
 
     
Figure 1.22  
“All Quiet on the home front,” front and verso, Nazi leaflet, 1944, Imperial War 
Museum.  
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Figure 1.23 
“Passerchein” (Safe Conduct), front and verso, Nazi leaflet, 1944, Klaus Kirchner  
Leaflets from Germany For American Soldiers in Western Europe, 1945, vo. 16 
















































Signal Corps, “PWs: Nazis in U.S. Prison Camps are Arrogant and Sturdy But Far From 
Being Supermen.” Life, January 10, 1944, 47.  
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\ 
Figure 1.25 





“German prisoners of war well treated in U.S. Camps (no date)…A German war prisoner 
cook is pictured beside a batch of rolls fresh from the oven in the mess kitchen of the 
camp in southern U.S. state. War prisoners get all the food they want. New prisoners are 
surprised at the quality of camp fare” (no date), Signal Corps, NARA. 
 

























Figure 1.28  
George Strock, “Three Americans,” Life, September 20, 1943, 35.  
 
 
  235 
 
   
Figure 1.29  




“On or about 17 December, in the vicinity of Five Points, near Malmedy Belgium, 
American soldiers, after they surrendered were shot by German troops, and their bodies 
left where they had fallen in the wastes of mud and snow. Bodies of the soldiers, in such 
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conditions as shown in picture, were dug out after recapture of the ground by Allied 
forces. 12/17/44,” Signal Corps, NARA. 
 
Figure 1.31 




David E. Sherman, “The Backwash of Battle,” Life, April 16, 1945, 27.  
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Figure 1.33  
“German Atrocities Raise Questions are Nazi POW’s ‘Coddled’ Here?” Newsweek, May 
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Figure 1.34  
“Hier fängt der Wiederaufbau an,” (Here is where reconstruction begins) PWD Leaflet 
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Figure 1.35 
“Als Kriegsgefangener in USA” (A Prisoner-of-War in the USA), Heute, March 1, 1946, 




Walter Lane, “Nazi PWs Learn Democracy,” Life, March 18, 1946, 91-92.  
 
  240 
 
Figure 1.37  




“The Last PW” Heute, July 15, 1947, 5.  
 
 
  241 
 
Figure 1.39 
“Photographic Record: Former Special Prisoners Engaged in their Present Jobs as 
Civilians,” (likely 1946 or 1947), NARA. 
 
         
Figure 1.40  
Upper image: “Former Special Prisoners are working under the 9th Inf. Div., 3rd Army at 
the discharge center Here they are filling out necessary date on Discharge Certificates for 
other German POW to be discharged.” “Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
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Figure 1.41  
Lower image:  “PWE #26 Bad Aibling Bavaria. A German POW doctor is show giving a 
final physical check to a group of special prisoners befor (sic) their discharge.” 
“Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
 
 
Figure 1.42  
“PWE  # 25 Bad Aibling, Bavaria. Each POW on being discharged is given Food Ration 
Tickets for three days. Picture shows a former Special Prisoners handing out Ration 
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Tickets to a new group of Special Prisoners about to be released.” “Photographic 
Record,” n.p., NARA. 
 
   
Figure 1.43 
Lower image: “PWE #26 Bad Aibling Bavaria. Exit- Ausgang. Thro (sic) this gate 
walked approx. 24,000 Special Prisoners as free men. A special train took them to all the 
main Railway-points in the U.S. Zone were (sic) they could take off in search of their 
next of kin and start their life anew.” “Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
 
           
Figure 1.44  
Lower image: “Munich, Germany, Brehem, Horst (L); Mittermeyer, Richard (R) 
At their newly assigned job as Surgical Technicians at the 98th General Hospital in 
Munich.” “Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
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Figure 1.45  
Lower image: “Munich, Germany. Fisher, Hans is one of the cooks at the 98th General 
Hospital, Munich.” “Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
 
   
Figure 1.46  
Upper image: “Salzburg, Austria. Riegersberger, Rupert is one of thousands of former 
Eutis Graduates now engaged in unskilled Laborers in the reconstruction of towns and 
cities throughout the U.S. zone of Occupation.” “Photographic Record,” n.p., NARA. 
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Figure 1.47  
Upper image: “Munich, Germany. Alt, Helmut works on the Editorial Staff of the 
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Chapter 2 




Diese Schandtaten: Eure Schuld! (These Shameful Acts: Your Guilt!) 





















“Nürnberg: Nach dem Urteil” (Nuremberg: After the Verdict,” Heute, October 15, 1946, 
cover.  
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Figure 2.3 
German civilians tour Buchenwald; US artillery, tanks in action, April 1945 [Still from 





Survivors of the Ohrdruf concentration camp demonstrate torture methods used in the 
camp to top ranking American generals, April 12, 1945. [General Dwight Eisenhower, 
(center), General Omar Bradley (second from the left), and General George S. Patton 
(left).] USHMM, courtesy of NARA. Accessed: 
https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa7825 
 




Figure 2.5  
“Civilians of Beckum, Germany look at display of atrocity pictures, committed by their 
forces. This is one of the many ways the German population is being educated on their 





 “K.Z. Dachau- Velden – Buchenwald. Ich schäme mich daß ich ein Deutscher bin.“ 
(Concentration Camps Dachau, Velden, Buchenwald. I am ashamed to be German.) 
Signal Corps, NS-Dokumentationzentrum, Munich. 
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Figure 2.7  






“Wer ist am Kriege Schuld? Roosevelt, Churchill, und Stalin tragen vor der Geschichte 
die Verantwortung für diesen Krieg. Hinter ihnen aber steht der Jude.” (Who Bears the 
Guilt for the War? Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin Bear the Responsibility for the War in 
the Eyes of History: Behind them, However, Stands the Jew), Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish 
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Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, Mass.: 




"German Boys View Horror Camp Pictures. German boys in Possneck, Germany, read a 
poster June 18, 1945, describing atrocities committed by the Germans in concentration 
camps. Allied authorities in Germany are posting descriptions of these ‘horror’ camps in 
town and villages, and requiring German civilians to read them." USHMM, courtesy of 
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Figure 2.10 


















„Bild 22: Europäische Schriftsteller am Massengrab“ (Picture 22: European writers at the 
mass grave), Auwärtiges AMT, Amtliches Material Zum Massemord Von Katyn (Berlin: 
1943) 
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Figure 2.14 




“Zwanzig Angeklagte vor dem Gericht der Welt” (Twenty defendants before the court of 
the world), Heute, issue 4 (no date, c. December 1945), 19. 
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Figure 2.16 
The remodeled courtroom at Nuremberg, site of the International Military Tribunal. 






“Zwanzig Angeklagte vor dem Gericht der Welt” (Twenty defendants before the court of 
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Figure 2.18 





“The Jackson Statement,” Army Talks, February 10, 1946, 6-7, NARA. 
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Figure 2.20 
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Figure 2.22 




“Vor dem Urteil” (Before the Judgment), Heute, September 1, 1946, 6-7.  
 
 
  258 
 
Figure  2.24       Figure 2.25 
Heute, October 1, 1946, cover.   “Deutscher Wendepunkt,” (German 




“US Proposals for a Peaceful Germany,” Heute, October 13, 1945, cover. NARA 
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Figure 2.27 



















  261 
 
Figure 2.30 





“Nürnberg Trial Ends with Death Sentences, ”Life, October 14, 1946, 38-39.   
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Figure 2.32 
“Nürnberg Trial Ends with Death Sentences, ”Life, October 14, 1946 Life October 14, 




“Goering Ends Life in Cell: 10 Nazis Hang,” Daily News, Oct 16, 1946.  
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Figure 2.34 
Signal Corps, “Watch on Nazi Criminals,” Life, January 7, 1946, 34.   
 
    
Figure 2.35 
“Nazis are Hanged,” Life, October 28, 1946, 42-43. 
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Figure 2.36  
U.S. Signal Corps Photos, “Executed Nazi Leaders,” Life, November 4, 1946, 38-39.  




“Convicted of murder of six American airmen seven Germans were sentenced to death by 
military tribunal in Darmstadt, Germany. Here Käthe Reinhardt, horror stricken, listens 
as she is condemned to death. 7/31/45. U.S. Seventh Army,” Signal Corps, NARA. 
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Figure 2.38 
“Pfc George Fleps is sentenced to hanging by the U.S. Military Tribunal at Dachau, 






Hans Wolf, Executed November 19, 1948, Signal Corps, NARA.  
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Figure 2.40 





“Werner Braune before execution at the War Crimes Prison. 
Landsberg Prison, Germany, June 7, 1951,” (Faces whited out to protect the identity of 










“Werner Braune after execution at the War Crimes Prison. 
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Chapter 3 





















Heute, September 15, 1947, cover. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  
“Don’t Fraternize!” Poster, U.S. Army, April 1945, Imperial War Museum. 
 




“Was der Mann an Opfern bringt im Ringen seines Volkes, bringt die Frau an Opfern im 
Ringen um die Erhaltung dieses Volkes in den einzelnen Zellen. Was der Mann einsetzt 
an Heldenmut auf dem Schlachtfeld, setzt die Frau ein in ewig geduldiger Hingabe, in 
ewig geduldigem Leid und Ertragen. Jedes Kind, das sie zur Welt bringt, ist eine 
Schlacht, die sie besteht für das Sein oder Nichtsein ihres Volkes.—Adolf Hitler“ 
(The sacrifices, which the man makes in the struggle of his nation, the woman makes in 
the preservation of this nation in the individual cells. What the man gives in courage on 
the battlefield, the woman gives in eternal self-sacrifice, in eternal pain and suffering. 
Every child that a woman brings into the world is a battle, a battle waged for the 
existence or non-existence of her people,) 1933, poster 003-002-013, Das Bundesarchiv. 
 
 
  270 
 
Fig. 3.4 
“Hilf auch Du mit”! (Help us too!), 1941, Designer Theo Matejko,  Publisher Dr. Güntz, 
Dresden, poster 003-028-083, Das Bundesarchiv. 
  
Figure 3.5 
“It’s a Tradition with Us, Mister!” Westinghouse War Production Coordinating 
Committee, n.d., William Bird and Harry R. Rubenstein, Design for Victory: World II 
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Figure 3.6 
“Grow your own, Can your own.” United States Office of War Information, n.d. Bird and 




Glen Grohe, “He’s Watching You,” c. 1942, NARA. Accessed: 
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/ 
hes_watching_you/images_html/hes_watching_you.html, Accessed March 12, 2019.  
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Figure 3.8 
VD, Army Talks, December 9, 1944, cover, NARA. 
 
 
Figure 3.9  
Pfc. G. Buckley, U.S. Army, “There’s our second front. Venereal Clinic,” Poster 112-P-
59, NARA.  
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Figure 3.10  
VD, Army Talks, December 9, 1944, NARA. 
 
 
Figure 3.11  
Poster of Unknown Origins, “Axis Agents! A Toast to Hitler and Hirohito!” (c. 1942-44), 
poster 112-P-95, NARA. 
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Figure 3.14 




U.S. Signal Corps Photo, “Fraternization,” Life, July 2, 1945, 26. 
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Figure 3.16 




“Ach, Ingelore, I had such a vonderful English lesson tonight.” “Baby,” Occupation 
Chronicle, October 2, 1946, 3, NARA. 
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Figure 3.18 
Don Sheppard, “Oh, Ja, Papa was in the party—but chust as a social obligation.” 




“2nd Lt. Earl F. Blanford from 504 Madison Ave., Elmira, New York, and an MP of the 
529th Military Police Service Company, turn a VD (venereal disease) suspect over to the 
Giessen Civilian Police in Giessen, Germany…,” November 21, 1947, Signal Corps, 
NARA.  
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Figure 3.20 
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Figure 3.22  




“10,22 Meter Soff—Ein neues CARE-Paket und was mann daraus machen kann” 
(10.25 meters fabric-A new CARE package and what you can do with it), Heute, August 
15, 1947, 24-25. 
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Figure 3.24 
Heute, January 1, 1947, 11. 
 
 
Figure 3.25  
“Die Wehrertüchtigung der Deutschen Jugend” (The Military Training of Hitler Youth), 
1941, poster 003-011-044, Das Bundesarchiv. 
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Fig. 3.26 
“Bewegung der Kriegsfreiwilligen” (Movement of the war volunteers), 1944, poster 003-




“Hitlerjugend, Deutsches Jungvolk (Pimpfe). Tauziehen mit Gasmaske” (Hitler Youth, 
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Figure 3.28 
“Vormilitärische Ausbildung im Bann-Lager der Hitler-Jugend” (Hitler Youth Pre-




“Captured Boy Soldiers—Three 14-Year-Old Boys, Shown in German Army Uniforms. 
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Figure 3.30 
“Captured Hitler Youth. This is a part of group of 60 members of the Hitler Youth 
organization capture by the 15th Armored Division, Third U.S. Army, in the vicinity of 
Martinzoll (sic), Germany. Ranging in age from 13 to 17 years, they were manning 




Ralph Morse, “Educating Hitler Youth,” Life, October 8, 1945, 76-77.  
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Figure 3.32 
New York Times, Paris Bureau, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, NARA. 
 
                 
Figure 3.33                       
“That German Children are still fascinated by the weapons formerly manned by their 
fathers  of the Wehrmacht indicates the huge take facing MG [Military Government] 
before instilling Nazi Youth with respect for Democratic ways, Twelve Years of Fascist 
Propaganda must be blotted out,” Army Talks, November 18, 1945, back cover, NARA.  
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Figure 3.34  
“German boy’s play with Nazi anti-aircraft gun left among the highway with other 
equipment when American troops entered the area just outside Coblenz [sic]. For first 
Publication Evening Papers June 7 [likely 1945]. Office of War Information. New York 
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Figure 3.35 
“FDJ Gesunde Jugend schafft ein neues Deutschland!” (Healthy youth creates a new 
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Figure. 3.36 
“Im Bund Deutscher Mädel: Reichssporttag des BDM” (In the League of German Girls: 
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Figure 3.37  
“Jugend, die Heimat ruft Dich!” (Youth, your homeland calls you!), FDJ Poster, 1946, 
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Figure 3.39 
“Das große Fest der Deutschen Schule fand unter Teilnahme von über 30.000 Kindern im 
Berliner Stadion statt!” (The big festival of the German School took place with the 
participation of more than 30,000 children in the Berlin Stadium!), September 1933, 





“The New Pied Piper,” The Occupation Chroncile, July 31, 1946, 2, NARA. 
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Figure 3.41 




“Accent on German Youth,” I&E Bulletin, September 29, 1946, 6-7, NARA. 
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Figure 3.43 
“Members of the Bremen Port of Embarkation WAC Detachment, play catch on the side 
with German children too young to play baseball in Bremerhaven, Germany. This youth 
center sponsored by the WACs and three other organizations is host to 2,000 German 




“Lesson in Democracy,” Occupation Chronicle, March 4, 1947, 3, NARA. 
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Figure 3.45 
“Softball ohne Wörterbuch” (Softball without Dictionary); “Jugendleben unbeschwert“ 




“Amerikaner Basteln Für Deutsche Kinder” (American crafts for German children), 
Heute, December 1, 1946, cover.   
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Figure 3.47 
„CARE PAKETE—diesmal für Babys“ (CARE package, this time for Babies), Heute, 




“Ein Versorgungsflugzeug, im Berliner Volksmund „Roisenbomber“ genannt, landet auf 
dem Flugplatz Tegel” (A supply aircraft, known in the vernacular as the "Roisenbomber", 









Fig 4.1  
“Country Doctor,” Life, September 20, 1948, 115. 
 
 
Fig 4.2  
“Country Doctor,” Life, 116-117. 
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Fig 4.3  
“Country Doctor,” Life, 118-119. 
 
  
Fig 4.4  
“Country Doctor,” Life, 120-121. 
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Fig 4.5 
“Country Doctor,” Life, 122-123. 
 
 
Fig 4.6  
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Figure 4.7 
“Ein Landarzt” (A Country Doctor), Heute, February 1, 1949, 27.  
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Fig. 4.8 




Country Doctor, Heute, 30-31.  
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Fig. 4.10 




Country Doctor, Amerika, 4-5. 
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Fig. 4.12 




Country Doctor, Amerika, 8-9. 
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